• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.54 no.6
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• pp.2120-2134
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• 2022

A hypothetical core destructive accident (HCDA) has received widespread attention as one of the most serious accidents in sodium-cooled fast reactors. This study combined recent advantages in numerical methods to realize realistic modeling of the complex fluid-structure interactions during HCDAs in a full-scale sodium-cooled fast reactor. The multi-material arbitrary Lagrangian-Eulerian method is used to describe the fluid-structure interactions inside the container. Both the structural deformations and plug rises occurring during HCDAs are evaluated. Two levels of expansion energy are considered with two different reactor models. The simulation results show that the container remains intact during an accident with small deformations. The plug on the top of the container rises to an acceptable level after the sealing between the it and its support is destroyed. The methodology established in this study provides a reliable approach for evaluating the safety feature of a container design.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.291-298
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• 2003

The KN-12 transport cask has been designed to transport 12 PWR spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to comply with the regulatory requirements for a Type B(U) package. The containment boundary of the cask is defined by a cask body, a cask lid, lid bolts with nuts, O-ring seals and a bolted closure lid. The containment vessel for the cask consists of a forged thick-walled carbon steel cylindrical body with an integrally-welded carbon steel bottom and is closed by a lid made of stainless steel, which is fastened to the cask body by lid bolts with nuts and sealed by double elastomer O-rings. In the cask lid an opening is closed by a plug with an O-ring seal and covered by the bolted closure lid sealed with an O-ring. The cask must maintain a radioactivity release rate of not more than the regulatory limit for normal transport conditions and for hypothetical accident conditions, as required by the related regulations. The containment requirements of the cask are satisfied by maintaining a maximum air reference leak rate of $2.7{\times}10^{-4}ref.cm^3s^{-1}$ or a helium leak rate of $3.3{\times}10^{-4}cm^3s^{-1}$ for normal transport conditions and for hypothetical accident conditions.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.183-191
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• 2023

The potential impact of hypothetical accidents that occur during the immediate and deferred dismantling of the Kori Unit 1 steam generator has been comprehensively evaluated. The evaluation includes determining the inventory of radionuclides in the Steam Generator based on surface contamination measurements, assuming a rate of release for each accident scenario, and applying external and internal exposure dose coefficients to assess the effects of radionuclides on human health. The evaluation also includes calculating the atmospheric dispersion factor using the PAVAN code and analyzing three years of meteorological data from Kori NPP to determine the degree of diffusion of radionuclides in the atmosphere. Overall, the effective dose for residents living in the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) of Kori NPP is predicted, an it is found that the maximum level of the dose is 0.034% compared to the annual dose limit of 1 mSv for the general public. This implies that the potential impact of hypothetical accidents on human health discussed above is within acceptable limits.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society for Noise and Vibration Engineering Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.766-771
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• 2001

The package used to transport radioactive materials, which is called by cask, must be safe under normal and hypothetical accident conditions. These requirements for the cask design must be verified through test or finite element analysis. Since the cost for FE analysis is less than one for test. the verification by FE analysis is mainly used. But due to the complexity of mechanical behaviors. the results depends on how users apply the codes and it can cause severe errors during analysis. In this paper, finite element analysis is carried out for the 9 meters free drop and the puncture condition of the hypothetical accident conditions using LS-DYNA3D and ABAQUS/Explicit. We have investigated the analyzing technique for the free drop impact test of the cask and found several vulnerable cases to errors. The analyzed results were compared with each other. We have suggested a reliable and relatively simple analysis technique for the drop test of spent nuclear fuel casks.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2004.05a
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• pp.174.1-174.1
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• 2004

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2003.10a
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• pp.180-180
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• 2003

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.187-201
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• 2002

The KN-12 cask is designed to transport 12 PWR spent nuclear fuels and to comply with the requirements of Korea Atomic Energy Act, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.57-1 and US 10 CFR Part 71 for a Type B(U)F package. It provides containment, radiation shielding, structural integrity, criticality control and heat removal for normal transport and hypothetical accident conditions. W.H 14$\times$14, 16$\times$16 and 17$\times$17 fuel assemblies with maximum allowable initial enrichment of 5.0 wt.%, maximum average burn-up of 50,000 MWD/MTU and minimum cooling time of 7 years being used in Korea will be loaded and subsequently transported under dry and wet conditions. A forged cylindrical cask body which constitutes the containment vessel is closed by a cask lid. Polyethylene rods for neutron shielding are arranged in two rows of longitudinal bore holes in the cask body wall. A fuel basket to accommodate up to 12 PWR fuel assemblies provides support of the fuels, control of criticality and a path to dissipate heat. Impact limiters to absorb the impact energy under the hypothetical accident conditions are attacked at the top and at the bottom side of the cask during transport. Handling weight loaded with water is 74.8 tons and transport weight loaded with water with the impact limiters is 84.3 tons. The cask will be licensed in accordance with Korea Atomic Energy Act 3nd fabricated in Korea in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section 111, Division 3.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1997.05a
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• pp.495-501
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• 1997

A preliminary and parametric sensitivity study on recriticality risk of fast reactor cores after a hypothetical total core meltdown accident was performed. Only neutronic aspects of the accident were considered, independent of the accident scenario, and efforts were made to estimate the quantity of molten fuel which must be ejected out of the core to assure a sub-critical state after the accident. Two types of parameters were examined : characteristic parameters of molten core such as geometry, molten pool type (homogenized or stratified), fuel temperature, environment, and relative parameters to normal core such as core size(small or large), and fuel type (oxide, nitride, metal). The first type of parameters was found to intervene more directly in the recriticality risk than the second type of parameters.

• Journal of computational fluids engineering
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• v.10 no.3 s.30
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• pp.9-18
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• 2005

During a hypothetical severe accident in a nuclear power plant (NPP), hydrogen is generated by the active reaction of fuel-cladding and steam in the reactor pressure vessel and released with steam into the containment. In order to mitigate hydrogen hazards possibly occurred in the NPP containment, hydrogen mitigation system (HMS) is usually adopted. The design of the next generation NPP (APR1400) designed in Korea specifies 26 passive autocatalytic recombiners and 10 igniters installed in the containment for the hydrogen mitigation. in this study, the analysis of the hydrogen and steam behavior during a total lose of feed water (TLOFW) accident in the APR1400 containment has been conducted by using the CFD code GASFLOW. During the accident, a huge amount of hot water, steam, and hydrogen is released in the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST). The current design of the APR1400 includes flap-type dampers at the IRWST vents which are operated depending on the pressure difference between inside and outside of the IRWST. it was found that the flaps strongly affects the flow structure of the steam and hydrogen in the containment. The possibilities of a flame acceleration and transition from deflagration to detonation (DDT) were evaluated by using Sigma-Lambda criteria. Numerical results indicate the DDT possibility could be heavily reduced in the IRWST compartment when the flaps are installed.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.8
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• pp.3017-3029
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• 2023

In the late in-vessel phase of a nuclear reactor severe accident, the internal heat transfer and crust evolution during the debris bed melting process have important effects on the thermal load distribution along the vessel wall, and further affect the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) failure mode and the state of melt during leakage. This study coupled the phase change model and large eddy simulation to investigate the variations of the temperature, melt liquid fraction, crust and heat flux distributions during the debris bed melting process in the hypothetical severe accident of HPR1000. The results indicated that the heat flow towards the vessel wall and upper surface were similar at the beginning stage of debris melting, but the upward heat flow increased significantly as the development of the molten pool. The maximum heat flux towards the vessel wall reached 0.4 MW/m². The thickness of lower crust decreased as the debris melting. It was much thicker at the bottom region with the azimuthal angle below 20° and decreased rapidly at the azimuthal angle around 20-50°. The maximum and minimum thicknesses were 2 and 90 mm, respectively. By contrast, the distribution of upper crust was uniform and reached stable state much earlier than the lower crust, with the thickness of about 10 mm. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis of initial condition indicated that as the decrease of time interval from reactor scram to debris bed dried-out, the maximum debris temperature and melt fraction became larger, the lower crust thickness became thinner, but the upper crust had no significant change. The sensitivity analysis of in-vessel retention (IVR) strategies indicated that the passive and active external reactor vessel cooling (ERVC) had little effect on the internal heat transfer and crust evolution. In the case not considering the internal reactor vessel cooling (IRVC), the upper crust was not obvious.