• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.1-12
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• 2022

Our study adds to the body of knowledge about the relationship between credit ratings and the capital structure of bond issuers. Using Bloomberg and Datastream databases and employing panel regression models, we study the capital structure changes of Japanese enterprises after credit rating changes by global rating agencies (S&P and Moody's) as well as their local counterparts (R&I and JCR) from 1998 to 2016. We find that after rating downgrades, Japanese enterprises considerably reduce net debt or net debt relative to net equity, similar to the findings of Kisgen (2009), who focused on U.S. industrial firms. They do not, however, make adjustments to their financial structure as a result of rating improvements. In comparison to downgrades by S&P and Moody's, Japanese corporations issue 1.89 percent less net debt and 1.50 percent less net debt relative to net equity after R&I and JCR rating downgrades. To put it another way, Japanese companies consider rating adjustments made by local agencies to be more significant than those made by global rating organizations. Our findings contradict earlier research that suggests S&P and Moody's are more prominent in the investment community than R&I and JCR in Japan.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.38 no.5
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• pp.754-768
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• 2003

The purpose of this study is to analyze how financial and commercial space in Jeonju had changed after Japanese rule. The biggest local bank was located near the Chungangdong post office in Taisyoudoori and the other bank facilities were located near the Jeonrabuk-do provincial office and Nammun market. Periodic markets and permanent stores were major commercial activities in Jeonju. Many stores and commercial companies established by many Chosun merchants near Nammun markets. Chosun commercial companies were superior to Japanese commercial companies in both number and capital scale. Japanese commercial companies were concentrated on Taisyoudoori(Jungang Road). Commercial activities in Jeonju were segregated by ethnic group. Financial and commercial activities were concentrated on Taisyoudoori and Ekimaedoori(Nammun Road).

• Journal of the Korean Society of Industry Convergence
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.121-127
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• 2004

This paper is to give some hints to solve the problems of the Korean The third Market suffering from the extreme shortage of the liquidity. To solve that problem, this paper mainly compare the liquidity indices of the Third Market with that of the Japanese third market, that is Mothers. The main liqudity indices of the Mothers shows better than that of the Korean Third Market redardless of the small numbers of the listed Firms. The main differences in the liquidity levels between two markets is to caused by the trading system. The Korean Third Market has been adapting the one-to-one trading system which most stock markets of the world gave up that system owing to the inefficiency. This paper shows the proper trading system for the Third Market is competitve trading system partialy combined with the market maker system beacause of the small firm characterristics.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.5 no.4
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• pp.9-20
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• 2018

Global rating agencies, such as Moody's and S&P, have assigned credit ratings to corporate bonds issued by Japanese firms since 1980s. Local Japanese rating agencies, such as R&I and JCR, have more market share than the global raters. We examine the yield spreads of 1,050 yen-denominated corporate bonds issued by financial firms in Japan from 1998 to 2014 and find no evidence that bonds rated by at least one global agency are associated with a significant reduction in the cost of debt as compared to those rated by only local rating agencies. Unlike non-financial firms, the reputation effect of global rating agencies does not exist for Japanese financial firms. We also observe that firms with less information asymmetry are more likely to acquire ratings from Moody's or S&P. Additionally, the firm's financial profile does not affect its choice to seek out ratings from global raters. Our findings are contradictory to those by Han, Pagano, and Shin (2012), who employ bonds issued by non-financial firms in Japan. Our conjecture is that the asymmetric nature of financial firms makes investors less likely to depend on a credit risk assessment by rating agencies in determining the yields of new bonds.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.166-182
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• 1994

Kyonggi Province in the late Chosun dynasty was a center of superior government offices including 'Han' River water-road transportation and was located in the middle of an 'X'-shaped arterial road network. Because of these reasons, Kyonggi Province had a faster inflow of commodities, informations and technics compared with the other province. At this period of time, every local 'Eup' (name of administrative district) had not been affected by their above administrative districts and had their own autonomy. For this reason, every 'Eup' could be developed as a town, even if its size was small when it had sufficient internal growing conditions. Moreover, the markets ('Si-Jon') in big towns and periodical markets which were spread over the Kyonggi Province played role of commercial functions of town. And because military bases for the defence of the royal capital in Kyonggi Province also took parts of a non-agricultural city role, Xyonggi Provinc had much more possibilities of growing as a town rather than the other provinces. The towns of the late Chosun Dynasty were, except the capital and superior administrative districts which were governed by the 'You-Su', small towns which had only about 3, 000-5, 000 people. Most of the town dewellers were local officials, nobles, merchants, craftmen and slaves. And the farmers who lived near town became a pseudo-towner through suburb agriculture. Among these people, the merchants were leaders of townization. The downtowns were affected by the landform and traffic roads. The most fundamental function of towns were administrative. The opcial's grade, which was dispatched to the local administrative district ('Kun' or 'Hyun'), was decided by the size of population and agricultural land of each county. Large county which was governed by a high ranking opcial had more possibilities to develop as a large town. Because they supervised other opcials of lower rank and obtained more land and population for the town. The phonomena of farm abandonment after the Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592-1598 stimulated the development of towns for commercial function. The commercial functions of towns were evident in the Si-Jon or Nan-Jon (names of markets) in the big cities such as Hansung and Kaesung, meanffwhile in the local areas it was emerged in the shape of periodical market networks as allied with near markets (which were called as Jang-Si) or permanent markets which were grown up from periodical markets. These facts of commercial development induced the birth of commercial town. Kyonggi Province showed the weak points of its defense system during both wars (Japanese Invasion in 1592 and Manchu's Invasion in 1636). The government reinforced its defense system by adding 4 'You-Su-Bus' and several military bases. Each local districts ('Eup'), where Geo-Jins were established, were stimulated to be a town while Jin-Kwan system were, adjusted and enforced. Among Dok-Jins(name of solitary military bases), Youngjongjin was grown up as a large garrison town which only played a role of defense. The number of towns that took roles of non-agricultural functions in Kyonggi Province was 52. Among these towns, 29 were developed as big towns which had above 3, 000 people and most of these towns were located on the northwest-southeast axes of 'X'-shaped arterial trafic network in the Chosn Dynasty, This fact points out that the traffic road is one of the important causes of the development of towns. When we make hierarchy of the towns of Kyonggi Province according to its population and how many functions it had, we can make it as 6 grades. The virst grade town 'Hansung' was the biggest central town of administration, commerce and defdnse. The 2nd grade town includes 'Kaesung' which had historical inertia that it had been the capital of the Koryo Dynesty. The 3rd grade towns include some 'You- Su-Bus' such as Soowon, Kanghwa, Kwangju and also include Mapo, Yongsan and from this we can imagine that the commercial development in the late Chosun Dynasty extremely affected the townization. The 4th-6th grade towns had smiliar population but it can be discriminated by how many town functions it had. So the 4th grade towns were the core of administration, commerce and defense function. 5th grade towns had administrative functions and one of commercial and defense functions. 6th grade towns had only one of these functions. When we research and town conditions of each grades as the ratio of non-agricultural population, we can find out that the towns from the 1st grade to 4th grade show difference by degree of townization but from the 4th grade to 6th grade towns do not show big difference in general.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.3-30
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• 1991

This paper examines Korea's exports of manufactures to the United States, Japan, and other OECD member countries in the 1974-89 period, focusing on the market share in the trade partners' imports. It decomposes the growth of exports into various effects, following the "constant-market-shares" analysis. For this purpose, the entire period is divided into three subperiods: 1974-78, 1978-83, and 1983-89. The paper also estimates a regression model of the market share determination, using the data of Korea's market share in U.S. imports. In the three subperiods under study, Korea's exports grew at different paces for varied reasons. The average annual growth rate was 28 %, 11 %, and 21 %, respectively. A large drop in the "competitiveness effect", that is, in the market-share growth rate, was mainly responsible for the decline in the export growth rate. The largest drop in the competitiveness effect was found in the light manufactures exports in the second period. The market share did not regain the rapid growth momentum. The main reason for the rise in export growth rate in the last subperiod was the "market-size effect"-a rise in the growth rate of the trade partners' imports. According to the regression results, high intensities in physical and human capital tended to lower the Korean manufacturing industries' market shares in the United States. This negative correlation was stronger in the case of human capital intensity, suggesting that Korea is relatively poorer in human capital endowment than in physical capital endowment when compared to the United States. This negative correlation between the market share and each of the two intensities became weaker overtime. This may be interpreted as the consequence of both physical and human capital accumulation which were faster than the labor force growth. Depreciation of the Japanese yen was estimated to have a negative influence on the Korean manufacturing industries' market share in the United States, and this negative influence became stronger each year in the 1980s. This seems to reflect the intensifying competition between the two countries' exports in U.S. import markets. The Heavy and Chemical Industry Policy of the 1970s, which promoted a number of selected industries by providing them with various incentives and inevitably discriminated against the rest of the industries, was estimated to have had strong negative effects on the export performance of the light manufacturing industries. This finding and the largest decline in the "competitiveness effect" -found in the light manufactures exports in the 1978-83 period-indicate that the Heavy and Chemical Industry Policy was mainly accountable for the drop in the export growth rate during the period. On the other hand, the rise in export growth rate during the subsequent subperiod was greatly impacted by the large scale exchange rate realignments of major currencies, especially by the appreciation of the Japanese yen, and other changes in international economic conditions.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.699-711
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• 2011

This study is to perform several major analyses to find any differences in the leverage between the pre- and post-period of the currency crisis. Moreover, another aspect is to investigate a financial aspect which has received relatively little attention to the firms and/or industries in the emerging capital markets in comparison to those in the advanced markets. The purpose of this empirical study is to confirm whether or not, it is myth or reality that Korean business conglomerate, chaebol, firms with subsidized financing from government-owned domestic financial institutions in the pre-financial turmoil, may still maintain their higher leverage, even after the crisis. It was found that firms belonging to the chaebol in Korea maintained higher average book-value and market-value based debt ratios, relative to their counterparts not belonging to the chaebol across all of the tested models. There were positive relationships of IND3(=the chemical industry) and Ind5(=the construction industry) to the book-value leverage. This study identified that there were no differences in the explanatory variables included, between the tested models (that is, without and with including the present value of an operating lease) related to each debt ratio. Since the Korean government continue to improve the corporate governance of the domestic firms in terms of accounting transparency and corporate ownership, it would be more efficient, if utilizing this "new" ratio considering an operating lease as an effective measurement of the level of leverage. In terms of the capital structure, it may also be possible for foreign firms to utilize and benefit from the results obtained in this study when operating their new businesses in Korea, given the economic circumstances such as the ongoing progress of the Korea-America FTA or the Korea-China FTA.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.21-46
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• 1990

This paper, a sequel to Yoo and Lee (1990), attempts to investigate the interindustry determinants of technical efficiency in Korea's manufacturing industries, and also to conduct an exploratory analysis on the stability of technical efficiency over time. The hypotheses set forth in this paper are most found in the existing literature on technical efficiency. They are, however, revised and shed a new light upon, whenever possible, to accommodate any Korea-specific conditions. The set of regressors used in the cross-sectional analysis are chosen and the hypotheses are posed in such a way that our result can be made comparable to those of similar studies conducted for the U.S. and Japan by Caves and Barton (1990) and Uekusa and Torii (1987), respectively. It is interesting to observe a certain degree of similarity as well as differentiation between the cross-section evidence on Korea's manufacturing industries and that on the U.S. and Japanese industries. As for the similarities, we can find positive and significant effects on technical efficiency of relative size of production and the extent of specialization in production, and negative and significant effect of the variations in capital-labor ratio within industries. The curvature influence of concentration ratio on technical efficiency is also confirmed in the Korean case. There are differences, too. We cannot find any significant effects of capital vintage, R&D and foreign competition on technical efficiency, all of which were shown to be robust determinants of technical efficiency in the U.S. case. We note, however, that the variables measuring capital vintage effect, R&D and the degree of foreign competition in Korean markets are suspected to suffer from serious measurement errors incurred in data collection and/or conversion of industrial classification system into the KSIC (Korea Standard Industrial Classification) system. Thus, we are reluctant to accept the findings on the effects of these variables as definitive conclusions on Korea's industrial organization. Another finding that interests us is that the cross-industry evidence becomes consistently strong when we use the efficiency estimates based on gross output instead of value added, which provides us with an ex post empirical criterion to choose an output measure between the two in estimating the production frontier. We also conduct exploratory analyses on the stability of the estimates of technical efficiency in Korea's manufacturing industries. Though the method of testing stability employed in this paper is never a complete one, we cannot find strong evidence that our efficiency estimates are stable over time. The outcome is both surprising and disappointing. We can also show that the instability of technical efficiency over time is partly explained by the way we constructed our measures of technical efficiency. To the extent that our efficiency estimates depend on the shape of the empirical distribution of plants in the input-output space, any movements of the production frontier over time are not reflected in the estimates, and possibilities exist of associating a higher level of technical efficiency with a downward movement of the production frontier over time, and so on. Thus, we find that efficiency measures that take into account not only the distributional changes, but also the shifts of the production frontier over time, increase the extent of stability, and are more appropriate for use in a dynamic context. The remaining portion of the instability of technical efficiency over time is not explained satisfactorily in this paper, and future research should address this question.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.31-68
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• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Traditional Landscape Architecture
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.58-67
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• 2020

The present study was conducted as part of basic research for selecting species of street trees with historical value in Seoul. It also made up a list of traditional landscape trees for a variety of alternatives. The following results are shown below. As to the history of street trees in Korea, records on to-be-estimated street trees are found in historical documents written in King Yangwon during the second year of Goguryeo Dynasty (546) and King Myeongjong during 27 year of Goryeo (1197). However, it is assumed that lack of clarity is found in historical records. During the 23 year of King Sejong in the early Joseon Dynasty (1441), the record showed that the state planted street trees as guideposts on the postal road. The records revealed that Ulmus spp. and Salix spp. were planted as guidance trees. The street tree system was performed in the early Joseon Dynasty as recorded in the first year of King Danjong document. Pinus densiflora, Pinus koraiensis, Pyrus pyrifolia var. culta, Castanea crenata, Styphnolobium japonicum and Salix spp. were planted along the avenue at both left and right sides. Morus alba were planted on streets during the five year of King Sejo (1459). As illustrated in pieces Apgujeong by painter Jeongseon and Jinheonmajeongsaekdo in the reign of King Yeongjo, street trees were planted. This arrangement is associated with a number of elements such as king procession, major entrance roads in Seoul, place for horse markets, prevention of roads from flood and indication. In the reign of King Jeongjo, there are many cases related to planting Pinus densiflora, Abies holophylla and Salix spp. for king procession. Turning king roads and related areas into sanctuaries is considered as technique for planting street trees. During the 32 year of King Gojong after opening ports (1985), the state promoted planting trees along both sides of roads. At the time, many Populus davidiana called white poplars were planted as rapidly growing street trees. There are 17 taxa in the Era of Three Kingdoms records, 31 taxa in Goryeo Dynasty records and 55 taxa in Joseon Dynasty records, respectively, described in historical documents to be available for being planted as street trees in Seoul. 16 taxa are recorded in three periods, which are Era of Three Kingdoms, Goryeo Dynasty and Joseon Dynasty. These taxa can be seen as relatively excellent ones in terms of historical value. The introduction of alien plants and legal improvement in the Japanese colonial period resulted in modernization of street tree planting system. Under the six-year street tree planting plan (1934-1940) implemented as part of expanding metropolitan areas outside the capital launched in 1936, four major street trees of top 10 taxa were a Populus deltoides, Populus nigra var. italica, Populus davidiana, Populus alba. The remaining six trees were Salix babylonica, Robinia pseudoacacia, platanus orientalis, Platanus occidentalis, Ginkgo biloba, and Acer negundo. Beginning in the mid- and late 1930s, platanus orientalis, Platanus occidentalis were introduced into Korea as new taxa of street trees and planted in many regions. Beginning on 1942, Ailanthus altissima was recommended as street trees for the purpose of producing silks. In 1957 after liberation, major street tree taxa included Platanus occidentalis, Ginkgo biloba, Populus nigra var. italica, Ailanthus altissima, Populus deltoides and Salix babylonica. The rank of major street tree species planted in the Japanese colonial period had changed. Tree planting trend around that period primarily representing Platanus occidentalis and Ginkgo biloba still holds true until now.