• Title/Summary/Keyword: Korea and China trade structure

Search Result 103, Processing Time 0.025 seconds

WTO GATS and Disputes on Trade in Service (WTO GATS 협정과 서비스 분쟁)

  • Lyou, Byung-Woon
    • THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
    • /
    • v.53
    • /
    • pp.265-288
    • /
    • 2012
  • Trade in service, which deals with intangible product, is distinguished from trade of goods for tangible product. The current multilateral service trade is based on GATS which includes MFN, securing the predictability as well as transparency of related service rules, specific commitment basis market access national treatment. Recently the WTO service disputes are increasing according to the frequent filing complaints against the regulation of service trade in China. The rules of GATS are not as strict as those of GATT. The commitment schedules, which were materialized between members, gets binding effect through the obligatory provisions of GATS. The GATS is inseparable relation with the Appendix of finance, of telecommunication, and of air transport, with the schedules of commitment of member states, and with the reference paper to the 4th protocol. GATS article XIV which is the general exception of GATS has a similar structure of GATT article XX. Based on the possibility of filing to the WTO, there is a need to examine whether the whole rules, regulation, and policy international trade in service of Korea perfectly macthed with the GATS. Korea with poor resources should take up the more positive attitude for the opening of international service market. According to the reciprocal aspects of concession, if Korea doesn't open a service market, the other WTO member country wouldn't allow Korea to access the their market as well as national treatment.

  • PDF

The Structure and Evolution of Renewable Energy Trade Networks in the RCEP Region: Application of SNA Method

  • Jinyan Tian;Qianli Wu;Congying Sun;Ziyang Liu
    • East Asian Economic Review
    • /
    • v.28 no.1
    • /
    • pp.3-35
    • /
    • 2024
  • This paper utilizes social network analysis to examine the structural characteristics and trade dynamics of the renewable energy (hydropower, wind energy, and solar energy) trade network within the RCEP region from 2011 to 2020. The findings reveal: (1) The renewable energy trade network within the RCEP exhibits dynamism, heterogeneity, and an uneven development. The solar energy network is the most balanced and stable, while the wind energy network lags and shows marked fluctuations, with the hydropower network falling between these two. This demonstrates the diversity of energy trade within the region. (2) China, Singapore, and Japan are identified as the key exporting and importing countries, with Vietnam showing substantial growth potential. Individual analyses shed light on the stark disparities in trade status among nations, reflecting the diverse roles and future potential of member countries. (3) The QAP regression analysis reveals a significant influence of environmental pressure, particularly carbon dioxide emissions, on the renewable energy trade network. This study contributes to promoting environmental sustainability and energy security in the RCEP region and provides empirical evidence for global renewable energy trade strategies.

What Determines the DPRK's Anthracite Exports to China?: Implications for the DPRK's Economy

  • LEE, JONG KYU
    • KDI Journal of Economic Policy
    • /
    • v.37 no.2
    • /
    • pp.40-63
    • /
    • 2015
  • Anthracite exports have special value within the DPRK's economy. In this paper, we focus on what determines the DPRK's anthracite exports to China. We use panel data consisting of cross-section data from 30 provinces in China and quarterly time-series data from 1998 to 2013. Controlling for all other variables that affect anthracite imports, the variable for steel production in China is robust and statistically significant. This is consistent with on-site interviews which indicate that much of North Korean anthracite is consumed by China's steel industry. This implies that the North Korean authorities need to make adjustments to the foreign trade structure, as the import demand for anthracite in China may decline further.

  • PDF

Research on the Impact of Shandong Province's FDI on Economic Growth under the Background of One Belt One Road

  • ZHONG, Xinqi;ZHANG, Fan
    • The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
    • /
    • v.12 no.9
    • /
    • pp.31-42
    • /
    • 2021
  • Purpose: After the reform and opening up, China's overall economic development has entered a new era. From mutual investment and trade transactions between domestic provinces and regions to investment and trade with foreign companies, the continuous supplement of investment funds makes the follow-up development of all aspects of economic development smoother and has played a strong impetus. effect. Foreign direct investment has many influences on the economic development of a country or region. Research design, data and methodology: This article uses the sample data of Shandong Province from 2011 to 2019 to analyze the foreign direct investment in Shandong Province by industry, region, method and other aspects, and study the relationship and influence between foreign direct investment and economic growth. Results: The results show that there is a relatively close relationship between foreign direct investment and economic growth, and it has played a role in promoting economic development in many aspects such as industrial structure, foreign trade, and employment. Conclusions: At the same time, corresponding suggestions are put forward based on the analysis and conclusions drawn.

Interdependence and Check in East Sea Rim: Focused on Border Trade n Transitional Nations (환동해권 지역사회의 상호의존과 견제: 제이행국가 접경지역의 대외경제교류 중심으로)

  • Choi, Youngjin
    • International Area Studies Review
    • /
    • v.16 no.3
    • /
    • pp.293-321
    • /
    • 2012
  • This study aims to examine how institutions has been formed to deepen interdependence and to keep check in trade on the border regions of East Sea Rim between the macro structure and micro behaviors. The transitional nations such as China, Russia, and North Korea adjacent to the East Sea Rim exhibits unique characteristics in terms of transaction governance structure. While the regional economy in northeast China is still overwhelmed by the stated-owned enterprises(SOEs), it strongly encourages the private economic trade to form institutional economy through the border trade port and peddler trade market. Thus trade is shaped by the mixed governance. In far east Russia, whereas the SOEs are in charge of exporting oil, gas etc., private firms and small scale traders are importing household items, so that it can also be called as the mixed governance, while informal social networks simultaneously work. In North Korea, for the trade, since the firms are mainly required to have the permits from the different levels of government, it is regarded as the hierarchical governance. The institutional economics seems to well explain the changing agencies and their influence on the trade among the regions in the East Sea Rim.

Implications of China's Maritime Power and BRI : Future China- ROK Strategic Cooperative Partnership Relations (중국의 해양강국 및 일대일로 구상과 미래 한·중 협력 전망)

  • Yoon, Sukjoon
    • Strategy21
    • /
    • s.37
    • /
    • pp.104-143
    • /
    • 2015
  • China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

Coercive Economic Measures and their Implications to Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation (강압적 경제·통상 조치에 대한 분석과 남북한 경제 협력에의 시사점)

  • Lee, Jaewon;Park, Jeongjoon
    • Korea Trade Review
    • /
    • v.44 no.6
    • /
    • pp.327-344
    • /
    • 2019
  • This paper explores the hub-and-spoke system as the structure of the global economic network that presents obstacles for international cooperation. With its exclusive jurisdiction and control over the hub, a powerful state can employ coercive economic measures to compel and deter unwanted behavior of rogue states and even its allies. Against this backdrop, this study analyzes the cases of the US blocking access to its market by Chinese Huawei as well as the case of Japan in restricting trade for highly advanced goods to South Korea. This analysis reveals that both measures are forms of secondary boycotts, which affect not only the entities within their jurisdiction but also others located in third countries. In addition, this paper extends its findings to free trade agreements and offers implications on the outward processing scheme for the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in the KORUS FTA and the Korea-China FTA. These events result in a gray-risk for South Korea, a country that aims to resolve North Korea's denuclearization and inter-Korean economic cooperation.

Public Private Partnerships in Chinese Port as Infrastructure

  • Kim, Jin-Hwan
    • Journal of Distribution Science
    • /
    • v.14 no.7
    • /
    • pp.45-52
    • /
    • 2016
  • Purpose - The purpose of the paper is to look into and review the management and operation of Chinese infrastructure process, especially focusing on port industry. Research design, data and methodology - The research methods to be applied is to examine PPPs that is a key way of cooperation in many infrastructure investment, financial matters, and then port industry as well. Results - It is well noticed that Chinese government has well managed with project, planning and investments in national infrastructure matters. Especially, this is clear message that government institutions for infrastructure planning has been well organized with systematic structure. However, even if it is involved with some risky business, PPPs should be asked for cooperation in the areas of financial, institutional and logistic part of infrastructure development in China. Conclusions - Every country has been in promoting its infrastructure development and it is not an exception in China. In order to get over inefficiency done by public sectors, Chinese government has invited a private sector in the form of PPPs, which gives more competitive opportunities, especially in port industry.

A Study on the Impact of China's Trade-related Policy Changes on Export Performance of Korean Manufacturing Companies in China (중국의 무역관련 정책 변화가 현지 진출 한국계 기업의 수출성과에 미치는 영향에 관한 연구)

  • Hong, Jae-Sung;Lee, Yong-Keun
    • International Commerce and Information Review
    • /
    • v.16 no.1
    • /
    • pp.69-88
    • /
    • 2014
  • According to the previous study, after 2000s, factors of the Chinese government's trade policy changes would be a significant burden on the company. However, many previous studies were limited to the response strategy by judicial analysis. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the factors that affect the export performance of Korean manufacturing companies in China. Also, by using that result, I would like to provide advises for entered the korean companies in Chinese market As the results, I knew that export performance are most heavily influenced by labor policy factor and the fallowing is exchange rate policy factor. Eventually, Most of our country companies entering in china were affected changes in the exchange rate policy factor, but many company were manufacturing-type businesses to economize labor costs. Therefore, corporate and governmental response strategies are needed for that's companies.

  • PDF

China's Informal Economic Sanctions (중국의 비공식적 경제 제재)

  • Cho, Hyungjin
    • Analyses & Alternatives
    • /
    • v.5 no.1
    • /
    • pp.25-57
    • /
    • 2021
  • As the strategic competition between the United States and China for global hegemony intensifies, China is using economic sanctions against other countries more and more frequently. Republic of Korea, which has China as its largest trading partner but is an ally of the United States, is more likely to be a target of economic sanctions, as seen in China's retaliation toward its deployment of a THAAD missile-defense system. Against the background, this paper analyzes China's economic sanctions, especially focusing on its informality. China does not publicly declare economic sanctions in most cases, such as Korean one, in which the trade structure is in its favor and can take advantage of its position as a big buyer with huge markets. However, China responds in a more open and formal manner when it is related to its core interests, when it is impossible to exert substantial sanctions effect and when mutual disputes intensify and cannot maintain informality. Korea, which is vulnerable to China's informal economic sanctions, should prepare for them by analyzing the characteristics of China's economic sanctions in depth and thinking about various strategies and measures in advance.

  • PDF