• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.31-36
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• 2013

We propose a war-game model that is appropriate for a raid-type warfare in which, a priori, the maneuver of the attacker is relatively certain. The model is based on a multi-weapon extention of the Lanchester's law. Instead of a continuous time dynamic game with the differential equations from the Lanchester's law, however, we adopt a multi-period model relying on a time-discretization of the Lanchester's law. Despite the obvious limitation that two players make a move only on the discrete time epochs, the pragmatic model has a manifold justification. The existence of an equilibrium is readily established by its equivalence to a finite zero-sum game, the existence of whose equilibrium is, in turn, well-known to be no other than the LP-duality. It implies then that the war-game model dictates optimal strategies for both players under the assumption that any strategy choice of each player will be responded by a best strategy of her opponent. The model, therefore, provides a sound ground for finding an efficient reinforcement of a defense system that guarantees peaceful equilibria.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.11 no.6
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• pp.50-55
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• 2017

The objective of this study was to use the Lanchester equation to predict the outcome of our engagement between our unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (Blue Group) and enemy UAV (Red Group). Lanchester's law states that the power of corps is proportional to the number of combatants. A second law states that the power of corps is proportional to the square of the number of combatants. The first law is a suitable law for guerrilla warfare while the second law is known as the law suitable for all-out war. Therefore, the second law is commonly used. The second law of Lanchester's was used in this study to predict engagement results. We estimated the battle loss rate value to win the battle as well as the required power number. We also predicted power number to make the damage of our group less than one. The battle loss rate to reliably receive victory when the enemy's UAV and the ally's UAV are equal in number of combat units must be 1: 1.5 or more.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.263-271
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• 2023

In the (3,3) close combat model based on the Lanchester Square Law, this study proposes a plan to optimally allocate residual combat power after the battle to other battlefields. As soon as the two camps of three units can grasp each other's information and predict the battle pattern immediately after the battle began, the Time Zero Allocation of Force (TZAF) scenario was used to initially allocate combat power to readjust the combat model. It reflects travel time, which is a "field friction" in which physical distance exists from battlefields that support combat power to battlefields that are supported. By developing existing studies that try to examine the effect of travel time on the battlefield through the combat model, this study forms a (3,3) combat model, which is a large number of minimum units. In order to achieve the combat purpose, the principle of optimal combat force operation is presented by examining the aspect that support combat power is allocated to the two battlefields and the consequent battle results. Through this, various scenarios were set in consideration of the travel time and the situation of the units, and differentiated results were obtained. Although the most traditional, it can be used as the basic logic of the training or the commander's decision-making system using the actual war game model.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.1-9
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• 2013

We propose a heuristic algorithm for war-game model that is appropriate for warfare in which the maneuver of the attacker is relatively certain. Our model is based on a multi-weapon extention of the Lanchester's square law. However, instead of dealing with the differential equations, we use a multi-period linear approximation which not only facilitates a solution method but also reflects discrete natures of warfare. Then our game model turns out to be a continuous game known to have an ${\varepsilon}$-Nash equilibrium for all ${\varepsilon}{\geq}0$. Therefore, our model approximates an optimal warfare strategies for both players as well as an efficient reinforcement of area defense system that guarantees a peaceful equilibrium. Finally, we report the performance of a practical best-response type heuristic for finding an ${\varepsilon}$-Nash equilibrium for a real-scale problem.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.135-145
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• 2005

The recent notion of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) emphasizes the ability to distribute the right information at the right time to maximize the combat effectiveness. Accordingly, in the modern combat system, the importance of non-physical elements, such as a communication system, is increasing. However, an NCW-support communication network system is expensive. Therefore, it is essential to develop a proper combat system evaluation method to establish an efficient NCW-support combat system. Traditionally, combat system effectiveness is measured in terms of physical elements such as men and fire power, Obviously, such method is hardly applicable to a modern combat system. To overcome this difficulty, we propose an evaluation model based on CA (Cellular Automata) simulation. A set of preliminary combat simulations show that CA simulation may be promising in evaluating non-physical element of a modern combat system.