• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Industrial Safety Conference
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• 2002.05a
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• pp.231-236
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• 2002

급속한 산업의 발달에 따른 화학산업 시설의 공정 및 설비의 세분화는 대규모의 잠재 위험성을 증가시키며, 산업현장에서는 인간의 불안전한 행동 및 상태의 잠재위험으로 인한 중대재해 사고의 우려가 더 한층 증가하고 있다.(중략)

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.21 no.5
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• pp.515-523
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• 2015

This study reviewed 612 DP LOP(Loss of Position) incident reports which submitted to IMCA from 2001~2010 and identified 103 human error caused incidents and classified it through HFACS. And, this study analysis of conditional probability of human error on DP LOP incidents through application of bayesian network. As a result, all 103 human error related DP LOP incidents were caused by unsafe acts, and among unsafe acts 70 incidents(68.0 %) were related to skill based error which are the largest proportion of human error causes. Among skill based error, 60(58.3%) incidents were involved inadvertent use of controls and 8(7.8%) incidents were involved omitted step in procedure. Also, 21(20.8%) incidents were involved improper maneuver because of decision error. Also this study identified that unsafe supervision(68%) is effected as the largest latent causes of unsafe acts through application to bayesian network. As a results, it is identified that combined analysis of HFACS and bayesian network are useful tool for human error analysis. Based on these results, this study suggest 9 recommendations such as polices, interpersonal interaction, training etc. to prevent and mitigate human errors during DP operations.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.181-191
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• 2009

In general, seafarer's human error is considered to be the preponderant muse for the majority of maritime transportation accidents in a merchant ship. The implementation techniques for Human Error Model (HEM) to assess possible accident risk by deck officers including captain, chief officer, second mate and third mate are described in this study. The scope of this work is focused to 642 deck officers in the ship management company with 130 vessels. At first, HEM can be constructed through the statistical analysis and expert's brainstorming process with human data to 642 deck officers. Then the variables $\upsilon$ for the human factors, the evaluation level EP($\upsilon$) for $\upsilon$, the weight $\alpha$ of $\upsilon$, and the title weight $\beta$ of each deck officers can be decided. In addition, through the analysis of ship's accident history, the accident causation ratios by human error ${\gamma}_H$ and by external error ${\gamma}_B$ can be found as 0.517(51.7%) and 0.483(48.3%), respectively. The correlation coefficients to $\upsilon$ are also shown significant for a 95% confidence interval (p < 0.05) for each coefficient. And the validity of HEM is also surveyed by the analysis of normal probability distribution of risk level RL to each deck officer.

• The Journal of Korea Institute of Information, Electronics, and Communication Technology
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.7-13
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• 2021

This paper proposes a method to minimize the target's direction detection error using RADAR. The radar system cannot accurately detect the target direction due to the phase error of he received signal. The proposed method of this study obtains a phase by applying an root mean square to each antenna incident signal, and reduces the phase error by using an optimal signal to noise ratio. In the simulation result, the probability of detecting the target direction is the best when the antenna spacing is half wavelength. The conventional method of direction detection probability 10-1.7 and the proposed method is 10-3.3. The target detection direction of the existing method represents [-8°,8°] with an error of 2 degrees. The target detection direction of the proposed method is shown in [-10°,10°], and all target directions are accurately detected. In the future, There is need for a method to reduce the phase error even though the resolution decrease.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Disaster Information Conference
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• 2022.10a
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• pp.227-228
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• 2022

전통적인 HRA(Human Reliability Analysis)방법은 특정 애플리케이션 또는 산업을 염두에 두고 있으며. 또한 이러한 방법은 종종 복잡하며, 시간이 많이 걸리고 적용하는 데 비용이 많이 들며 직접 비교하기에는 적합하지 않다. 제안된 HFHM(Human Factors Hazard Model: 인적 요인 위험 모델)은 기검증되고 시간 테스트를 거친 FTA(Fault Tree Analysis:결함 트리 분석)및 ETA(Event Tree Analysis:이벤트 트리 분석)의 확률 분석 도구 및 새로 개발된 HEP(Human Error Probability:인적 오류 확률)예측 도구와 통합되고, 인간과 관련된 PSF(Performance Shaping Factors:성능 형성 요인)를 중심으로 새로운 접근 방식으로 개발되었다. 인간-시스템은 상호작용으로 인한 재난사고 가능성을 모델링하는 위험분석 접근법 HFHM은 다음과 같은 상용 소프트웨어 도구 내에서 예시되고 자동화된다. HFHM에서 생성된 데이터는 SE 분석가 및 설계에 대한 표준화된 가이드로 사용될 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 인적 위험을 예측하는 이 새로운 접근 방식을 통해, 전체 시스템에 대한 포괄적인 재난안전 분석을 가능하게 한다.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.36 no.1
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• pp.64-72
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• 2004

The purpose of this study is to develop a system dynamics model for the assessment of the organizational and human factors in a nuclear power plant which contribute to nuclear safety. Previous studies can be classified into two major approaches. One is the engineering approach using tools such as ergonomics and Probability Safety Assessment (PSA). The other is the socio-psychology approach. Both have contributed to find organizational and human factors and to present guidelines to lessen human error in plants. However, since these approaches assume that the relationship among factors is independent they do not explain the interactions among the factors or variables in Nuclear Power Plants. To overcome these restrictions, a system dynamics model, which can show cause and effect relationships among factors and quantify the organizational and human factors, has been developed. Handling variables such as the degree of leadership, the number of employees, and workload in each department, users can simulate various situations in nuclear power plant organization. Through simulation, users can get insights to improve safety in plants and to find managerial tools in both organizational and human factors.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.35-42
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• 2022

When an accident occurs, the associated human activity is typically regarded as a "human error," or a temporal deviation. On the other hand, if the accident results in a serious loss or if it evokes a social issue, the person determined to be responsible may be punished with a "violation" of related laws or regulations. However, as Heinrich stated, it is neither appropriate nor reasonable in terms of probability theory and cognitive science to distinguish whether it is a "human error" or a "violation" with a criterion of resultant accident severity. Nonetheless, some in society get on the social climate to strengthen regulations on workers who have caused accidents, especially violations. This response can present a social issue due to the lack of systematic judgment procedure which distinguishes violations from human errors. The purpose of this study was to develop an objective and systematic procedure to assess whether workers' activities which induced industrial accidents should be categorized as violations rather than human errors. Various analysis techniques for the determination of violation procedure were investigated and compared using an analysis approach method. An appropriate technique was not found, however, for judging the culpability of intentional violations. As an alternative, this study developed the process of creating violations, based on cognitive procedure, as well as the criteria to determine and categorize an activity as a violation. In addition, the developed procedure was applied to cases of industrial accidents and nuclear power plant issues to test its practical applicability. The study demonstrated that the proposed model could be used to determine the existence of a violation even in the case of multiple workers who work simultaneously.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.45 no.2
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• pp.141-150
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• 2013

There is mounting evidence that complex computer system displays in control rooms contribute to cognitive complexity and, thus, to the probability of human error. Research shows that reaction time increases and response accuracy decreases as the number of elements in the display screen increase. However, in terms of supporting the control room operator, approaches focusing on addressing display complexity solely in terms of information density and its location and patterning, will fall short of delivering a properly designed interface. This paper argues that information complexity and semantic complexity are mandatory components when considering display complexity and that the addition of these concepts assists in understanding and resolving differences between designers and the preferences and performance of operators. This paper concludes that a number of simplified methods, when combined, can be used to estimate the impact that a particular display may have on the operator's ability to perform a function accurately and effectively. We present a mixed qualitative and quantitative approach and a method for complexity estimation.

• Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.99-108
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• 2011

Almost all companies have paid much attention to the safety management ranging from maintenance to operation even at the stage of designing in order to prevent accidents, but fatal accidents continue to increase throughout the world. In particular, it is essential to systematically prevent such fatal accidents as fire, explosion or leakage of toxic gas at factories in order to not only protect the workers and neighbors but also prevent economic losses and environmental pollution. Though it is well known that accident probability is very low in NPP(Nuclear Power Plants), the reason why many researches are still being performed about the accidents is the results may be so severe. HRA is the main process to make preparation for possibility of human error in designing of the NPP. But those techniques have some problems and limitation as follows; the evaluation sensitivity of those techniques are out of date. And the evaluation of human error is not coupled with the design process. Additionally, the scope of the human error which has to be included in reliability assessment should be expanded. This work focuses on the coincidence of human error and mechanical failure for some important performance shaping factors to propose a method for improving safety effectively of the process industries. In order to apply in these purposes into the thesis, I found 63 critical Performance Shaping Factors of the eight dimensions throughout studies that I executed earlier. In this study, various analysis of opinion of specialists(Personal Factors, Training, Knowledge or Experience, Procedures and Documentation, Information, Communications, HMI, Workplace Design, Quality of Environment, Team Factors) and the guideline for construction of PSF were accomplished. The selected method was AHP which simplifies objective conclusions by maintaining consistency. This research focused on the implementation process of PSF to evaluate the process of PSF at each phase. As a result, we propose an evaluation model of PSF as a tool to find critical problem at each phase and improve on how to resolve the problems found at each phase. This evaluation model makes it possible to extraction of PSF succesfully by presenting the basis of assessment which will be used by enterprises to minimize the trial and error of construction process of PSF.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.47 no.2
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• pp.187-195
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• 2015

Human-induced initiating events, also called Category B actions in human reliability analysis, are operator actions that may lead directly to initiating events. Most conventional probabilistic safety analyses typically assume that the frequency of initiating events also includes the probability of human-induced initiating events. However, some regulatory documents require Category B actions to be specifically analyzed and quantified in probabilistic safety analysis. An explicit modeling of Category B actions could also potentially lead to important insights into human performance in terms of safety. However, there is no standard procedure to identify Category B actions. This paper describes a systematic procedure to identify Category B actions for low power and shutdown conditions. The procedure includes several steps to determine operator actions that may lead to initiating events in the low power and shutdown stages. These steps are the selection of initiating events, the selection of systems or components, the screening of unlikely operating actions, and the quantification of initiating events. The procedure also provides the detailed instruction for each step, such as operator's action, information required, screening rules, and the outputs. Finally, the applicability of the suggested approach is also investigated by application to a plant example.