• International Journal of Internet, Broadcasting and Communication
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• 제13권1호
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• pp.238-242
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• 2021

Game theory has been regarded as a useful theoretical tool for modeling the interactions between distinct entities and thus it has been harnessed in various research field. In particular, research attention has been shown to how to apply game theory to modeling the interactions between malign and benign entities in the field of wireless networks. Although various game theoretic modeling work have been proposed in the field of wireless networks, our proposed work is disparate to the existing work in the sense that we focus on mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. More specifically, we propose a Bayesian game theoretic modeling for mobile malign node detection problem in static wireless sensor networks. In our modeling, we formulate a two-player static Bayesian game with imperfect information such that player 1 is aware of the type of player 2, but player 2 is not aware of the type of player 1. We use four strategies in our static Bayesian game. We obtain Bayesian Nash Equilibria with pure strategies under certain conditions.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제31권4호
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• pp.277-288
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• 2005

The proliferation of the internet technologies and applications has intensified business activities on the Internet. This study considered the price competition between two shopping channels, one on-line seller and the other traditional off-line retailer. Based on the Hotelling's linear market model, we derive the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria as a function of the cost parameters which represent the characteristics of the online and off-line channels. By analyzing the equilibrium solutions, the following significant findings were obtained. First, pricing by Stackelberg equilibrium always outperformed that of Nash equilibrium. However the value of the cost parameters played a crucial role in determining both channels' preferred position (price leader or follower). Second, the online seller could benefit more in terms of profit by lowering its efficiency when its efficiency belongs to a certain interval. Third, when the online seller's efficiency is low, lowering its delivery cost has no contribution to its profit. To benefit more from lowering its delivery cost, increasing its channel efficiency to a certain level should be preceded.

• 대한수학회논문집
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• 제29권2호
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• pp.367-377
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• 2014

In this paper, we first introduce a generalized concept of Berge strong equilibrium for a generalized game $\mathcal{G}=(X_i;T_i,f_i)_{i{\in}I}$ of normal form, and using a fixed point theorem for compact acyclic maps in admissible convex sets, we establish the existence theorem of generalized Berge strong equilibrium for the game $\mathcal{G}$ with acyclic values. Also, we have demonstrated by examples that our new approach is useful to produce generalized Berge strong equilibria.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권10호
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• pp.3867-3886
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• 2015

This article investigates the problem of opportunistic spectrum access in dynamic environment, in which the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is time-varying. Different from existing work on continuous feedback, we consider more practical scenarios in which the transmitter receives an Acknowledgment (ACK) if the received SNR is larger than the required threshold, and otherwise a Non-Acknowledgment (NACK). That is, the feedback is discrete. Several applications with different threshold values are also considered in this work. The channel selection problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and subsequently it is proved to be a potential game, which has at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Following this, a multi-agent Q-learning algorithm is proposed to converge to Nash equilibria of the game. Furthermore, opportunistic spectrum access with multiple discrete feedbacks is also investigated. Finally, the simulation results verify that the proposed multi-agent Q-learning algorithm is applicable to both situations with binary feedback and multiple discrete feedbacks.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제59권12호
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• pp.2150-2156
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• 2010

In this paper, we investigate how an electricity capacity market design may encourage generators to exaggerate their available capacity. In order for an analytical approach, a two player game model is introduced. We focus on two pure strategy Nash equilibria: an equilibrium at which generators offer their true capacities, and an equilibrium at which generators offer exaggerated capacities. The latter case is caused by asymmetries of information between players and so called 'moral hazard' in terms of the economics literature. This paper shows that, considering practical electricity markets, the moral hazard case is highly probable. Moreover, it is shown that, with the considered capacity market design in the real world, the better the electricity energy market performs, the higher the risk of moral hazard becomes.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.1817-1836
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• 2020

Network convergence is considered as one of the key solutions to the problem of achieving future high-capacity and reliable communications. This approach overcomes the limitations of separate wireless technologies. Efficient interface selection is one of the most important issues in convergence networks. This paper solves the problem faced by users of selecting the most appropriate interface in the heterogeneous radio-access network (RAN) environment. Our proposed scheme combines a hierarchical evaluation of networks and game theory to solve the network-selection problem. Instead, of considering a fixed weight system while ranking the networks, the proposed scheme considers the service requirements, as well as static and dynamic network attributes. The best network is selected for a particular service request. To establish a hierarchy among the network-evaluation criteria for service requests, an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used. To determine the optimum network selection, the network hierarchy is combined with game theory. AHP attains the network hierarchy. The weights of different access networks for a service are calculated. It is performed by combining AHP scores considering user's experienced static network attributes and dynamic radio parameters. This paper provides a strategic game. In this game, the network scores of service requests for various RANs and the user's willingness to pay for these services are used to model a network-versus-user game. The Nash equilibria signify those access networks that are chosen by individual user and result maximum payoff. The examples for the interface selection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제42권2호
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• pp.1-8
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• 2019

Network externalities are essentially dynamic in that the value consumers feel about a product is affected by the size of the existing customer base that uses that product. However, existing studies on network externalities analyzed the effects of network externalities in a static way, not dynamic. In this study, unlike previous studies, the impact of network externalities on price competition in a vertically differentiated market is dynamically analyzed. To this end, a two-period duopoly game model was used to reflect the dynamic aspects of network externalities. Based on the game model, the Nash equilibria for price, sales volume, and revenue were derived and numerically analyzed. The results can be summarized as follows. First, if high-end product has strong market power, the high-end product vendor takes almost all benefits of the network externality. Second, when high-end product has strong market power, the low-end product will take over most of the initial sales volume increase. Third, when market power of high-end product is not strong, it can be seen that the effects of network externalities on the high and low-end products are generally proportional to the difference in quality. Lastly, if there exists a strong network externality, it is shown that the presence of low-end product can be more profitable for high-end product vendor. In other words, high-end product vendor has incentive to disclose some technologies for the market entrance of low-end product, even if it has exclusive rights to the technologies. In that case, however, it is shown that the difference in quality should be maintained significantly.

• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제14권1호
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• pp.231-246
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• 2023

Purpose - This study attempts to provide a new theoretical perspective on the quality signaling and its impact on a market under information asymmetry, focusing on how the accuracy and the cost of quality signaling affect sellers' and buyers' profit, suggesting appropriate designs of quality signaling methods which mitigates information asymmetry. Design/methodology/approach - In order to examine the effect of quality signaling on strategic interactions within the market, we establish an analytic model where market outcomes are determined by seller's quality claim and price, and buyers are risk-neutral. By investigating this analytic model through relevant game trees, we find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the market and predict related market outcomes based on sellers' quality signaling strategy. Findings - Our analytic model shows counterintuitive results that seller profit will be the lowest with inaccurate quality signaling and the highest with no quality signaling, mostly due to the certification cost. Consequently, sellers should proceed with caution if the quality signaling is less than accurate, as it may backfire. We believe that this is due to the fact that the inaccuracy of quality signaling causes some confusion and uncertainty in both sellers and buyers' decision to maximize profit, making it hard for sellers to predict buyers' behavior. Research implications or Originality - Although the sources and types of quality signaling errors have been investigated in the literature, there has not been satisfactory understanding regarding how inaccuracy of quality certification affects specific market outcomes. We expect that our theoretical model would provide important implications on how to utilize quality signaling to solve adverse selection issues in markets under information asymmetry.

• 한국습지학회지
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• 제26권1호
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• pp.10-20
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• 2024

습지의 보전 및 복원은 지속 가능한 인간 사회와 환경을 위한 필수적 과제로, 생물다양성 유지, 자연재해 저감, 기후 변화 완화 등 중요한 혜택을 제공한다. 본 연구는 습지 복원 및 조성을 위한 다양한 이해관계자들 간의 전략적 상호작용과 이익을 게임 이론을 통해 분석하고, 정책 결정에 중요한 근거를 제공하고자 한다. 이 연구에서는 대도시, 중소도시, 소도시의 세 가지 도시 유형에 대해 가상의 상황을 설정하고, 정부, 개발회사, 환경단체, 지역 주민 등의 이해관계자를 정의하였다. 각 이해관계자별 전략적 선택 사항을 도출하고, 습지생태 전문가들의 논의를 통해 보수행렬을 설정하였다. 이후 비협력적 게임 이론을 적용하여 내쉬 균형과 파레토 효율성을 분석하였다. 대도시에서는 '습지 보존'과 '친환경 개발', 중소도시에서는 다양한 전략들, 그리고 소도시에서는 '친환경 개발'이 이해당사자 모두에게 이득이 되는 해결책으로 나타났다. 파레토 효율성 분석 결과, 각 도시 유형별로 습지 관리와 관련하여 이해당사자들 간의 최적의 해결책이 어떻게 달라질 수 있는지를 보여주었다. 도시 유형별로 습지 보존, 친환경 개발, 습지 복원 사업이 각각 중요하게 부각되었다. 이에 따라 정책 입안자들은 환경 보호와 도시 개발의 조화를 이루는 규제와 인센티브를 마련하고, 지역 사회의 참여를 촉진하는 프로그램을 고려해야 한다. 이해당사자별 역할과 전략을 통해 습지 보존과 지역 경제 발전을 동시에 촉진하는 방안을 모색해야 한다. 전략별 장단점을 이해하고, 이를 바탕으로 보다 효과적인 정책 결정을 내리는 것이 중요하다.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.67-86
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• 2013

This study first provides a stylized model that captures the essential features of the SC (Social Commerce) business and the competition process. The model focuses on the relationship between key decision issues such as marketing inputs and market value. As more SCs join the industry, they are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing and advertising expenditure. This type of competition may lead the industry away from its optimal development path, and at worst, toward a disruption of the entire industry ecosystem. Such being the case, another goal of this study is to examine the possibility that the ToC (Tragedy of the Commons) may occur in the SC industry. We build game models, each of which assumes homogeneity and heterogeneity of SC providers, respectively, and derive explicit equilibrium solutions from both models. Our basic analysis presents Nash equilibria in both models and shows that SC providers are inevitably faced with fierce competition, which may lead to sharp increase in the total marketing expenses. We also compare the game outcomes with one with a hypothetical social planner who determines the total marketing level that optimizes the entire market value. Then, ToC can be defined to describe the situation where the total marketing efforts exceed the socially optimal level of marketing efforts. In both models, we examine the possibility of the ecosystem disruption and specify the conditions under which ToC may occur. However, the chance of avoiding ToC is higher with heterogeneous players than with homogeneous players. To supplement our analytical results, we develop a simulation model which incorporates a market dynamics based on the gap between actual marketing efforts and socially optimal marketing level. Simulation experiments present some lessons and insights which also confirm out findings from equilibrium analysis. For example, heterogeneity in SC providers alleviates the severity of ToC and makes it faster for survivors to escape from the ToC trap. As a result, the degree of industrial concentration tends to increase, which also explains the 'rich-get-richer' phenomenon observed in some empirical studies on the SC industry. Lastly, based on our analytical and experimental results, we come up with some measures to avoid ToC and overcome the shortcomings intrinsic to the current business model. And further discussions provide strategic implications and policy directions to overcome the possible trap of ToC in this ecosystem, and eventually help the industry to sustainably develop itself toward the next level. To name a few examples of policy measures, regulations on the marketing activities so that the overall marketing expenses cannot go beyond the socially optimal level; institutional guidelines and rules to straightening up the distortions in the way that SC providers view the marketing costs (the current marketing costs are underestimated, thereby encouraging SC providers to increase marketing expenditure); and so on.