• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.37-47
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• 2022

This study uses monthly data from January 2009 to December 2020 to examine the effectiveness of foreign currency intervention and its influence on monetary policy in Vietnam using a Hierarchical Bayesian VAR model. The findings suggest that foreign exchange intervention has little influence on the exchange rate level or exports, but it can significantly minimize exchange rate volatility. As a result, we can demonstrate that the claim that Vietnam is a currency manipulator is false. As well, the forecast error variance decomposition results reveal that interest rate differentials mainly determine the exchange rate level instead of foreign exchange intervention. Moreover, the findings suggest that foreign exchange intervention is not effectively sterilized in Vietnam. Inflation is caused by an increase in international reserves, which leads to an expansion of the money supply and a decrease in interest rates. Although the impact of foreign exchange intervention grows in tandem with the growth of international reserves, if the sterilizing capacity does not improve, rising foreign exchange intervention will instead result in inflation. Finally, we use a rolling window approach to examine the time-varying effect of foreign exchange intervention.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.47 no.2
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• pp.103-120
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• 2022

This paper studies the possibility of options as an instrument for central bank to intervene foreign exchange market. As opposed to spot transaction or forward transaction, which impacts spot exchange rate only once, currency options can continuously resist a directional speculative pressure on spot market due to the dynamic delta hedging of OTC currency options market maker. This research also analyzes whether and how central banks can use currency options to lower exchange rate volatility and maintain (implicit) target zones in foreign exchange markets. It argues that short position rather than long position in options will result in market makers dynamically hedging their long option exposure in a stabilizing manner, consistent with the first objective. Selling a "Strangle" allows a central bank to increase the credibility of its commitment to a target zone, and could have a lower expected cost than spot market interventions. However, this strategy also exposes the central bank to an unlimited loss potential. Therefore these kinds of intervention strategies must be used in the short run and temporarily.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.10
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• pp.133-153
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• 1997

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.17-29
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• 1982

This paper is concerned with the application of the intervention analysis to the wholesale Trice index of Korea. There were four big shocks on the WPI during the last two decades, which were caused by the series of oil price hikes and changes in the foreign exchange rate. Intervention analysis of these multiple shocks revealed the nature and causalities of each shocks to the general price level of Korea.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.111-125
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• 1990

For the last several years, considerable criticism has been leveled against Korea's exchange rate management. While Korea was designated a currency manipulator by the U.S., domestically it is often complained that the won/dollar rate did not adequately reflect changes in Korea's export competitiveness and fluctuations in the exchange rates of major currencies. In view of this situation, Korea changed its exchange regime at the beginning of March this year from the dual currency basket system to a more flexible one, called a "market average rate regime". Under this new regime, the won rate is determined in the exchange market based upon the supply of and demand for foreign exchange and is allowed to freely fluctuate each day within a + 0.4 % range. This paper, first, seeks to evaluate Korea's exchange rate management under the dual basket regime of the 1980s, and then to construct an optimal currency basket for the won which could provide a proper indicator for exchange market intervention under the new market average rate regime. The analysis of fluctuations in the real effective exchange rate (REER) of the won indicates that the won rates in the 1980s failed not only to offset changes in relative prices between home and trading partner countries, but also to properly respond to variations in major exchange rates as further evidenced by sizable fluctuations in the nominal effective rates of the won. In other words, the currency basket regime which was adopted in 1980 for the stabilization of the REER of the won has not been operated properly, mainly because authorities often resorted to policy considerations in determining the won's rate. In the second part of the paper, an optimal currency basket for Korea is constructed, designed to minimize the fluctuations in the REER of the won without including policy considerations as a factor. It is recognized, however, that both domestic and foreign price data are not available immediately for the calculation of the REER. For this problem, the approach suggested by Lipschitz (1980) is followed, in which optimal weights for currencies in the basket are determined based upon the past correlation between price and exchange rates. When the optimal basket is applied to Korea since the mid-80s, it is found that the REER of the won could have been much more stable than it actually was. We also argue for the use of variable weights rather than fixed ones, which would be determined by the changing relationship between exchange rates and relative prices. The optimal basket, and the optimal basket exchange rate based on that basket, could provide an important medium- or long-term reference for proper exchange market intervention under the market average rate regime, together with other factors, such as developments in the current account balance and changes in productivity.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.49-68
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• 2017

This paper investigates the spillover effect of the U.S. Interest on Korea's interest rate as well as the role of exchange rate in the spillover effects, by utilizing a open macro model on the determinants of long-term interest rates. According to the cointegration estimation and the Impulse response function, it is found that, across both long-term and short-term, there exist the spillover effect of the U.S. Interest on Korea's interest rate. The fiscal deficit and expected exchange rate have significantly positive relationship with the Koreas's long-term interest rate. Further, foreign exchange market intervention in Korea did not have significant effect on the spillover effect. Thus, this study suggests that exchange rate flexibility would not be enough to restrain the spillover effects of the U.S. interest rate.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.385-400
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• 2004

China has pegged its currency to the US dollar (at RMB 8.3 to the dollar) since 1994. The yuan's dollar peg has increased demand for chinese exports, which account for about a third of gross domestic product. The peg has also helped to attract $308 billion in foreign investment. But there has been criticism that China has over the past two years been engaging in protracted, large-scale intervention in one direction in exchange markets. According to many reports, RMB is undervalued by somewhere between 15 and 30% by manipulation. China may not want to float the currency at once, since doing so would have a dramatic and negative effect on the economy. However, there has so far been strong pressure from trading partners including the Unite States, Japan, EU. Considered all these things, China may eventually allow some changes in the Yuan's value. This may come in the form of widening a band of movement for the currency, rather than letting it float freely in the market.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.499-524
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• 2010

The purpose of this study is to based on review of theoretical and empirical studies to assess the independence of central banks - the former Socialist republics, including the Russian Federation and Czech, Poland. In addition, the work is expected to clarify whether a link exists between independence and the most important economic indicators such as inflation, economic activity, the budget deficit. And The subject of this study are the formal and actual independence of national banks, as well as limiting factors: political and economic. Background investigation of the problem of independence of central banks from the fact that, according to many economists, it is essential to the successful development of a market economy. The effectiveness of any country's economy due to currency volatility, low inflation, high reliability of the banking system, etc. As far as the independence of monetary regulation contributes to these goals - one of the most actively debated issues in the world of economic theory and practice for a long time. The issue of central bank independence is extremely important for Russia, Czech, Poland. In the near future to the central bank has important tasks, among which are the transition to inflation targeting in the rejection of significant intervention in the foreign exchange market, as well as improving the sustainability of the national banking system. Transparency and independence of the Bank of Russia, Czech Republic, Poland, in my view, should be an important factor in achieving these goals. The countries of Czech Republic, Poland have already made a number of steps to bring the status of their banks to the European standards. Many other developing countries are also in the process of reforming their central banks and the improving conditions of their functioning. However, despite the fact that as a model for reform used by the central banks of countries with developed market economies, central banks in developing countries are still yet deprived of the legal, economic and political independence. A different situation exists in transition space. Because of significant differences in the views of the authorities in transition republics at the necessary level of independence of central banks and the exchange rate and monetary policy reform of monetary management in these countries led to different results.