• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.67 no.8
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• pp.1009-1018
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• 2018

As the generation of renewable energy increases rapidly, the stability of the grid due to its intermittency becomes a problem. The most appropriate way to solve this problem is to combine and operate the renewable generators with the ESS(Energy Storage System). However, since the revenues of operating the ESS are less than the investment cost, many countries are implementing various incentive policies for encouraging investment of the ESS. In this paper we estimated optimal capacity of the ESS to maximize profits of renewable energy generation businesses under the incentive policy of Korea and analyzed the impact of the incentive policy on the future electric power system of Jeju island. The simulation results show that the incentive policy has significantly improved the profitability of the renewable energy businesses generation business. But the volatility of the net demand has increased as the energy stored in the ESS is discharged intensively at the time of the incentive application.

• KIEAE Journal
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.53-59
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• 2015

Purpose: Reducing energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions is a primary concern throughout the world, and the building sector is a particularly efficient area for making these reductions. In South Korea, the government has recently enacted policies for "Green Growth" that, among other things, enforce regulations in the building certification rating system (BCRS) and reorganize existing incentive systems. Method: In this study, we examined regulations and incentive systems used in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States that encourage the use of energy efficient technologies in construction and compared these policies to those used in South Korea. We also disseminated surveys to experts in the fields of architecture, planning and design, and engineering to better understand their knowledge and perception of the BCRS and its incentive systems. Additionally, we sought their recommendations for improving these incentive systems. Result: Based on our comparative case studies of regulations and incentives in other countries, alongside recommendations from experts in South Korea, we concluded that incentive systems in South Korea are limited and require improvement. We make recommendations for strengthening existing regulations and incentives and for implementing new incentive programs.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.59-75
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• 1998

This paper presents an incentive system to reduce response time from a supplier. The incentive system is expressed as a contract between an assembler and a supplier who have a long-term relationship. We produce the optimal payment scheme and expected total cost, when the assembler is farsighted. We show that the farsighted assembler obtains higher effort level from the supplier than the myopic assembler. We also show that the expected total cost of the farsighted assembler is smaller in the long run, although it is initially higher than that of the myopic assembler.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.3
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• pp.536-542
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• 2010

This paper presents an unique approach to scheme a demand response (DR) program in the electricity market from a customer-oriented perspective, which is based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The proposed program has the objective to maintain the system reliability at the emergency period, and it is designed as an incentive-based program (IBP) considering Korea power systems with the cost-based generation pool (CBP). The DR program using AHP could represent the mutual importance degrees of load curtailment criteria from the viewpoint of different load-holders, thus customers' participation in this program is determined by the incentive payments corresponding the specific load curtailment conditions. A test system for the case study is used to demonstrate the usefulness and applicability of the proposed approach, and the load profiles with the proposed DR program and the required incentive payments are obtained. The results show not only the enhancement of system reliability but also the economic benefit within Pareto-improvement.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.999-1007
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• 2018

To implement crowdsensing system in reality, trustiness between service provider server and user is necessary. Service provider server could manipulate the evaluation of sensing data to reduce incentive. Moreover, user could send a fake sensing data to get unjust incentive. In this paper, we adopt private blockchain on crowdsensing system, and thus paid incentives and sent data are unmodifiablely recorded. It makes server and users act as watcher of each others. Through adopting smart contract, our system automates sensing data evaluation and opens to users how it works. Finally, we show the feasibility of proposing system with performance evaluation and comparison with other systems.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.39-48
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• 2019

This paper considers the Prisoner's Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game's payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.199-214
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• 2016

There is a negotiation between management and labors about paying incentive at the every end of the year. This result causes the conflict between management and labors. The successful operation of incentive system is based on respect and common benefit between workers and managers. The manager-trust is the power of leading reciprocality. This research started from the issues of companies with incentive system at this year. This research analysed the influence of manager-trust by the fairness of incentive system. and how HRM system affects the manager-trust through the strength of the HRM system. It appeared in a survey that shows the fairness of incentive system and manager-trust effect positive matter. As a result of the control effect in the strength of the HRM system, the relationship between distributive justice and manager-trust shows that Distinctiveness, consistency, and consensus have the control effect. Although the Distinctiveness has control effect, consistency and consensus didn't have control effect in the relationship between perceptual justice and manager-trust.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.22-31
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• 2009

While large companies successfully manage incentive systems, small and medium sized companies have difficulties in successful management of the incentive system. In this article, we propose an incentive model fitted for the small and medium sized companies. To overcome the barriers, which are mainly due to lack of resources, we use the ideas of TOC and BSC. We also provide an application example of an actual company and examine the validity of our model.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.263-274
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• 2012

This study describes the hypertensive patients characteristics associated with the health incentive point program, and develops and analyzes a simple predictive model of participation in the program. Based on the Incheon Chronic Disease Management System(iCDMS), a model program of community partnership for hypertensive or diabetic patients detection and follow-up since 2005 in Incheon metropolitan city, a cross-sectional design was used in this study. An effective 10.844 adults sample was divided into groups according to participation in the health incentive point program and continuing treatment, and individual and health characteristics among groups were compared. Furthermore, the predictors associated with participation in the program were identified by the logistic regression analysis. After the health incentive point program in iCDMS was introduced, the number of hypertensive patients participation in the program increased 23.9 times which is vastly high given the various programs were provided. There were statistically significant differences among the groups: age(p=0.000), treatment compliance(p=0.000), and blood pressure control at the last measurement(p=0.000), in particular, between participation group(GroupI, n=246) and non-participation group(GroupIII, n=10,408). Furthermore, age over 60 years(OR: 0.33), treatment compliance(OR: 3.49~3.78) and blood pressure controls(OR: 2.13~2.30) were statistically significant predictors associated with participation in the program, based on the logistic regression analysis with GroupI and GroupIII. To increase participation in the health incentive point program, variables such as age, treatment compliance and blood pressure controls are more concerned. And, high-risk patients and family members need targeted health incentive programs.