• Strategy21
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• s.36
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• pp.59-93
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• 2015

A Paradigm shift is in process in China's foreign policies during Xi Jinping's era. Such changes occur with changing national identities from developing country to great power, and from continental power to continental-maritime power. China's pursuit for sea power embraces its global strategy. Accommodating the new identity of maritime power, China is developing its maritime strategy. New silk-road strategy actively utilizes China's advantage in economy, while avoiding direct military challenges against the U.S. China seeks an associated balance of power with the U.S. On the other hand, China make its determination clear to protect its core national interests, particularly Taiwan straits issue, deploying Anti-Access and Area-Denial strategy. 'Pax-Americana 3.0' and 'China's rise 2.0' have convoluted and evolved in complexity. South Korea faces much tougher challenges ahead in its foreign and security environments.

• Strategy21
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• s.42
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• pp.258-292
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• 2017

This paper is designed to make a national strategic concept for the ROK's maritime security and to explore cooperation directions for the ROK Navy and Coast Guard in order to implement the newly-made maritime security strategic concept. As strategy is composed of three main categories(goals, ways, means), the goal of the ROK's maritime security strategy is 'Safe and Affluent Sea' and the way to realize the goal is the principle of cooperative leverage, and the means as tasks to implement the strategic concept are maritime safety, maritime security, and maritime stewardship. The concept of national fleet as used in the US is applied to promoting the cooperation between the ROK Navy and Coast Guard. Thus, under the newly-established maritime security strategic concept along with the national fleet model, followings are suggested as policy proposals for facilitating mutual cooperation between the ROK Navy and Coast Guard in dealing with not only traditional threats but also non-traditional treats at sea and from the sea as well. First, the ROK Navy and Coast Guard has been making efforts to enhance interoperability between the two sea services. However, the mutual cooperations have been focused mainly on areas on operational level rather than policy level. Therefore, the two sea services are recommended to enlarge exchanges and cooperation in policy areas. Second, there are still demands for further cooperation areas between the two sea services in command and communications. The interoperability in C2 between the two needs to be upgraded even to the areas of anti-terrorist activities ar sea, ASUW, ASW, maritime interdiction, etc. Third, mutual comparability between the two needs to be reflected in the maritime forces development to ensure the comparability in UNREP and other logistics areas. Fourth, the standardization of logistical materials and equipments is needed as a way of sustaining operational capability and logistical capacity for the ROK Navy and Coast Guard as well. Fifth, the ROK Navy and Coast Guard are recommended to participate more actively in international maritime cooperation activities such as PASSEX. Sixth, Complementary laws and regulations need further to be revised and to be newly made for collectively managing swiftly maritime accidents and natural disasters at sea.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.160-191
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• 2013

This article is focused how the maritime strategy between continental powered country(the Soviet, the China) and maritime powered country(the U.S.) interact with attack and defense theory. We will know, what is the maritime strategy that the U.S. of military superiority has pursued with the point of view of attack, on the other hand, relatively what is the maritime strategy that the Soviet-Sino of military inferiority has pursued with the point of view of defense. In cold war, the Soviet has counteracted to 'blue belt defense' in active defense as to the U.S. 'sea strike' and in post cold war, the China counteract to 'A2/AD' as to the U.S. 'Air-Sea Battle'. The difference between the Soviet-Sino maritime strategy is that the China has emerged the second an economic power and their leadership has a strong's will to strengthen their navy's power. although the U.S. declare the pivot to Asia, the influence on Asia of the U.S. tend to decrease because of sequest. therefore, the China will seek to the more active defense beyond the first island chain. Meanwhile, the U.S. has reinforced of 'hub and spoke strategy' to solidify the U.S. formal allies to band together regional powers and to overcome the A2/AD challenge, the U.S. has been developed that the Air-Sea Battle concept meshes with Washington's 'rebalancing' policy toward the Asia-Pacific as its vital missions to safeguard core island or semi-island allies-namely, Korea and Japan-and crucial sea lanes of communication in the region are conducted mostly from or over the sea.

• Maritime Security
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.57-81
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• 2023

This study aims to review Russia's annexation of Crimea from a maritime security perspective. Based on a comprehensive analysis of Russia's national security perception, this study analyzed Russia's maritime security strategy and the security importance of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and reviewed the annexation of Crimea from a maritime security perspective. The main argument of this study is as follows. Russia's annexation of Crimea was necessary for the successful fulfillment of Russia's maritime security strategy in the Black and Azov Seas. Russia's annexation of Crimea guarantees the activities of the Black Sea Fleet militarily from a maritime security point of view, secures a passage to the Atlantic Ocean to counter NATO's expansion. From a economic security point of view, Russia's annexation of Crimea was based on the strategic considerations to secure influence within the Black Sea economic bloc which guarantees stable production and transportation of natural resources and shipping.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.13-46
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• 2015

Dokdo issue reaches beyond economic and security interest to Koreans, as it is regarded as symbol of her independence. Albeit the fact that Japan has merely no legitimate title over Dokdo, Japan has been tenaciously insisting their jurisdiction over Dokdo since the independence of Korea. Under such circumstances, public outrage towards Japan is most certainly understandable. Yet, mere outrage itself, lacking in logic and factual grounds, can contribute little if not any, to the desirable solution of the problem. Precedents reveal that dealing maritime issues amid lack of profound understanding in international law has often led to undesirable results, such as the inclusion of Dokdo in the Joint Management Fisheries Zone in 1999 Korea-Japan Fisheries Agreement. In a sense, adroit use of international law is a critical element in preserving Korea's sovereign rights against persistent Japanese plans to rob Dokdo once again. The Dokdo issue is inextricably bound to international law; the legal status of Dokdo as island, the equitable solution of maritime boundary delimitation and effective control, existence of dispute. Yet, the public policies and arguments made by pundits are generally in lack of understanding in international law. It is now the time for Korea to commence on long-term cross-academia / department plans to establish Dokdo strategy as part of the nationwide maritime strategy effectively using international law as its stronghold.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.116-147
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• 2019

Despite the fact that South Korea, one of peninsula countries, has been already a middle power in an international arena, it still tends to get stuck in continental-driven inertia and be reluctant to become a consolidated maritime power. In its efforts to deal with the parable of South Korea, designing a tailored-made strategy needs to be initiated in detail. Its design is centered around two variables: classification of waters and prestige. First of all, the domain of waters confronted to South Korea ranges from the greatest threat to scattered national interest. Second, South Korea is prestigiously regarded as the middle power which is equipped with the capability to see beyond its sovereign waters. The Maritime Access Strategy(MAS) can be more clearly explained by three-axis factors: ends, ways, and means. Ends need to be oriented to achieving three types of classified objectives-Deterrence, Engagement around the world to maximize remotely-scattered interest and Check of neighboring countries' seapower expansion, called DEC. Ways is mainly driven by the closer access to three different types of waters: waters of security, check, and interest. The active access and closer approach to the domain of waters need to be maintained with a high degree of willingness and capability. Means is attainable by guiding naval forces to be armed with multiple platforms and functionally-balanced assets. These platforms and assets will allow the naval forces to attain and maintain cost effective means, leading to making MAS feasible. This strategy allows the middle-power Korea to make the best of its maritime assets at various seas, contributing to international stability as well as national security and interest.

• The Journal of Information Technology
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.35-56
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• 2009

After Chinese reforms and market opening, China actively started working on ways to attach importance to the ocean and it's maritime strategy has been developed and carried out by external and internal factors. We can take two things as external factors attributed to China's marine strategy. The first one is maritime environment change in the East Asian region and the second one is the strategic importance of Taiwanese Straits and the South China Sea. And we can take about national strategy, security strategy, and change of foreign policy as internal factors. China recognizes the ocean as a major step to achieve a goal of national development. The main goal of China's marine strategy in the 21st century is to secure marine transportation and marine resources and to make peaceful maritime environment in the ocean to keep up with their economic development by opening itself to the world. China has strengthened their defense abilities to act against threat of national security by modernizing sea forces and increased national power by building up the marine power. It is expected that China will continue to seek more aggressive maritime strategy on matters of national security as well as pour heir efforts into making economic development and obtaining energy resources. This will also be one factor making new dynamics between countries in and around the East Asian region.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.34 no.7
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• pp.595-601
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• 2010

This paper aims to diagnose the strategy execution ability and to provide corresponding measures for Korean oceanic shipping companies. The analysis method is the t-test between importance awareness and Corresponding ability for strategy execution diagnosis index(XPP). According to the diagnosed results, the strategy development is unsatisfactory because the strategy implemented does not adhere to concurrent environmental change. Moreover, the execution of the strategy is also unsatisfactory. Therefore, an evaluation shows that there is a need for a SWOT analysis using BSC, an organization structure to strengthen the strategy execution ability and the support from the market condition analysis prediction center.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.131-143
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• 2016

On 12 July 2016, China's maritime claim to most of the South China Sea (SCS) based on the so-called nine-dash line was rejected by the Arbitral Tribunal, constituted under Annex VII to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning issues in the South China Sea including the legality of the so-called "nine-dashed line", the status of certain maritime features and their corresponding maritime entitlements, together with the lawfulness of certain actions by China which the Philppines, in a case brought in 2013, alleged were violations. As having the Tribunal determined that China's claim had no legal grounds in UNCLOS, thus undermining China's claims, and establishing that China has no exclusive legal rights to control the area roughly the size of India. There are some major implications from the Tribunal's ruling in the Arbitration award. These include implications on: how to delimit the maritime boundary in disputed waters, how to promote maritime confidence-building measures, how to safeguard maritime safety and security, and how to promote the rule of law in the SCS. Since its application of UNCLOS in East Asia, it has been obvious that the only way to resolve maritime disputes in the region is to build strong maritime cooperative partnerships under the auspices of the rule of law.