• Strategy21
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• 통권45호
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• pp.91-115
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• 2019

1997년 Issue Correlates of War(ICOW) 프로젝트 시작 이후 해양관할권 분쟁에 대한 정량적 연구가 미국을 중심으로 활발하게 진행되었다. 이러한 정량적 연구는 일부 해양관할권 분쟁 중심의 사례 연구에 비해 많은 해양관할권 분쟁을 연구 범위에 포함하고 있고, 통계적 오류를 최소화하기 위해 다양한 통계기법을 적용함으로써 광범위한 사례에 적용될 수 있는 일반화된 연구결과를 도출하고 있다. 이번 연구는 ICOW 데이터를 바탕으로 해양관할권 분쟁을 정량적으로 연구한 결과를 분석한 후 독도 문제에 적용될 수 있는 요소를 도출하고, 이를 바탕으로 독도 문제의 평화적 관리 및 해결에 어떤 전략이 효과적일지 설명하고자 한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.103-141
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• 2018

As the South China Sea maritime dispute illustrates, when considering the place where maritime claims occur, states do not have many choices to respond to maritime claims in which disputed areas are located far away from the land and are surrounded by the sea. As Mearsheimer (2014) points out, the sea stops power projection. Therefore, in order to adopt coercive as well as peaceful settlement policies to deal with maritime claims, states need to overcome obstacles (the sea) to project power. It means that if states want to conduct a specific foreign policy action, such as negotiating maritime borderlines or arguing sovereignty on islands, they need a tool (naval power) to coerce or to persuade the opponent. However, there are lack of research that studies maritime claims from the perspective of naval power. This research project fills this gap based on naval power. How do relative levels of naval power and (dis) parities of naval power influence the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims? Naval power is a constitutive element during maritime claims. If disputants over maritime claims have required naval power to project their capability, it means that they have the capability to apply various ways, such as aggressive options including MIDs, to accomplish their goals. So, I argue that when two claimants have enough naval power to project their capabilities, the likelihood of MIDs over maritime claims increases. Given that one or both states have a certain level of naval power, how does relative naval power between two claimants influence the management of maritime claims? Based on the power transition theory, I argue that when the disparities of relative naval power between claimants becomes distinctive, militarized conflicts surrounding maritime territory are less probable. Based on the ICOW project which codes maritime claims from 1900 to 2001, the empirical results of the Poisson models show if both claimants have projectable naval power, the occurrence of MIDs over maritime claims increases. In addition, the result shows that when disputants maintain similar relative naval powers, they are more likely to initiate MIDs over maritime claims. To put it differently, if naval capabilities' gap between two claimants becomes larger, the probability of the occurrence of MIDs decreases.