• Korean Journal of Optics and Photonics
• /
• v.29 no.6
• /
• pp.253-261
• /
• 2018

In this paper, we study a method of designing a reflector for LED light sources with an asymmetric light distribution. In a sports game, lighting with a symmetric distribution makes the athlete and spectators look directly at the light source, so it can cause glare. We derive the optimal tilt angle and design a reflector with asymmetric light distribution to solve these problems. Afterward, performance is analyzed according to the tennis-court lighting standard, and is confirmed to meet the class 1 European standard.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
• /
• v.26 no.2
• /
• pp.72-77
• /
• 2022

Among the techniques of reinforcement learning, Q-Learning means learning optimal policies by learning Q functions that perform actionsin a given state and predict future efficient expectations. Q-Learning is widely used as a basic algorithm for reinforcement learning. In this paper, we studied the effectiveness of selecting and learning efficient paths by designing policies and rewards based on Q-Learning. In addition, the results of the existing algorithm and punishment compensation policy and the proposed punishment reinforcement policy were compared by applying the same number of times of learning to the 8x8 grid environment of the Frozen Lake game. Through this comparison, it was analyzed that the Q-Learning punishment reinforcement policy proposed in this paper can significantly increase the learning speed compared to the application of conventional algorithms.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
• /
• 2010.11a
• /
• pp.478-481
• /
• 2010

본 논문에서는 경제학, 사회학, 수학 분야에서 수십년 전부터 연구해오던 죄수의 딜레마 게임의 협동진화에 대해 고찰해보고자 한다. 반복적 죄수의 딜레마 게임은 게임이론의 가장 기본적인 이론으로써, 사회적 상호작용, 경제활동, 국제관계 등 다양한 현상들을 모델링 하기 위한 하나의 방법이다. 그 중에 N명이 참가하는 반복적 죄수 딜레마 게임의 전략은 유전 알고리즘(Genetic Algorithms, GAs)을 통해 진화적으로 만들어 낼 수 있으며, 이 경우에 그 결과를 일반적인 내쉬 균형 이 아닌, 모든 개체들이 유전알고리즘을 통해 협동으로 수렴하도록 유도할 수 있다는 사실은 상당히 시사하는 바가 크다. 기존에 주로 연구되어오던 죄수의 딜레마 게임은 협동으로의 수렴과정에서 일반적으로 순위기반선택(Rank-based selection)과 1점 교배기법(1point crossover)을 사용한다. 그러나 순위기반선택은 모든 개체에 순위을 매겨야 하기 때문에, 개체수가 커질수록 성능이 저하되며, 1점 교배기법은 개체 값이 분산되어있을 경우, 최적해(Optimal solution)을 찾기 힘들다는 단점이 있어, 개체수가 많은 경우에 적용하기에는 비효율적이다. 본 논문에서는 토너먼트 선택기법(Tournament selection)과 자기 적응형 교배기법(Self-adaptive crossover)을 적용한 새로운 기법을 제안한다. 또한 기존 기법과 비교 실험을 통해 제안기법이 기존기법에 비해 평균 수렴시간과 수렴 횟수에서 뛰어난 성능을 보이고 있음을 확인하였다.

• Journal of Internet of Things and Convergence
• /
• v.9 no.3
• /
• pp.61-67
• /
• 2023

In order to optimize the pulse electroforming copper process, a double hidden layer BP (Back Propagation) neural network is constructed. Through sample training, the mapping relationship between electroforming copper process conditions and target properties is accurately established, and the prediction of microhardness and tensile strength of the electroforming layer in the pulse electroforming copper process is realized. The predicted results are verified by electrodeposition copper test in copper pyrophosphate solution system with pulse power supply. The results show that the microhardness and tensile strength of copper layer predicted by "3-4-3-2" structure double hidden layer neural network are very close to the experimental values, and the relative error is less than 2.32%. In the parameter range, the microhardness of copper layer is between 100.3~205.6MPa and the tensile strength is between 112~485MPa.When the microhardness and tensile strength are optimal,the corresponding process conditions are as follows: current density is 2A-dm-2, pulse frequency is 2KHz and pulse duty cycle is 10%.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
• /
• v.27 no.2
• /
• pp.395-407
• /
• 2016

This study aims to apply the G-theory for estimation of reliability of evaluation scores between raters on Taekwondo Poomsae rating categories. Selecting a number of game days and raters as multiple error sources, we analyzed the error sources caused by relative magnitude of error variances of interaction between the factors and proceeded with D-study based on the results of G-study for optimal determination of measurement condition. The results showed below. The estimated outcomes of variance component for accuracy among the Taekwondo Poomsae categories with G-theory showed that impact of error was the biggest influence factor in raters conditions and in order of interaction in subjects and between subjects, also impact of variance component estimation error on expression category was the major influence factor in interaction and in order of the between subjects and raters. Finally, the result of generalizability coefficient estimation via D-study showed that measurement condition of optimal level depend on the number of raters was 8 persons of raters on accuracy category, and stable reliability on expression category was gained when the raters were 7 persons.

• Journal of the Korea Computer Industry Society
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.131-146
• /
• 2004

As Electronic Commerce(EC) has been emerged and has developed, many researchers have tried to establish EC framework for automated contract and negotiation using agent technologies. Traditional researches, however, often had limitations. They often enforced the user's participations during the automated contract process of agents. They also could only consider a few of the user's requirements for a specific goods and did not have supported the procedures and methodologies for making the best contract. In this paper, we propose business model on EC based on multiagents to overcome the defects of the previous researches. We apply CSP techniques to brokerage process to satisfy various preferential requirements from the user. We also propose efficient negotiation mechanism using negotiation model of game theory. The contract candidates automatically negotiate and mediate in terms of their benefits through the proposed negotiation mechanism. For the optimal brokerage and automated negotiation, the agents process activities for contract on three layers, which are called competition layer, constraint satisfaction layer and negotiation layer in the proposed model. We also design the message driven communication protocol to support the automated contract among the agents. Finally, we have implemented prototype systems applying the proposed model and have shown the various experimental results for efficiency of the proposed model.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.2
• /
• pp.95-120
• /
• 1990

The underpricing of new shares of a firm that are offered to the public for the first time (initial offerings) is well known and has puzzled financial economists for a long time since it seems at odds with the optimal behavior of the owners of issuing firms. Past attempts by financial economists to explain this phenomenon have not been successful in the sense that the explanations given by them are either inconsistent with the equilibrium theory or implausible. Approaches by such authors as Welch or Allen and Faulhaber are no exceptions. In this paper, we develop a signalling model of capital investment to explain the underpricing phenomenon and also analyze the efficiency of investment. The model focuses on the information asymmetry between the owners of issuing firms and general investors. We consider a firm that has been owned and operated by a single owner and that has a profitable project but has no capital to develop it. The profit from the project depends on the capital invested in the project as well as a profitability parameter. The model also assumes that the financial market is represented by a single investor who maximizes the expected wealth. The owner has superior information as to the value of the firm to investors in the sense that it knows the true value of the parameter while investors have only a probability distribution about the parameter. The owner offers the representative investor a fraction of the ownership of the firm in return for a certain amount of investment in the firm. This offer condition is equivalent to the usual offer condition consisting of the number of issues to sell and the unit price of a share. Thus, the model is a signalling game. Using Kreps' criterion as the solution concept, we obtained an essentially unique separating equilibrium offer condition. Analysis of this separating equilibrium shows that the owner of the firm with high profitability chooses an offer condition that raises an amount of capital that is short of the amount that maximizes the potential profit from the project. It also reveals that the fraction of the ownership of the firm that the representative investor receives from the owner of the highly profitable firm in return for its investment has a value that exceeds the investment. In other words, the initial offering in the model is underpriced when the profitability of the firm is high. The source of underpricing and underinvestment is the signalling activity by the owner of the highly profitable firm who attempts to convince investors that his firm has a highly profitable project by choosing an offer condition that cannot be imitated by the owner of a firm with low profitability. Thus, we obtained two main results. First, underpricing is a result of a signalling activity by the owner of a firm with high profitability when there exists information asymmetry between the owner of the issuing firm and investors. Second, such information asymmetry also leads to underinvestment in a highly profitable project. Those results clearly show the underpricing entails underinvestment and that information asymmetry leads to a social cost as well as a private cost. The above results are quite general in the sense that they are based upon a neoclassical profit function and full rationality of economic agents. We believe that the results of this paper can be used as a basis for further research on the capital investment process. For instance, one can view the results of this paper as a subgame equilibrium in a larger game in which a firm chooses among diverse ways to raise capital. In addition, the method used in this paper can be used in analyzing a wide range of problems arising from information asymmetry that the Korean financial market faces.

• Journal of Distribution Research
• /
• v.16 no.2
• /
• pp.119-138
• /
• 2011

Internet commerce has been growing at a rapid pace for the last decade. Many firms try to reach wider consumer markets by adding the Internet channel to the existing traditional channels. Despite the various benefits of the Internet channel, a significant number of firms failed in managing the new type of channel. Previous studies could not cleary explain these conflicting results associated with the Internet channel. One of the major reasons is most of the previous studies conducted analyses under a specific market condition and claimed that as the impact of Internet channel introduction. Therefore, their results are strongly influenced by the specific market settings. However, firms face various market conditions in the real worlddensity and disutility of using the Internet. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of various market environments on a firm's optimal channel strategy by employing a flexible game theory model. We capture various market conditions with consumer density and disutility of using the Internet.