• 무역상무연구
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• 제68권
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• pp.89-121
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• 2015

Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.121-145
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• 2009

South Korea has investment agreements such as FTAs, BITs with several countries. Up to now, no single case has been registered against the Korean government on breach of investment agreements, but it is likely that the number of such cases would increase. Therefore, an investor-state dispute settlement system, an arbitral procedure by which a foreign investor may seek compensation of damage against the host country, is gaining its importance. The provision of the ISDS has been one of the hottest issues in Korea while the Kor-US FTA was being signed. In this respect, with the growing number of regional agreements such as BITs and FTAs, a careful scrutiny on the ISDS is necessary for Korea. I have therefore studied theoretically subjects including the National Treatment(NT), the Most-Favored Nation(MFN), Fair and Equitable Treatment and Expropriation - those that have been the objects of protection on investors. And I have analyzed ICSID arbitral awards and provided implications. In the ICSID arbitral awards, the Fair and Equitable Treatment turned out to be the most recognized violation on investors by the host State in terms of investor protection. On the other hand, Indirect Expropriation - a matter of which public anxiety was shown led by civic groups - was not generally recognized in arbitral awards. This study is written for sake of governments, local autonomous entities and public enterprises that are in charge of FTAs and BITs.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제33권1호
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• pp.23-49
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• 2023

An ICSID award on Lone Star case has been rendered finally on August 31st, 2022 after almost ten years since the Lone Star Funds submitted the request for arbitration against the Republic of Korea in 2012. The Lone Star case is the first investor-state dispute settlement(ISDS) case brought against Korea, and this case, also known as "eat and run" case, has given rise to heated debates for years. Moreover, as the ICSID tribunal has ordered Korea to pay the Lone Star Funds the sum of USD 216.5 million plus interest in the award, this case has become once again the subject of controversy. Any arguments and evidence submitted by the parties in dispute have not been disclosed until recently, however, as the memorials and the award are now open to the public, it has become possible to realize the assertions of each party and the decisions of the tribunal in detail. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the main issues of the Lone Star case with a focus on the ICSID award. By examining the substantive and procedural issues of the case one after the other, it might be able to understand the whole picture of the case and prepare for the remaining procedures of this case and other upcoming cases as well.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권3호
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• pp.185-226
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• 2015

As in some developing countries and more recently some developed countries worldwide and in the Asian region, Australia has faced significant internal opposition and public debate especially over treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). As outlined in Part II(1), concerns have re-emerged and escalated since the first-ever claim was brought against Australia regarding its tobacco plain packaging legislation, in 2011 by Philip Morris Asia under an old BIT with Hong Kong. However, Australia signed bilateral FTAs with Korea in 2014 and with China in 2015, including ISDS protections, prompting several sets of parliamentary inquiries (Part II(2)). Australia's close trading partner, New Zealand, had already concluded an FTA with China in 2008 that included more expansive ISDS-backed investor protections. In 2015, the New Zealand Parliament has been debating ratification of its own FTA with Korea, with ISDS also now attracting growing scrutiny, as elaborated in Part III below. In both bilateral FTA negotiations, the present Korean government seems to have reverted to a strong preference for concluding investment agreements with extensive ISDS protections, despite public and parliamentary debate around 2011 in the context of ratifying its FTA with the United States. As mentioned briefly in the concluding Part IV, Korea's stance has significant implications for the future trajectory of treaty-based ISDS - and indeed international arbitration more generally - in the Asia-Pacific region, and perhaps even globally.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제34권2호
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• pp.27-44
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• 2024

The lack of consistency and predictability of arbitral awards in the Investor-State Dispute Settlement ("ISDS") mechanism has long been a subject of criticism. In international investment disputes, arbitral tribunals have frequently come up with different interpretations and results on similar investment agreement provisions. The arbitral tribunal's inconsistent decisions raised concerns not only among the parties to the investment dispute but also amongthe arbitral tribunals in other cases, which ultimately led to legal inconsistencies in international investment law. Arbitration awards may have some degree of disagreement in interpretation. However, the systemic inconsistencies that pervade ISDS risk undermining the purpose of the investment agreement system, which is to provide a predictable and stable framework to protect andpromote foreign investment while maintaining a balance with host state regulations. Therefore, this study proposes a plan to resolve this discrepancy and review standards for practical application. Reform of the ISDS mechanism could be a viable option to reduce, to some extent, the inconsistencies in interpretation, if not completely eliminate them. Reforms such as establishingguidelines, promoting cooperation between arbitral tribunals, and codifying the norms of the agreement can provide a means of reducing interpretive inconsistencies and strengthening the legitimacy of the ISDS mechanism. Reforming the ISDS mechanism will require all stakeholders to carefully consider the issues and the scope, nature, and feasibility of eachpotential reform.

• 아태비즈니스연구
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• 제10권1호
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• pp.117-133
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• 2019

This paper examines the most-favored-nation treatment clause on the BITs concluded by China and examines the attitudes of China on the application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs by period as the scope of arbitration increases. Moreover, this study pointed out the problems that would be exposed if the most-favored-nation treatment clause applies to ISDs and then also suggested solutions. The conclusions of this study are as follows; if the Chinese government strictly restricts the applicable expansion of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the dispute settlement procedure by considering only the position of the capital importing country, it implies a contradiction against the development trend of the arbitration system related to international investment disputes. Of course, in order to protect the rights of Chinese investors investing abroad, expanding the applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment clause to the ISDs procedure unconditionally may have a negative impact under China's dual status of being a capital-importing country and a capital-exporting country. Therefore, China should clearly define the scope of application of the most-favored-nation treatment clause, the completion of the local remedy for the host country in cases of BIT to be concluded in the future or amended, and also clearly define that the most-favored-nation treatment clause should not be retroactively applied into BITs already concluded as an exception of applicability of the most-favored-nation treatment.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제29권1호
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• pp.31-52
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• 2019

As international transactions have grown more numerous, situations of disputes related to the transactions are getting more complicated and more diverse. Cost-effective remedies to settle the disputes through traditional methods such as adjudications of a court will be insufficient. There fore, nations are attempting to more efficiently solve investor-state disputes through arbitration under organizations such as the ICSID Convention, the ICSID Additionary Facility Rules, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules by including the provisions on investor-state dispute settlement at the conclusion of an investment agreement. In case of an arbitration under the ICSID Convention, ICSID directly exercises the supervisorial function on arbitral proceedings, and there is no room for the intervention of national courts. In time of the arbitration where the ICSID Convention does not apply, however, the courts have to facilitate the arbitral proceedings. When the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention are guaranteed by the Convention, it should be considered that the New York Convention does not apply to them under the Convention Article 7 (1) fore-end. In exceptional cases in which an arbitral award under the ICSID Convention cannot be recognized or enforced by the Convention, the New York Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement because the award is not a domestic award of the country in which the recognition or enforcement is sought. It is up to an interpretation of the New York Convention whether the New York Convention applies to ISDS arbitral awards not based on the ICSID Convention or not. Although an act of the host country is about sovereign activities, a host country and the country an investor is in concurring to the investment agreement with the ISDS provisions is considered a surrender of sovereignty immunity, and it will not suffice to exclude the investment disputes from the scope of application of the New York Convention. If the party to the investment agreement has declared commercial reservation at its accession into the New York Convention, it should be viewed that the Convention applies to the recognition and enforcement of the ISDS awards to settle the disputes over an investitive act, inasmuch as the act will be considered as a commercial transaction. When the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on investment disputes about a nation's sovereign act have been sought in Korea and Korea has been designated the place of the investment agreement arbitration as a third country, it should be reviewed whether the disputes receive arbitrability under the Korean Arbitration Act or not.