Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.
In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.
Chinese stock market often rises and falls sharply. The impact of the stock price crash risk has become a hot research field to maintain financial stability. This study starts from the perspective of the proportion of largest shareholders holding shares, and studies whether largest shareholders have more incentive to supervise management and reduce self-interest behavior of management. We use the data of Chinese listed companies from 2009 to 2019 as a sample, and study the relationship between largest shareholders and share price crash risk. Empirical research shows that the higher the proportion of largest shareholders of state-owned enterprise, the company's stock price crash risk can be significantly reduced. This study suggests that the higher the share of the largest shareholder, the lower the opportunistic behavior of managers and that information asymmetry between the company and the shareholders can be alleviated.
Purpose - This study conducted empirical research on non-financial corporations listed on the stock exchange from 2001 to 2010, focusing on the effects of corporate governance on real earnings management of corporations. In particular, this study examined primarily the impact of the largest shareholder who could use earnings management to pursue his own self-interest, and foreign investors who played a checking role against the largest shareholders. The study also reviewed the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management while also considering corporate growth. Research design, data, and methodology - As for the measurements of real earnings management, abnormal operating cash flow and abnormal production cost were utilized. As for the independent variables, share ratio of the largest shareholder and affiliate person (M) and share ratio of foreign investors (FT) were leveraged. This study excluded those organizations that had changed their fiscal years, those that had not submitted an audit report, corporations under supervision, delisted corporations, corporations that had changed their business type, and so on, from the non-financial corporations out of the publicly traded corporations whose fiscal year ended in December from 2001 to 2010 in addition, KIS values were utilized for the corporate financial data in the study. To verify whether management structure and growth had an impact on real earnings management of a corporation through empirical analysis, a multiple regression analysis model was applied. Result - First, as a result of the analysis, the share ratio (M) of the largest shareholder and affiliate person was found to have a significant positive correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations(ACF) and abnormal production cost (APD). When controlling the growth, the share ratio (M) of the largest shareholder and affiliate person was found to have an insignificant correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations(ACF) but a significant correlation with abnormal production cost (APD). Second, foreign ownership (FT) was found to have a significant positive correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations(ACF) and abnormal production cost (APD) at the confidence level of 1 percent when not including the growth dummy. When controlling the growth, foreign ownership (FT) was found to have a significant negative correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations (ACF) and with abnormal production cost (APD). Conclusion - The results imply that the largest shareholder is closely related to earnings management through real activities regardless of corporate growth. It is also possible to determine from these results that foreign investors are related to earnings management through real activities when not considering corporate growth, but that they would reduce earnings management in the case of considering the growth. Thus, this study verified along with the existing studies that foreign investors were conducting the control function on controlling shareholders.
Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
/
v.16
no.3
/
pp.145-158
/
2021
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the ownership structure of unlisted firms on KOSDAQ listing. There are few studies analyzing the characteristics of listing success based on ownership structure. For startup executives, there is not enough data to refer to the ownership structure that can increase the possibility of listing. This paper examines the effects of ownership structure on IPO success through comparison between listed successful and failed companies among the companies in application for KOSDAQ listing eligibility review. The major findings are as follows; (1) Venture capital investment and shareholding have a statistically positive effect on the success of KOSDAQ listing. This results indicate that the venture capital's investment alleviate the problem of information asymmetry, and it is a valid signal for market participants. The result means the role of venture capital seems to be important when companies are listed on the KOSDAQ. (2) The largest shareholder's stake has an inverted-U shape relationship with listing success. In other words, the ownership concentration mitigates moral hazard problem, which leads to listing success. However, if the ownership concentration exceeds a certain level, the chances of success in listing will decrease due to concerns over the pursuit of private interests. The result suggests that the largest shareholder's stake reduce agency problem. This study academically contributes to the existing literature by demonstrating the ownership structure affects IPOs, and explaining the results based on agent theory and signal theory. Our results provide practical implications for companies preparing for an IPO on the KOSDAQ.
This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and the intensity of R&D expenditures of a firm by analyzing the panel data composed of 553 manufacturing firms in KSE(Korea Stock Exchange) and KOSDAQ listed firms for the period of 2007-2014. The major findings are as follows; (1) Regarding the relationship between CEO stockholding and R&D intensity, we find the inverted-U shape relationship in KOSDAQ firms, consistent with the theoretical discussion and empirical studies on U.S. firms. The result suggests that management stockholding reduces agency problem at the R&D margin. On the contrary, the insignificant result in KSE firms seems to be due to the scant stockholding of most 'non-owner' CEOs. (2) Regarding the relationship between the largest shareholder's portion and R&D intensity, KSE firms exhibit negatively significant relationship, suggesting the existence of serious agency problem between the largest shareholder and the minor shareholders. This agency problem seems to be alleviated in KOSDAQ firms mainly because the founders with technology expertise are still in charge of the business. (3) Foreign investors seem to fail in effectively encouraging R&D expenditures in either KSE or KOSDAQ listed firms. This study contributes to the existing literature by showing for the first time that ownership structure affects R&D activities in different ways between KSE and KOSDAQ firms.
This paper examines how the concentration of ownership in firms influences the R&D investment decision and whether the type of a firm's management (i.e, the owner-manager or professional manger) differentiates the relationship between the ownership concentration and R&D investments by using data of Korean pharmaceutical companies between 2004 and 2008. The results show that the share of the largest shareholder and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and whether a CEO is an owner or a professional manager affects the curvature of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, when a firm's CEO is a professional manager and the share of his stock is small, increase in the CEO's share increases the R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because the increase in ownership reduces agency cost; However, when the share of his stock is large, the increase in CEO's share decreases R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because a professional manager gets concerned over excessive risk exposure more than an owner-manager does.
This paper investigates how corporate governance characteristics are related to long-term corporate survival in an emerging economy. We used the data of 311 companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) in 1979 and examined the survival chances of those companies through the IMF crisis in 1998, upon governance characteristics that are expected to increase long-term strategic orientations. We utilized Cox regression model for the analysis. The results indicate that firms with particular governance characteristics that may be tied to CEO's long-term orientations show higher long-term survivability. Specifically, the probability of a firm's long-term survival is increased when founding family ownership is sustained, the company ownership is concentrated, and the CEO is the largest shareholder. This study has significance in that it is one of initial tries to examine the impact of corporate governance on long-term corporate survival with large scale statistical analysis. Also, the study findings provide some clues as to why the portion of family firms in emerging economies is continuously increased, thus providing meaningful insights to corporate governance literature.
The paper examines the ownership structure and the firm value of online firms in the world. Data are gathered by using FACTIVA database for firms in the Dow Jones index for the 2014 fiscal year. The Ordinary Least Squares regressions, the Generalized Linear Model, and the model selection criteria are employed to analyze the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. The paper tests theories such as the convergence of interest theory, the managerial entrenchment theory, and the eclectic theory. The paper finds that the ownership structure has an influence on the firm value depending on the rank of the large shareholders. While the first large shareholders have a negative association with the firm value, the presence of the second and the third large shareholders have a positive influence on the firm value. The paper also finds that the identity of the largest shareholders whether they are insiders or outsiders have an influence on the firm value. The proportion of shareholding by a large shareholder and her identity are variables which predict a firm value.
Purpose - Since the 2020s, the management philosophy of Chinese firms' ESG has been rapidly established under the leadership of the Chinese government. We empirically analyze the ESG characteristics and effects on corporate value of Chinese firms. Design/methodology/approach - Using OLS and random effect panel regression analysis, we identify ESG determinants. In analyzing the impact on corporate value, likewise a large number of literatures, we adopt a 2SLS methodology using instrumental variables in the reason of endogeneity between ESG and firm value. We analyze using the G2SLS methodology, which is improving the efficiency of the estimation coefficients along with 2SLS. Findings - We find that ESG ratings are high in state-owned and foreign capital invested companies, ESG ratings are low in companies with a high proportion of non-floating stocks which implies information asymmetry. However, there are no significance in the institutional investor's, the major 10 largest shareholders' and manager's ownership. Furthermore, we can support most of the hypotheses that ESG ratings will be high in companies with high management performance. ESG ratings are significantly higher in companies with high ROA, rich in cash asset, low debt ratio, and large size. we strongly support the hypothesis that the higher the ESG rating, the higher the firm value, and ESG has a moderating effect on state-owned companies, non-floating shares, the ownership of institutional investors, manager, and the 10 major shareholder. In particular, state-owned companies, the proportion of non-floating shares, and the ownership of the 10 major shareholders have a negative impact on firm value, however, ESG attenuates this negative effect. Research implications or Originality - This study looks forward to enhancing our understanding of ESG characteristics in East Asia.
본 웹사이트에 게시된 이메일 주소가 전자우편 수집 프로그램이나
그 밖의 기술적 장치를 이용하여 무단으로 수집되는 것을 거부하며,
이를 위반시 정보통신망법에 의해 형사 처벌됨을 유념하시기 바랍니다.
[게시일 2004년 10월 1일]
이용약관
제 1 장 총칙
제 1 조 (목적)
이 이용약관은 KoreaScience 홈페이지(이하 “당 사이트”)에서 제공하는 인터넷 서비스(이하 '서비스')의 가입조건 및 이용에 관한 제반 사항과 기타 필요한 사항을 구체적으로 규정함을 목적으로 합니다.
제 2 조 (용어의 정의)
① "이용자"라 함은 당 사이트에 접속하여 이 약관에 따라 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스를 받는 회원 및 비회원을
말합니다.
② "회원"이라 함은 서비스를 이용하기 위하여 당 사이트에 개인정보를 제공하여 아이디(ID)와 비밀번호를 부여
받은 자를 말합니다.
③ "회원 아이디(ID)"라 함은 회원의 식별 및 서비스 이용을 위하여 자신이 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을
말합니다.
④ "비밀번호(패스워드)"라 함은 회원이 자신의 비밀보호를 위하여 선정한 문자 및 숫자의 조합을 말합니다.
제 3 조 (이용약관의 효력 및 변경)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트에 게시하거나 기타의 방법으로 회원에게 공지함으로써 효력이 발생합니다.
② 당 사이트는 이 약관을 개정할 경우에 적용일자 및 개정사유를 명시하여 현행 약관과 함께 당 사이트의
초기화면에 그 적용일자 7일 이전부터 적용일자 전일까지 공지합니다. 다만, 회원에게 불리하게 약관내용을
변경하는 경우에는 최소한 30일 이상의 사전 유예기간을 두고 공지합니다. 이 경우 당 사이트는 개정 전
내용과 개정 후 내용을 명확하게 비교하여 이용자가 알기 쉽도록 표시합니다.
제 4 조(약관 외 준칙)
① 이 약관은 당 사이트가 제공하는 서비스에 관한 이용안내와 함께 적용됩니다.
② 이 약관에 명시되지 아니한 사항은 관계법령의 규정이 적용됩니다.
제 2 장 이용계약의 체결
제 5 조 (이용계약의 성립 등)
① 이용계약은 이용고객이 당 사이트가 정한 약관에 「동의합니다」를 선택하고, 당 사이트가 정한
온라인신청양식을 작성하여 서비스 이용을 신청한 후, 당 사이트가 이를 승낙함으로써 성립합니다.
② 제1항의 승낙은 당 사이트가 제공하는 과학기술정보검색, 맞춤정보, 서지정보 등 다른 서비스의 이용승낙을
포함합니다.
제 6 조 (회원가입)
서비스를 이용하고자 하는 고객은 당 사이트에서 정한 회원가입양식에 개인정보를 기재하여 가입을 하여야 합니다.
제 7 조 (개인정보의 보호 및 사용)
당 사이트는 관계법령이 정하는 바에 따라 회원 등록정보를 포함한 회원의 개인정보를 보호하기 위해 노력합니다. 회원 개인정보의 보호 및 사용에 대해서는 관련법령 및 당 사이트의 개인정보 보호정책이 적용됩니다.
제 8 조 (이용 신청의 승낙과 제한)
① 당 사이트는 제6조의 규정에 의한 이용신청고객에 대하여 서비스 이용을 승낙합니다.
② 당 사이트는 아래사항에 해당하는 경우에 대해서 승낙하지 아니 합니다.
- 이용계약 신청서의 내용을 허위로 기재한 경우
- 기타 규정한 제반사항을 위반하며 신청하는 경우
제 9 조 (회원 ID 부여 및 변경 등)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객에 대하여 약관에 정하는 바에 따라 자신이 선정한 회원 ID를 부여합니다.
② 회원 ID는 원칙적으로 변경이 불가하며 부득이한 사유로 인하여 변경 하고자 하는 경우에는 해당 ID를
해지하고 재가입해야 합니다.
③ 기타 회원 개인정보 관리 및 변경 등에 관한 사항은 서비스별 안내에 정하는 바에 의합니다.
제 3 장 계약 당사자의 의무
제 10 조 (KISTI의 의무)
① 당 사이트는 이용고객이 희망한 서비스 제공 개시일에 특별한 사정이 없는 한 서비스를 이용할 수 있도록
하여야 합니다.
② 당 사이트는 개인정보 보호를 위해 보안시스템을 구축하며 개인정보 보호정책을 공시하고 준수합니다.
③ 당 사이트는 회원으로부터 제기되는 의견이나 불만이 정당하다고 객관적으로 인정될 경우에는 적절한 절차를
거쳐 즉시 처리하여야 합니다. 다만, 즉시 처리가 곤란한 경우는 회원에게 그 사유와 처리일정을 통보하여야
합니다.
제 11 조 (회원의 의무)
① 이용자는 회원가입 신청 또는 회원정보 변경 시 실명으로 모든 사항을 사실에 근거하여 작성하여야 하며,
허위 또는 타인의 정보를 등록할 경우 일체의 권리를 주장할 수 없습니다.
② 당 사이트가 관계법령 및 개인정보 보호정책에 의거하여 그 책임을 지는 경우를 제외하고 회원에게 부여된
ID의 비밀번호 관리소홀, 부정사용에 의하여 발생하는 모든 결과에 대한 책임은 회원에게 있습니다.
③ 회원은 당 사이트 및 제 3자의 지적 재산권을 침해해서는 안 됩니다.
제 4 장 서비스의 이용
제 12 조 (서비스 이용 시간)
① 서비스 이용은 당 사이트의 업무상 또는 기술상 특별한 지장이 없는 한 연중무휴, 1일 24시간 운영을
원칙으로 합니다. 단, 당 사이트는 시스템 정기점검, 증설 및 교체를 위해 당 사이트가 정한 날이나 시간에
서비스를 일시 중단할 수 있으며, 예정되어 있는 작업으로 인한 서비스 일시중단은 당 사이트 홈페이지를
통해 사전에 공지합니다.
② 당 사이트는 서비스를 특정범위로 분할하여 각 범위별로 이용가능시간을 별도로 지정할 수 있습니다. 다만
이 경우 그 내용을 공지합니다.
제 13 조 (홈페이지 저작권)
① NDSL에서 제공하는 모든 저작물의 저작권은 원저작자에게 있으며, KISTI는 복제/배포/전송권을 확보하고
있습니다.
② NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 상업적 및 기타 영리목적으로 복제/배포/전송할 경우 사전에 KISTI의 허락을
받아야 합니다.
③ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 보도, 비평, 교육, 연구 등을 위하여 정당한 범위 안에서 공정한 관행에
합치되게 인용할 수 있습니다.
④ NDSL에서 제공하는 콘텐츠를 무단 복제, 전송, 배포 기타 저작권법에 위반되는 방법으로 이용할 경우
저작권법 제136조에 따라 5년 이하의 징역 또는 5천만 원 이하의 벌금에 처해질 수 있습니다.
제 14 조 (유료서비스)
① 당 사이트 및 협력기관이 정한 유료서비스(원문복사 등)는 별도로 정해진 바에 따르며, 변경사항은 시행 전에
당 사이트 홈페이지를 통하여 회원에게 공지합니다.
② 유료서비스를 이용하려는 회원은 정해진 요금체계에 따라 요금을 납부해야 합니다.
제 5 장 계약 해지 및 이용 제한
제 15 조 (계약 해지)
회원이 이용계약을 해지하고자 하는 때에는 [가입해지] 메뉴를 이용해 직접 해지해야 합니다.
제 16 조 (서비스 이용제한)
① 당 사이트는 회원이 서비스 이용내용에 있어서 본 약관 제 11조 내용을 위반하거나, 다음 각 호에 해당하는
경우 서비스 이용을 제한할 수 있습니다.
- 2년 이상 서비스를 이용한 적이 없는 경우
- 기타 정상적인 서비스 운영에 방해가 될 경우
② 상기 이용제한 규정에 따라 서비스를 이용하는 회원에게 서비스 이용에 대하여 별도 공지 없이 서비스 이용의
일시정지, 이용계약 해지 할 수 있습니다.
제 17 조 (전자우편주소 수집 금지)
회원은 전자우편주소 추출기 등을 이용하여 전자우편주소를 수집 또는 제3자에게 제공할 수 없습니다.
제 6 장 손해배상 및 기타사항
제 18 조 (손해배상)
당 사이트는 무료로 제공되는 서비스와 관련하여 회원에게 어떠한 손해가 발생하더라도 당 사이트가 고의 또는 과실로 인한 손해발생을 제외하고는 이에 대하여 책임을 부담하지 아니합니다.
제 19 조 (관할 법원)
서비스 이용으로 발생한 분쟁에 대해 소송이 제기되는 경우 민사 소송법상의 관할 법원에 제기합니다.
[부 칙]
1. (시행일) 이 약관은 2016년 9월 5일부터 적용되며, 종전 약관은 본 약관으로 대체되며, 개정된 약관의 적용일 이전 가입자도 개정된 약관의 적용을 받습니다.