• Title/Summary/Keyword: IS payoff

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Study on the Optimal Location of Low Altitude Air Defense Radar (저고도 방공 레이더 최적 배치에 관한 연구)

  • Baek, Kyung-Hyoek;Lee, Youngwoo;Jang, Hoon
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Military Science and Technology
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    • v.17 no.2
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    • pp.248-257
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    • 2014
  • As observed in the recent war, suppression of enemy air defense operation is one of the major tactics, simultaneously conducted with high payoff target. Specifically, our air defense operation should be properly constructed, since the operating environment of our forces mostly consists with mountainous terrain, which makes detections of the enemy difficult. The effective arrangements of low altitude air defense radars can be suggested as a way of improving the detection capability of our forces. In this paper, we consider the location problem of low altitude air defense radar, and formulate it as an Integer Programming. Specifically, we surveyed the previous researches on facility location problems and applied two particularly relevant models(MCLP, MEXCLP) to our problem. The terrain factor was represented as demand points in the models. We verified the optimal radar locations for operational situations through simulation model which depicts simple battle field. In the simulation model, the performance of optimal radar locations are measured by the enemy detection rate. With a series of experiments, we may conclude that when locating low altitude air defense radars, it is important to consider the detection probability of radar. We expect that this finding may be helpful to make a more effective air defense plan.

AN EFFICIENT AND ROBUST NUMERICAL METHOD FOR OPTION PRICES IN A TWO-ASSET JUMP-DIFFUSION MODEL

  • Lee, Chaeyoung;Wang, Jian;Jang, Hanbyeol;Han, Hyunsoo;Lee, Seongjin;Lee, Wonjin;Yang, Kisung;Kim, Junseok
    • The Pure and Applied Mathematics
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    • v.27 no.4
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    • pp.231-249
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    • 2020
  • We present an efficient and robust finite difference method for a two-asset jump diffusion model, which is a partial integro-differential equation (PIDE). To speed up a computational time, we compute a matrix so that we can calculate the non-local integral term fast by a simple matrix-vector operation. In addition, we use bilinear interpolation to solve integral term of PIDE. We can obtain more stable value by using the payoff-consistent extrapolation. We provide numerical experiments to demonstrate a performance of the proposed numerical method. The numerical results show the robustness and accuracy of the proposed method.

Multi-Stage Generation Allocation Game Considering Ramp-rate Constraints (경쟁적 전력시장에서 발전기 증감발률을 고려한 다중시간 발전량 배분 게임)

  • Park, Yong-Gi;Park, Jong-Bae;Roh, Jae-Hyung;Kim, Hyeong-Jung;Shin, Jung-Rin
    • The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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    • v.60 no.3
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    • pp.509-516
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    • 2011
  • This paper studies a novel method to find the profit-maximizing Nash Equilibriums in allocating generation quantities with consideration of ramp-rates under competitive market environment. Each GenCo in a market participates in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies. In order to find the Nash equilibriums it is necessary to search the feasible combinations of GenCos' strategies which satisfy every participant's profit and no one wants various constraints. During the procedure to find Nash equilibriums, the payoff matrix can be simplified as eliminating the dominated strategies. in each time interval. Because of the ramp-rate, generator's physically or technically limits to increase or decrease outputs in its range, it can restrict the number of bidding strategies of each generator at the next stage. So in this paper, we found the Nash Equilibriums for multi-stage generation allocation game considering the ramp-rate limits of generators. In the case studies, we analyzed the generation allocation game for a 12-hour multi-stage and compared it with the results of dynamic economic dispatch. Both of the two cases were considered generator's ramp-rate effects.

An Economic Analysis of Commercial Arbitration from the Game Theory Perspective: Theoretical Analysis and a Case Study (게임이론을 통한 상사중재의 경제학적 분석: 이론과 사례)

  • Kim, Sung-Ryong;Hwang, Seok-Joon;Hwang, Uk
    • Korea Trade Review
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    • v.43 no.6
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    • pp.1-24
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    • 2018
  • This study analyzes the dispute settlement of between arbitration and litigation using a game theoretical approach. Many studies on arbitration have so far focused on the relevant institutions. However, there are few theoretical studies that have focused on the demand side of arbitration. The model presented here suggests conditions under which arbitration form a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, provided that the players strategically choose a dispute settlement tool. Furthermore, the suggested model is used to analyze simple cases of international commercial dispute cases.

Power Control Algorithm with Finite Strategies: Game Theoretic Approach (게임이론을 이용한 유한 전략 집합을 갖는 전력제어 알고리즘)

  • Kim, Ju-Hyup;Jang, Yeon-Sik;Lee, Deok-Joo;Hong, Een-Kee
    • Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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    • v.13 no.1
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    • pp.87-96
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    • 2009
  • The purpose of this paper is to analyze the power control problem in wireless communications with game theoretic approach. The major contribution of the present paper is that we formulated the problem as a game with a finite number of strategies while most of the previous game theoretic power control literatures modeled with continuous game in which there are infinite number of strategies. It should be noted that the closed-loop power control would be performed in a discrete manner, power up or down from the present level of power with fixed power control step size. We model the current closed-loop power control scheme with the famous Prisoner's dilemma model and show that the power-up strategy is Nash equilibrium. That is, every mobile tries to increase their power and approach to their maximal power. Thus, the outcome of current power control (Nash equilibrium) is inefficient. In order to attain efficient power control for the environment where ICI(Inter-Cell Interference is severe, we developed a new payoff function in which the penalty mechanism is introduced and derived conditions under which power-down becomes Nash equilibrium strategy for all players. Furthermore we examined the trajectory of equilibrium power when the power control game will be played repeatedly.

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Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in a Polluting Duopoly and Endogenous Timing Game (오염배출기업의 환경에 대한 사회적 책임과 내생적 시간게임)

  • Lee, Sang-Ho;Park, Chul-Hi
    • Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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    • v.27 no.1
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    • pp.1-28
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    • 2018
  • This study investigates the strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) of polluting duopoly when two firms have different production costs and compete with prices. We then examine an endogenous timing game in choosing ECSR and its effects on environmental damage and social welfare. The followings are the main findings: First, sequential choice of ECSR is strategic complements and it provides late adopter advantage irrespective of cost difference. Second, sequential choice of ECSR is the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. In particular, an efficient firm-leading ECSR is the payoff dominance equilibrium when cost difference is significant. Finally, environmental damage and social welfare depend on the social cost of pollution. In particular, an efficient firm-leading ECSR is socially desirable when social cost is high. However, an inefficient firm-leading ECSR increases environmental damage irrespective of social cost and it reduces social welfare when cost difference is significant.

GDP Linked Bonds and Currency Risk Premiums (GDP 연계채권과 환리스크 프리미엄)

  • Sohn, Kyoung-woo
    • Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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    • v.12 no.3
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    • pp.379-396
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    • 2021
  • Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study the rational payoff from the standpoint of foreign investors and the government when the government issues GDP-linked bonds to foreign investors. Design/methodology/approach - In this paper, the prices of 12 types of GDP-linked bond structures, which are classified according to the calculation cycle of the rate of change of linked GDP, the currency issued, and whether options are embedded, were evaluated. The Fama-French 3-factor model and the GMM-SDF model are used in the asset pricing model, and domestic and overseas investors used different basis assets. Findings - The KRW premium for US investors is estimated to be 43bp on a quarterly basis and 30bp on an annual basis, respectively, meaning that when the government issues bonds in KRW, the interest rate paid to US investors will be reduced by 30bp to 160bp (annually converted). Using the Fama-French 3 factor model, the KRW premium is the risk premium for the US market beta, meaning that if US investors do not intend to invest in US market beta, it is advantageous to receive an additional interest rate by investing in USD-denominated GDP-linked bonds. Korea's GDP- linked bond give US investors diversified investment utility, so they are willing to incorporate Korean GDP-linked bonds even if -150bp of interest is deducted from the structure issued to Korean investors. And as a result of estimating the value of the option through the GDP-linked bond with options that provides a floor for guaranteeing the principal, the value of the option linked to the annual GDP issued in dollars was the lowest. Research implications or Originality - Issuing dollar-denominated GDP-linked bonds linked to annual GDP with the option of guaranteeing the principal by the government is a way to increase investment opportunities for US investors and achieve financial stability of the government.

An Experimental Study on the Prospect Theory (전망이론에 관한 실험연구)

  • Guahk, Seyoung
    • Journal of Digital Convergence
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    • v.15 no.11
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    • pp.107-112
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    • 2017
  • This paper performed an experimental study to test the validity of the prospect theory proposed by Tversky and Kahneman as an alternative to the expected utility theory. 115 college students attended the hypothetical games to choose one of two lotteries, one is safe option while the other one is risky. The risky options were set up to have low, medium or high probability of payoffs or losses. The amount of payoffs and losses of the lotteries was either large or small. Maximum likelihood estimation of the hypothetical games have shown that in case of high probability of positive payoffs the respondents were risk averse and when the probability of positive payoffs were small the respondents were risk loving. when the possibility of loss is high they were risk loving, while the probability is of loss is low the respondents were found to be risk averse. When the probability of risky options were medium the results were significant statistically in case of only losses. The amount of positive payoff or losses does not affect the results. Overall the results of this experiments support the prospect theory more than those of Laury & Holts (2008).

A Study of Call Admission Control Scheme using Noncooperative Game under Homogeneous Overlay Wireless Networks (동종의 중첩 무선 네트워크에서 비협력적 게임을 이용한 호수락 제어기법의 연구)

  • Kim, Nam Sun
    • Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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    • v.20 no.4
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    • pp.1-9
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    • 2015
  • This paper proposes CAC method that is more efficient for RRM using game theory combined with Multiple Attribute Decision Making(MADM). Because users request services with different Quality of Service(QoS), the network preference values to alternative networks for each service are calculated by MADM methods such as Grey Relational Analysis(GRA), Simple Additive Weighting(SAW) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution(TOPSIS). According to a utility function representing preference value, non-cooperative game is played, and then network provider select the requested service that provide maximum payoff. The appropriate service is selected through Nash Equilibrium that is the solution of game and the game is played repeated. We analyze two overlaid networks among four Wireless LAN(WLAN) systems with different properties. Simulation results show that proposed MADM techniques have same outcomes for every game round.

PECAN: Peer Cache Adaptation for Peer-to-Peer Video-on-Demand Streaming

  • Kim, Jong-Tack;Bahk, Sae-Woong
    • Journal of Communications and Networks
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    • v.14 no.3
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    • pp.286-295
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    • 2012
  • To meet the increased demand of video-on-demand (VoD) services, peer-to-peer (P2P) mesh-based multiple video approaches have been recently proposed, where each peer is able to find a video segment interested without resort to the video server. However, they have not considered the constraint of the server's upload bandwidth and the fairness between upload and download amounts at each peer. In this paper, we propose a novel P2P VoD streaming system, named peer cache adaptation (PECAN) where each peer adjusts its cache capacity adaptively to meet the server's upload bandwidth constraint and achieve the fairness. For doing so, we first propose a new cache replacement algorithm that designs the number of caches for a segment to be proportional to its popularity. Second, we mathematically prove that if the cache capacity of a peer is proportional to its segment request rate, the fairness between upload and download amounts at each peer can be achieved. Third, we propose a method that determines each peer's cache capacity adaptively according to the constraint of the server's upload bandwidth. Against the proposed design objective, some selfish peers may not follow our protocol to increase their payoff. To detect such peers, we design a simple distributed reputation and monitoring system. Through simulations, we show that PECAN meets the server upload bandwidth constraint, and achieves the fairness well at each peer. We finally verify that the control overhead in PECAN caused by the search, reputation, and monitoring systems is very small, which is an important factor for real deployment.