• 제목/요약/키워드: National Defense Mobilization Plan

검색결과 6건 처리시간 0.018초

중국의 국방동원법 (China's National Defense Mobilization Law)

  • 이대성;김상겸
    • 융합보안논문지
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    • 제23권5호
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    • pp.223-230
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    • 2023
  • 국제사회에서 중화인민공화국은 정치, 경제, 군사, 외교 등의 분야에서 그 영향력이 확대되는 추세이다. 덩샤오핑(Deng Xiaoping) 지배체제기인 1978년 12월 개최된 중국공산당 제11기 중앙위원회 전체회의에서 제안 및 시행된 '개혁·개방'정책은 중국의 경제력과 군사력이 급격히 성장하는 계기가 되었다. 장쩌민(Jiang Zemin) 집권기인 1994년 국방동원위원회가 설립되면서 국방동원업무도 함께 추진되었다. 또한 1998년 12월 이후 개최된 제9기·10기·11기 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회는 국방동원입법 계획을 수립하였고, 2008년 8월 국방동원법 초(안) 작업도 진행하였다. 2005년 11월 후진타오(Hu Jintao) 지도체제에서 국방동원법 초(안)이 국무원 상임위원회를 통과하였고, 2010년 2월 전국인민대표대회 상무위원회에서 여러 차례의 심의와 수정을 거쳐 통과되었으며, 2010년 7월 1일부터 국방동원법은 공포·시행되고 있다. 중화인민공화국은 중국공산당에 의한 1당 독재체제와 중국공산당의 군대인 인민해방군에 의해 지배되고 있다. 이러한 측면에서 전체주의 국가인 중국의 국방동원법 내용을 검토함과 동시에 쟁점을 분석 및 평가하였다.

A Study On Wartime Sealift Operation Using Simulation

  • Lee, Sangjin;Yunchul Cho
    • 한국시뮬레이션학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 한국시뮬레이션학회 2001년도 The Seoul International Simulation Conference
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    • pp.468-476
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    • 2001
  • The ROK TRANSCOM is trying to establish a concrete wartime sealift operation plan. But there are many problems to be solved for setting up the plan. The most serious problem is to procure war materiel to be shipped in U.S.A and next one is to determine the number of sealift assets and to allocate them. The process of sealift operation can be described as follows. Before the order of vessel mobilization, all vessels appointed for activation would be scattered in worldwide in the state of Beaded or unloaded. After the order of vessel mobilization, vessels would go to SPGE(seaport of embarkation) to load war materiel. Some loaded ships should offload the commercial cargo to the near port as soon as they are activated, before they would go to SPOE. All vessels would load procured materiel in SPOE and then go to SPOD(seaport of debarkation). They would offload war materiel in SPOD and then go back to SPOE to load war materiel again. We will simulate this process using ARENA(1), evaluate the sealift capability of ROK and find omit problems of the sealift plan. This model ultimately evaluates the sealift capability and provides planners with critical information far establishing and correcting the plan. This study can also provide military planners with a flexible and accessible decision support tool to provide advance planning under a variety of conditions on the sealift capability. The military planner is expected to make use of this model as a standard for establishing effective and concrete sealift operation in the near future. We can conclude how procurement capability significantly affects the result of sealift operation through this model. We could decide the appropriate levee of sealift asset such as the number of vessels and the number of available berth. So we could allocate effectively the resources for completing the sealift operation within the TGT(Target) time.

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미래형 예비군 훈련체제 정립에 관한 연구 (Thinking about the training system of R.O.K. reserved force in the future)

  • 정원영
    • 안보군사학연구
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    • 통권5호
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    • pp.47-85
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    • 2007
  • Reserved force's training(RFT) is undoubtedly the critical component to increase the national capability in case of emergency. It is because RFT plays an important role in maintaining the peace for the Korean peninsula as the key deterrence force power for more than 40 years. Considering the reserved force reform linked with the goal and the plan of Korean Defense Reform 2020', we can expect the utility of the reserved force as the potential combat power to make national defense resources more efficient and useful. In that sense, this study suggests some solutions to promote the reserved force's competency to demonstrate the ROK Armed Force's combat power as the equivalent partner with the active force as well as the future deterrence power. This study also analyzes the present training system including law and regulation, identifies some implications through the literature review, and designs the future ROK reserved force's training system by extracting new variables forecasting the future environment for national defense. In addition, this study includes its concerned systems generally without limiting the scope into the reserved force. Therefore we try to seek to prepare for mobilization readiness and to promote regional hometown defense capability in order to cope with the enemy's threat in case of emergency.

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동적계획법에 기반한 지역예비군 총기, 탄약 분배 우선순위 선정에 관한 연구 (Priority Selection of Firearms and Ammunition for the Local Reserve Forces using Dynamic Programming)

  • 조상준;마정목
    • 한국산학기술학회논문지
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    • 제21권8호
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    • pp.67-74
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    • 2020
  • 예비군을 관리하는 현역부대의 임무 중 하나는 동원령 선포 시 예비군이 전투력을 발휘할 수 있도록 신속하게 전투물자를 지급하는 것이다. 후방지역의 현역부대는 대규모의 지역예비군을 지원하지만 운용 할 수 있는 병력이 부족하고, 많은 수량의 총기와 탄약을 부대 내부에서 통합 보관하고 있기 때문에 어려움을 가지고 있다. 이러한 이유로 지역예비군은 총기와 탄약을 통합 보관된 장소인 현역부대의 무기고와 탄약고로 이동해서 분배 받는다. 현재 군에서 사용하는 분배계획(기존 계획)은 선입선출 방식으로 분배순서가 일정하지 않다. 분배순서의 변화는 분배 완료 시간을 증가시킬 수 있고, 증가된 시간은 지역예비군의 전투력 발휘를 지연시키므로 분배 시간을 최소화 하는 것이 중요하다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 지역예비군의 총기, 탄약 분배모형을 동적계획법에 기반하여 제시하였다. 제시한 모형의 검증을 위해 후방지역 대대급 현역부대에서 수집한 실제 데이터로 현재 군에서 사용하는 분배계획과 비교하였다. 그 결과 본 연구에서 제시한 모형이 기존 계획보다 분배 완료 시간을 줄이는 우수한 성능을 보였다는 것을 알 수 있었다.

한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로- (The lesson From Korean War)

  • 윤일영
    • 안보군사학연구
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    • 통권8호
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망 (Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an)

  • 김성만
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.