• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.231-249
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• 2014

This paper discusses a green supply chain with a manufacturer and a collection trader, and it proposes an optimal production planning for remanufacturing of parts in used products with quality classification errors made by the collection trader. When a manufacturer accepts an order for parts from a retailer and procures used products from a collection trader, the collection trader might have some quality classification errors due to the lack of equipment or expert knowledge regarding quality classification. After procurement of used products, the manufacturer inspects if there are any classification errors. If errors are detected, the manufacturer reclassifies the misclassified (overestimated) used products at a cost. Accordingly, the manufacturer decides to remanufacture from the higher-quality used products based on a remanufacturing ratio or produce parts from new materials. This paper develops a mathematical model to find how quality classification errors affect the optimal decisions for a lower limit of procurement quality of used products and a remanufacturing ratio under the lower limit and the expected profit of the manufacturer. Numerical analysis investigates how quality of used products, the reclassification cost and the remanufacturing cost of used products affect the optimal production planning and the expected profit of a manufacturer.

• Journal of radiological science and technology
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.1-9
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• 2022

In this study, we proposed an image quality control for an automatic exposure control (AEC) of digital radiographic imaging system and tried to analyze the performance of the AEC by various manufacturer. The subjects of the experiment were analyzed for the AEC image quality evaluation using digital radiation generators from four manufacturer such as PHILIPS, GE Healthcare, SAMSUNG Healthcare, DK Medical Solution. We used as materials for the implementation of the image quality evaluation by coins (500 won, KOMSCO, Korea). This study evaluated the performance evaluation of the AEC as image quality and exposure dose (Milliampere-seconds; mAs). The image quality evaluation was tried visual assessment by two radiologic technologists and contrast to noise (CNR) by ImageJ. The exposure dose investigated mAs on digital radiation generators. The radiographic coin images acquired 360 images based on change in the control factors of the AEC, which were kVp, the consistency of field configuration and dominant zone, sensitivity and density. As a result, there was a significant difference in the AEC performance between manufacturer. The CNR by the AEC for each manufacturer showed a difference of up to about 1.9 times. The exposed tube current by the AEC for each manufacturer showed a difference of up to about 5.8 times. It is expected that our proposed evaluation method using coins could be applied as the AEC performance evaluation method in the future.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.162-170
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• 2009

This paper deals with a closed-loop remanufacturing system with one manufacturer and one remanufacturer. The manufacturer sells new products bearing the 'Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR).' It is assumed that the manufacturer's collection rate of used products depends only on the buy-back cost, while that of the remanufacturer depends on the minimum allowed quality level of used products in addition to the buy-back cost. Through the development of mathematical models with the objective function of maximizing profit, we study an efficient operation policy of each party. The decision variables are the unit selling price of new products and remanufactured products, the unit buy-back cost of the used products of the manufacturer and remanufacturer, and the minimum allowed quality level. The validity of the model is examined through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.248-274
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• 2015

This study discusses a contract to promote collection and recycling of used products in a green supply chain (GSC). A collection incentive contract is combined with a reward-penalty contract. The collection incentive contract for used products is made between a retailer and a manufacturer. The reward-penalty contract for recycling used products is made between a manufacturer and an external institution. A retailer pays an incentive for collecting used products from customers and delivers them to a manufacturer with a product order quantity under uncertainty in product demand. A manufacturer remanufactures products using recyclable parts with acceptable quality levels and covers a part of the retailer's incentive from the recycled parts by sharing the reward from an external institution. Product demand information is assumed as (i) the distribution is known (ii) mean and variance are known. Besides, the optimal decisions for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level for recyclable parts under decentralized integrated GSCs. The analysis numerically investigates how (1) contract for recycling activity, (ii) product demand information and (iii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operation for each GSC. Supply chain coordination to shift IGSC is discussed by adopting Nash Bargaining solution.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.109-114
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• 2015

Purpose - The movie market has the characteristics of being a perfectly competitive market as well as a pure monopolistic market at the same time. This is because there are competitors in the industry but prices, although not fixed, have not changed a lot. Price competition may not have spread, but the competition is focused on artistic value, and the degree of box office success is most important. The artistic value is determined in the course of the production process. However, the degree of box office success is dependent upon the marketing manager. The marketing strategy represents the difference in the standard or quality of the movie. Inherently, the marketing manager adopts the entertainment strategy based on the quality of the foundation of the completed movie. At this time, the marketing manager knows the pertinent information (high quality/low quality) regarding the movie. This research study tries to reveal what should be the reasonable movie marketing expense, dependent on the quality of the movie. Research design, data, and methodology - Using a game scenario with different market players, the goal of the research analysis is to find out the following. First, the marketing expense is determined to maximize the profits after film production. Second, after the production costs are already committed, the manufacturer gets to choose the marketing level. At this time, there will be a profit maximization point, considering the competition. The premise of the research is as follows: if it is a good movie of quality, positive word of mouth increasing the audience continuously slows down the speed of the demand curve. If the movie quality is bad, the negative word of mouth decreasing the audience gradually hastens the speed of the demand curve. On the marketing side, when the manufacturer invests heavily in the marketing expense of the movie, consumer expectations increase to drive up the audience numbers. On the other hand, it is difficult to improve the profits excessively. When the manufacturer invests in marketing a little bit, the marketing expense is only relatively committed, therefore a lot of demand cannot be gained. Results - If a fixed market share is in a competitive situation, a low quality manufacturer expends relatively more marketing expense. If the situation assumes two manufacturers spend the same for the cost of production, the high quality manufacturer takes more profit. If the manufacturer expends less marketing budget to save costs, the optimum profit cannot be achieved since the other party (opponent) grabs the initial market share. Conclusions - In conclusion, investment is essential for market share to increase. We must refrain from a zero-sum game and have models where the game participants pursue the creative profits together. In the current film industry, there is the dominating logic of winner and loser but we have to create a film industry environment where the participants can be altogether satisfied and live together.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.1-18
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• 2012

With the enormous growth and various applications of private brands, national brand manufacturers are confronted with a dilemmatic situation. That is, paradoxically, some manufacturers have come to produce private brands of retailers which are potential competitors to their own brands. This study reveals why manufacturers with their own brands let themselves do the consignment production of retailers' private brands although those private brands may become strong competitors of their own brands and then investigates the condition in which manufacturers may benefit from such consignment production. Through an analysis of a game theoretical model assuming a monopoly market, the present study presents the theoretical backgrounds and provides new insights about consignment production of manufacturer with its own brand for retailer's private brand. First, such consignment production can play a role in mitigating the loss in the consignee manufacturer's own brand sales caused by the private brand in the competitive environment. Second, the effectiveness of such role is affected by the quality of the private brand produced under consignment. In other word, only if the consignee manufacturer keeps the quality of the private brand low, the manufacturer can maintain the benefit from its own brand. In addition, a consigner retailer needs to consider the final objective of launching its private brand, when it chooses its consignee manufacturer of the brand. Finally, a manufacturer with its own brand may consider consignment production as not merely an unavoidable option compelled by a retailer's power but a reasonable strategic choice to reduce the risk from competition.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.317-329
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• 2013

In recent years, for the purpose of solving the problem regarding environment protection and resource saving, certain measures and policies have been promoted to establish a green supply chains (GSC) with material flows from collection of used products to reuse of recycled parts in production of products. In this study, we propose an optimal operation of the GSC while considering the collection incentive of the used products and quality for recycling of used products. Two types of decision-making approaches are used for product quantity, collection incentive of used products and lower limit of quality level of reusable parts in the used products for recycling in the GSC. One is the decision-making under an independent policy in decentralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions so as to maximize profits individually. The other is the decision-making under a cooperative policy in centralized supply chains where a retailer and a manufacturer make decisions cooperatively so as to maximize the whole system's profit. Additionally, we also discuss supply chain coordination as a manufacturer-retailer partnership based on profit sharing. Furthermore, we show the effect of the quality of the reusable parts on the optimal decisions. The collection incentive of the used products was found to bring more profitability to the GSC activity.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.48 no.1
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• pp.125-147
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• 2020

Purpose: This study would measure the users'perceived overall quality level of A automobile Company, which has leading market power in the domestic automobile market and analyze the causal relationships in the quality value process Model to quality capability, customer value and loyalty based on that. Especially, this study would analyze the relative impacts of the users'perceived risks appearing in the quality value process model of the formation of Quality Factors(QF), Customer Value(CV), and Customer Loyalty(CL) and analyze the moderating effect of the causal relationships among the components. Methods: For an analysis of causal relationships connected to QF, CV, and CL of the customers who purchased Auto manufacturer A's automobile users, 179 users who used within 3 years were utilized as samples for the analysis. As for QF, based on the Garvin(1988), the QF of automobiles were redesigned. For a structural equation analysis of the entire research model, the PLS(S(Partial Least Square) model was utilized. Results: As a result of an analysis, R2 of CV and CL was 0.652 for CV and 0.664 for CL, which was a very stable Goodness of fit. As a result of an analysis of the hypotheses of QF and CV, automobile performance, conformance, aesthetics, serviceability, and durability. In addition, it turned out that the perceived risk had a moderating effect on convenience, service availability, and perceived quality. Conclusion: This study found that the perceived quality risk appearing among automobile users had negative effects on the quality value process model to QF, CV and CL. In contrast, there were factors not affecting the users'quality value process in spite of the perceived risk. These factors can suggest important managerial implications in that they can be utilized as Auto manufacturer A's market-dominant strengths.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.103-114
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• 1991

This article is concerned with cost analysis in warranty policy. The warranty cost can be different according to warranty rate and warranty renewal policy. In this paper the stepdown warranty policy is analyzed. Assuming the nonrepairable item, manufacturer's cost is calculated in stepdown warranty policy and free replacement, pro-rata, hybrid policy. Numerical examples are given over Weibull time-to-failure distribution.

• IE interfaces
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.296-305
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• 2000

In supply chains, coordination between a manufacturer and suppliers is regarded as the most important issue when partnership of organizations is considered. Since the suppliers are external to the manufacturer and poor coordination between them results in excessive delays and ultimately leads to poor customer service, manufacturers need a new methodology to select suppliers and to manage and enhance the partnership between manufacturer and suppliers. We suggest a methodology that extends knowledge obtained from the supplier selection process to the supplier management process. We reserved a word, the supplier selection and management system (SSMS) for this methodology. In this paper, we explain how the SSMS is applied to a real supply chain. The methodology identifies the managerial criteria using information derived from supplier selection process and makes use of them in the supplier management process. These managerial criteria include key criteria that are major criteria required by the manufacturer for the best quality of parts from suppliers according to the character of each part, and weak criteria that show the shortcomings of selected suppliers as compared with alternative suppliers with regard to each criterion. The effectiveness of supplier management with managerial criteria was verified by a t-test and a correlation analysis with data collected and hypothesized from a Korean air-conditioner manufacturer.