• 제목/요약/키워드: Investor-State Arbitration

검색결과 38건 처리시간 0.024초

국제투자중재에서 제3자 자금조달 제도의 주요 법적 쟁점 (Major Legal Issues with Third Party Funding in International Investment Arbitration)

  • 안건형;김성룡;조인호
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제23권2호
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    • pp.55-79
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    • 2013
  • As arbitration becomes an increasingly popular mode of resolving disputes, neighboring industries begin to take notice. This interest is reflected in the increasing utilization of third party funding in international arbitration claims. In this regard, the third party funding industry appears particularly interested in investor-state arbitration claims because they typically involve considerable claim amounts and substantial legal fees. To examine this trend more closely, this paper, firstly, examines the investor-state arbitration more precisely in Chapter II. In Chapter III, this study continues to examine some legal issues which can arise as a result of a conflict of interest between the parties to the funding agreement including, inter alia, 1) a dispute in which the funder terminates the agreement during the arbitration proceedings, 2) a dispute in relation to a funder's intervention in arbitration proceedings, and 3) a dispute on the responsibility for adverse costs orders, if any. This paper further identifies major legal issues which can arise in relation to 1) disclosure of existence of the funding agreement, 2) attorney-client privilege. Lastly, in Chapter IV, this paper provides some lessons from an in-depth case study on third party funding agreements and solutions to avoid and to solve prospective disputes in the future.

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공기업 재산에 대한 국제투자중재판정의 집행가능성 (Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards Against the Assets of State-Owned Enterprises)

  • 장석영
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제29권1호
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    • pp.71-89
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    • 2019
  • When the host states do not comply with the investor-state arbitral awards voluntarily, it is difficult for the successful claimants to seek the enforcement of arbitral awards against the host state because of the doctrine of state immunity. This raises a question whether the investors might be able to seize the assets of the state-owned enterprises, as well as those of the host states. The investors might consider the properties held by state-owned enterprises as an attractive target especially when it has been established that the host state is responsible for the act of its state-owned enterprise. In such case, the investor might argue that the close relationship between the state-owned enterprise and the host state has already been recognized so that the commercial assets of the state-owned enterprise could be subject to attachment. On the other hand, the host state might argue that the state-owned entity exists separately from the state, and thus its assets cannot be equated with those of the host state. Moreover, even if this argument is not accepted and, as a result, the properties of the state-owned entity is equated with those of the host state, the host state might still be able to argue that non-commercial assets of the state-owned enterprise are immune from execution.

투자자-국가간 분쟁해결제도의 문제점과 대응방안 (The Problems and Countermeasures of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism)

  • 홍성규
    • 무역상무연구
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    • 제68권
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    • pp.89-121
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    • 2015
  • Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

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FTA(자유무역협정)에서 투자자 대 국가간 분쟁해결을 위한 국제중재제도 (The International Arbitration System for the Settlement of Investor-State Disputes in the FTA)

  • 이강빈
    • 무역상무연구
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    • 제38권
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    • pp.181-226
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    • 2008
  • The purpose of this paper is to describe the settling procedures of the investor-state disputes in the FTA Investment Chapter, and to research on the international arbitration system for the settlement of the investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCTAD reports that the cumulative number of arbitration cases for the investor-state dispute settlement is 290 cases by March 2008. 182 cases of them have been brought before the ICSID, and 80 cases of them have been submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID reports that the cumulative 263 cases of investor-state dispute settlement have been brought before the ICSID by March 2008. 136 cases of them have been concluded, but 127 cases of them have been pending up to now. The Chapter 11 Section B of the Korea-U.S. FTA provides for the Investor_State Dispute Settlement. Under the provisions of Section B, the claimant may submit to arbitration a claim that the respondent has breached and obligation under Section A, an investment authorization or an investment agreement and that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of that breach. Provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the ICSID(Chapter 2), arbitration(Chapter 3), and replacement and disqualification of arbitrators(Chapter 5) as follows. The jurisdiction of the ICSID shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the ICSID. Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party. The tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention Section 3 and in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. The award of the tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by members of the tribunal who voted for it. The award shall deal with every question submitted to the tribunal, and shall state the reason upon which it is based. Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. In conclusion, there may be some issues on the international arbitration for the settlement of the investor-state disputes: for example, abuse of litigation, lack of an appeals process, and problem of transparency. Therefore, there have been active discussions to address such issues by the ICSID and UNCITRAL up to now.

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국제투자중재판정의 집행에 있어서 구제조치의 개선방안 (An Improvement Discussion of Remedy in the Enforcement Mechanism of the International Investment Arbitral Award)

  • 홍성규
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제27권1호
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    • pp.131-160
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    • 2017
  • When any investment dispute arises, the investor has to exhaust the local remedies available in the host state, and according to the agreement between the parties, the investor is filed to the ICSID arbitral tribunal to seek arbitral awards. At this time, if the arbitral tribunal decides that the investment agreement has been violated, it normally demands the host state to provide financial compensations to the investor for economic loss. According to the rules of the investment agreement, the host state is supposed to fulfill the arbitral awards voluntarily. If it is unwilling to provide financial compensations according to the arbitral awards, however, the investor may ask the domestic court of the host state for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. In addition, if the host state is unwilling to fulfill arbitral awards on account of state immunity, the investor may ask his own country (state of nationality) for diplomatic protection and urge it to demand the fulfillment of arbitral awards. Effectiveness for pecuniary damages, a means to solve problems arising in the enforcement of investment arbitral awards, is found to be rather ineffective. For such cases, this study suggests an alternative to demand either a restitution of property or a corrections of violated measures subject to arbitral awards.

론스타 사건에 대한 실체적 및 절차적 쟁점 분석 - ICSID 중재판정을 중심으로 (Substantive and Procedural Issues of the Lone Star Case With a Focus on the ICSID Arbitral Award)

  • 장석영
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제33권1호
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    • pp.23-49
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    • 2023
  • An ICSID award on Lone Star case has been rendered finally on August 31st, 2022 after almost ten years since the Lone Star Funds submitted the request for arbitration against the Republic of Korea in 2012. The Lone Star case is the first investor-state dispute settlement(ISDS) case brought against Korea, and this case, also known as "eat and run" case, has given rise to heated debates for years. Moreover, as the ICSID tribunal has ordered Korea to pay the Lone Star Funds the sum of USD 216.5 million plus interest in the award, this case has become once again the subject of controversy. Any arguments and evidence submitted by the parties in dispute have not been disclosed until recently, however, as the memorials and the award are now open to the public, it has become possible to realize the assertions of each party and the decisions of the tribunal in detail. Therefore, this paper aims at analyzing the main issues of the Lone Star case with a focus on the ICSID award. By examining the substantive and procedural issues of the case one after the other, it might be able to understand the whole picture of the case and prepare for the remaining procedures of this case and other upcoming cases as well.

국제투자조약상 포괄적 보호조항(Umbrella Clauses)의 해석에 관한 연구 (Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Treaties)

  • 조희문
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제19권2호
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    • pp.95-126
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    • 2009
  • One of the controversial issues in investor-state investment arbitration is the interpretation of "umbrella clause" that is found in most BIT and FTAs. This treaty clause requires on Contracting State of treaty to observe all investment obligations entered into with foreign investors from the other Contracting State. This clause did not receive in-depth attention until SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines cases produced starkly different conclusions on the relations about treaty-based jurisdiction and contract-based jurisdiction. More recent decisions by other arbitral tribunals continue to show different approaches in their interpretation of umbrella clauses. Following the SGS v. Philippines decision, some recent decisions understand that all contracts are covered by umbrella clause, for example, in Siemens A.G. v. Argentina, LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentina and Enron Corp. V. Argentina. However, other recent decisions have found a different approach that only certain kinds of public contracts are covered by umbrella clauses, for example, in El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentina, Pan American Energy LLC v. Argentina and CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina. With relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, most of tribunals have the position that the contractual remedy should not affect the jurisdiction of BIT tribunal. Even some tribunals considered that there is no need to exhaust contract remedies before bringing BIT arbitration, provoking suspicion of the validity of sanctity of contract in front of treaty obligation. The decision of the Annulment Committee In CMS case in 2007 was an extraordinarily surprising one and poured oil on the debate. The Committee composed of the three respected international lawyers, Gilbert Guillaume and Nabil Elaraby, both from the ICJ, and professor James Crawford, the Rapportuer of the International Law Commission on the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, observed that the arbitral tribunal made critical errors of law, however, noting that it has limited power to review and overturn the award. The position of the Committee was a direct attack on ICSID system showing as an internal recognition of ICSID itself that the current system of investor-state arbitration is problematic. States are coming to limit the scope of umbrella clauses. For example, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT detailed definition of the type of contracts for which breach of contract claims may be submitted to arbitration, to increase certainty and predictability. Latin American countries, in particular, Argentina, are feeling collectively victims of these pro-investor interpretations of the ICSID tribunals. In fact, BIT between developed and developing countries are negotiated to protect foreign investment from developing countries. This general characteristic of BIT reflects naturally on the provisions making them extremely protective for foreign investors. Naturally, developing countries seek to interpret restrictively BIT provisions, whereas developed countries try to interpret more expansively. As most of cases arising out of alleged violation of BIT are administered in the ICSID, a forum under the auspices of the World Bank, these Latin American countries have been raising the legitimacy deficit of the ICSID. The Argentine cases have been provoking many legal issues of international law, predicting crisis almost coming in actual investor-state arbitration system. Some Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina, already showed their dissatisfaction with the ICSID system considering withdrawing from it to minimize the eventual investor-state dispute. Thus the disagreement over umbrella clauses in their interpretation is becoming interpreted as an historical reflection on the continued tension between developing and developed countries on foreign investment. There is an academic and political discussion on the possible return of the Calvo Doctrine in Latin America. The paper will comment on these problems related to the interpretation of umbrella clause. The paper analyses ICSID cases involving principally Latin American countries to identify the critical legal issues arising between developing and developed countries. And the paper discusses alternatives in improving actual investor-State investment arbitration; inter alia, the introduction of an appellate system and treaty interpretation rules.

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한.미 FTA 투자챕터(Chapter)와 환경문제 (The Investment Chapter of the Korea-US FTA and its Implications for Environmental Matters)

  • 박덕영
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제24권1호
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    • pp.25-44
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    • 2014
  • Conflict between transnational environmental issues and foreign investment in capital-importing states can be commonly found. Actually, several investor-state dispute arbitration cases like Bilcon v. Canada, S.D. Myers v. Canada, and Metalclad v. Mexico concerned environmental matters. States are worried about their measures for securing the environment might be deemed to go against international investment agreements and foreign investors also are anxious because of excessive regulations. Against this backdrop, stakeholders attempt to strike a balance between securing foreign investment and preserving the environment. This article argues that the investment chapter of the Korea-US FTA tries to solve environment-investment collision in investor-state disputes. Before analyzing the provisions of the investment chapter most relevant to environmental issues, this article points out the most typical types of environmental clauses included in international investment agreements. The investment chapter of the Korea-US FTA has provisions which effectively prevent measures from becoming useless when those measures are legitimate measures relevant to environmental matters. This does not mean that the Korea-US FTA completely solves the conflict between environmental issues and the protection of foreign investment, but still it paves the way for a prudent solution which would hash out this thorny problem.

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최근의 EU 회원국간 양자투자협정과 투자자-국가 분쟁 동향 - Achmea BV v. Slovakia 사건을 중심으로 - (Achmea BV v. Slovakia: The End of the Intra-EU BIT and the Investor State Dispute?)

  • 강성진
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제28권2호
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    • pp.201-216
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    • 2018
  • After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union's Common Commercial Policy now belongs to the exclusive competence area of the EU, including the foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. Regarding the bilateral investment protection treaties (BITs) between the EU Member States, the European Commission is of the view that such BITs should be discarded. On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in the Achmea BV v. Slovakia case that a BIT between the EU Member States, as well as arbitral awards based on that BIT, is not subject to request for preliminary rulings under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and thus they are not compatible with the EU law. However, the judgment did not silence the controversy. Instead, many people questioned the legal reasoning and the legitimacy of judgment, and therefore the problem is still ongoing.

Recent Developments in the EU Investment Policy : Towards an Investment World Court?

  • Giupponi, Belen Olmos
    • 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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    • 제26권3호
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    • pp.175-230
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    • 2016
  • The controversies that have surrounded the negotiation of both the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have underlined the difficulties arising out from the adoption of a truly common EU investment policy. Non-governmental organizations have called into question transparency and legitimacy of international investment arbitration during the negotiations. The article presents a reflection about current developments of the EU investment policy addressing, in particular, the criticisms towards the whole investor-to-State system and the EU's efforts in developing a "tailor-made" investment agreement and Investor-to-State Dispute resolution system. Along these lines, the article critically assesses the recently announced proposal for the establishment of an 'Investment Court System' put forward by the EU during the TTIP negotiations.