• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.49-77
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• 2018

This essay examines the ego (I-Subject) problem in Husserl's phenomenology and consists of four parts, as follows. Section I describes the meaning of this research on ego and some important points to note in relation to this study. Section II discusses two aspects of the problem of pure ego, which appears as an ego-problem for the first time. The first aspect is the two opposing positions that Husserl himself took regarding pure ego. Husserl initially rejected pure ego as an object of research in Logische Untersuchungen I (1901) however, he withdrew this position in Logische Untersuchungen II (1913). The second aspect is the content of pure ego that Husserl explored in Ideen I (1913) after he accepted pure ego as a phenomenological problem. The theme of section III is the "theory of three egos" which appeared in Ideen II (1912, 1952). Here, two issues have been noted, one of which is the methodological basis for enabling this theory: the phenomenological "attitude change" (Einstellungsaenderung) and the "Underlying" (Fundierung). The other is the explanation of the content of the three egos: the "physical ego", "personal ego" and the "pure ego". Section IV concerns two themes of the "monadic ego" that appeared in the Cartesianische Meditationen (1931). The first theme is the theoretical premise for the establishment of the monadic ego. In conjunction with this theme, phenomenological-psychological reduction was used as a new method to open up new problem horizons. The second theme brings up the content of the monadic ego, the essence of which can be summarized as follows. 1) This ego is based on a pluralistic and independent ego-concept in which each ego is equal to its own self. 2) It must be asked whether each of the monadic egos is different from one another. 3) The "other" of a certain transcendental ego is not the ego-other relationship but ego-another ego (alter-ego). 4) This phenomenological monadic ego can mutually communicate with alter-egos through empathy, unlike Leibniz's metaphysical monads.