• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.248-255
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• 2021

The main causes of the July 2013 OZ 214 accident were poorly performed approach and the failure to recognize the autothrottle in the HOLD position which the automated speed control was not provided. The pilots late decision for go-around was also a critical factor leading to the accident. The B777 POM restricts the use of FLCH mode beyond the FAF. This research utilized the QAR data of an airline's B777 fleet in the period of two years where 44 cases were found. In many cases, the FLCH mode was used for rapid descent from an higher than normal situation. In addition, in the base turn, continuous use of FLCH mode even when the path was below the glide path were observed. Airports with elevation above 500 ft MSL had a higher rate of occurrence. In this research, the proper descent planning and vertical path monitoring, and the adherence to the limitation set in the manuals and the stabilized approach criteria were re-emphasized as mitigation to reduce event occurences.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Propulsion Engineers
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.32-42
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• 2022

The strategy to develop a launch vehicle family by bundling multiple rocket engines of a single type has been proven by SpaceX and their reusable fleet comprised of Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy. In this study, we revisit a potential launch vehicle family out of a 35 tonf-class methalox staged combustion cycle engine and evaluate their utility and performance in various space missions. For example, a Korean version of Falcon 9 can deliver 4.7 tons of payload into 500 km SSO in an expendable mode while the payload is reduced to 2.16 tons in a sea-landing reusable mode. A Korean version of Falcon Heavy can deliver 4.4 tons into GTO when launched from the Naro Space Center, indicating that this common booster core configuration can handle Cheollian 2 albeit the high inclination. Once developed, the same methaloax engine can power the first-stage of smallsat launch vehicles and air launch vehicles.

• Journal of The Geomorphological Association of Korea
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.59-75
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• 2010

In this study, location evaluation of the natural environment of ports in the Joseon Dynasty was carried out to investigate the outport of east coast for the conquest of Usanguk. As a result of study, there were 55 ports and naval stations in the Joseon Dynasty, including the Yeongokpo, Aninpo, Samcheokpo, Susanpo, and Wolsongpo. As a result of the restoration work in the sea level that was done in the sixth century, the sea level at that time was about 1m higher than that at present. In terms of the location type, three types were identified via natural-environment analysis. Location type I consists of a total of 21 ports suitable for defense due to the sand spit in all the sides and because it is located in the bay of small and medium rivers. Location type II is composed of 22 ports close to the open seas, and location type III consists of a total of 12 ports centering on the bay. A total of nine ports satisfied the location factor in the shortest distance analysis(targeting location type I), 15 ports in the slope analysis, 13 ports in the hinterland analysis, 13 ports in the visibility analysis, and 11 ports in the ocean current analysis. It was found in the final evaluation that the I level regions consist of two ports(Obunjin and Mangyangjin). Obunjin has a location characteristic that is advantageous for defense and that makes it suitable to serve as an anchorage harbor for a large-scale fleet as its water level is deep and as it has a wide embayment. In conclusion, Obunjin is considered the outport that has the highest possibility of serving as Isabu's departure port for the conquest of Usanguk.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• v.1
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• pp.27-31
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• 2006

GNSS Services and Applications are today in permanent evolution in all the market sectors. This evolution comprises: ${\bullet}$ New constellations and systems, being GALILEO probably the most relevant example, but not the only one, as other regions of the world also dwell into developing their own elements (e.g. the Chinese Beidou system). ${\bullet}$ Modernisation of existing systems, as is the case of GPS and GLONASS ${\bullet}$ New Augmentation services, WAAS, EGNOS, MSAS, GRAS, GAGAN, and many initiatives from other regions of the world ${\bullet}$ Safety of Life services based on the provision of integrity and reliability of the navigation solutions through SBAS and GBAS systems, for aeronautical or maritime applications ${\bullet}$ New Professional applications, based on the unprecedented accuracies and integrity of the positioning and timing solutions of the new navigation systems with examples in science (geodesy, geophysics), Civil engineering (surveying, construction works), Transportation (fleet management, road tolling) and many others. ${\bullet}$ New Mass-market applications based on cheap and simple GNSS receivers providing accurate (meterlevel) solutions for daily personal navigation and information needs. Being on top of this evolving market requires an active participation on the key elements that drive the GNSS development. Early access to the new GNSS signals and services and appropriate testing facilities are critical to be able to reach a good market position in time before the next evolution, and this is usually accessible only to the large system developers as the US, Europe or Japan. Jumping into this league of GNSS developers requires a large investment and a significant development of technology, which may not be at range for all regions of the world. Bearing in mind this situation, MAGIC appears as a concept initiated by a small region within Europe with the purpose of fostering and supporting the development of advanced applications for the new services that can be enabled by the advent of SBAS systems and GALILEO. MAGIC is a low cost platform based on the application of technology developed within the EGNOS project (the SBAS system in Europe), which encompasses the capacity of providing real time EGNOS and, in the near future, GALILEO-like integrity services. MAGIC is designed to be a testing platform for safety of life and liability critical applications, as well as a provider of operational services for the transport or professional sectors in its region of application. This paper will present in detail the MAGIC concept, the status of development of the system within the Madrid region in Spain, the results of the first on-field demonstrations and the immediate plans for deployment and expansion into a complete SBAS+GALILEO regional augmentation system.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.43 no.3
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• pp.125-145
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• 2018

The Baltic Shipping Exchange is reporting the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) which represents the average charter rate for bulk carriers transporting major cargoes such as iron ore, coal, grain, and so on. And the current BDI index is reflected in the proportion of capesize 40%, panamax 30% and spramax 30%. Like mentioned above, the capesize plays a major role among the various sizes of bulk carriers and this study is to analyze the influence of the factors influencing on charter rate of capesize carriers which transport iron ore and coal as the major cargoes. For this purpose, this study verified causality between variables using Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and tried to derive a long-run equilibrium model between the dependent variable and independent variables. Regression analysis showed that every six independent variable has a significant effect on the capesize charter rate, even at the 1% level of significance. Charter rate decreases by 0.08% when capesize total fleet increases by 1%, charter rate increases by 0.04% when bunker oil price increases by 1%, and charter rate decreases by 0.01% when Yen/Dollar rate increases by 1%. And charter rate increases by 0.02% when global GDP increases by one unit (1%). In addition, the increase in cargo volume of iron ore and coal which are major transportation items of capesize carriers has also been shown to increase charter rates. Charter rate increases by 0.11% in case of 1% increase in iron ore cargo volume, and 0.09% in case of 1% increase in coal cargo volume. Although there have been some studies to analyze the influence of factors affecting the charterage of bulk carriers in the past, there have been few studies on the analysis of specific size vessels. At present moment when ship size is getting bigger, this study carried out research on capesize vessels, which are biggest among bulk carriers, and whose utilization is continuously increasing. This study is also expected to contribute to the establishment of trade policies for specific cargoes such as iron ore and coal.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.192-221
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• 2013

In order to deal with the current economic crisis, the U.S. government, as a part of its austerity fiscal policy, implemented a budget sequester. The sequester will hit the U.S. defense budget the hardest, and as a result will most likely put the security of the international community in jeopardy. The U.S. will have to cut 46 billion dollars from its original 525 billon defense spending in 2013. And by the year 2022, will have to cut 486.9 billion dollars. Such an astronomical decrease in the U.S. defense spending will inevitably burden the friendly nations. According to recent studies, pirate related incidents in Somalia, where piracy is most active, has declined from its 226 incidents to 76 incidents per year in 2012, a 66% drop from previous years'. However, piracy threats as well as those related to firearms still remain and thus participants of anti-piracy operations, namely the U.S., U.K., France, Canada, NCC, EUNAVFOR, and NATO, are facing a problem of declining forces. Considering the current situation as well as rising expectations from the international community, Republic of Korea, a supporter of NCC's maritime security operation, not to mention its foremost duty of securing its sea, is at a stage to re-examine its operational picture. Such action will be a good opportunity for Republic of Korea to build the trust and live up to the international community's expectation. To quote from the network theory, although in relation to other friendly nations participating in the anti-piracy operation, Republic of Korea currently remains at a single cell level, this opportunity will certainly develop Korea to a 'node' nation in which power and information would flow into. Through this expansion of operational capability, Republic of Korea will be able to exert more influence as a more developed nation. Currently however, not only is the single 4,500 ton class destroyer deployed in Somalia a limited unit to further expand the scale and amount of force projection in the area, but also the total of six 4,500 ton class destroyers ROK feet possess is at a high fatigue degree due to standard patrolling operations, midshipman cruise and the RIMPAC exercise. ROK fleet therefore must consider expanding the number of ships deployed along with either deploying combat support ships or constructing logistics support site in the African region. Thus, by expanding its operational capabilities and furthermore by abiding to the rightful responsibilities of a middle power nation, Republic of Korea will surely earn its respect among the members of the international community.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.75-99
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• 1991

A quantitative analysis was carried out to monitor the commercial yield level of walleye pollock Theragra chalcogramma in the east coast of Korea, based on available data on catch and fishing effort, catch per unit of effort including fish prices from 1911 to 1988, using a traditional yield model. The results from the quantitative assessment were based to estimate maximum economic yield (MEY) and optimal fishing effort (E-opt) at MEY. On the other hand, interaction aspects between danish seine fishery and trawl fishery mainly targeting walleye pollock in the east coast of Korea were studied to predict optimal situation in fishing effort level from economic point of view which gives the most benefits to the two fisheries. Total production of walleye pollock in 1911 when its catch record was begun for the first time was about 12, 000 metric tons(M/T), and then the catch trend maintained nearly at the level of 50, 000 M/T per annum, showing a decreasing trend until 1930. The highest production from historical data base on walleye pollock fishery statistics was from the years in 1939 and 1940, about 270, 000 M/T and 26, 000 M/T, respectively. No production of the fish species was recorded during the years from 1943 to 1947, and from 1949 to 1951. From 1952 onwards annual production was only available from the southern part of 38$^{\circ}$N in the east coast. During two decades from 1952 to 1970, the production had sustained about less than 30, 000 M/T every year. Annual production showed an increasing trend from 1971, reaching a maximum level of approximately 162, 000 M/T in 1981. Afterwards, it has deceased sharply year after year and amounted to 180, 000 M/T in 1988. The catch composition of walleye pollock for different fishery segments during 1970~1988 showed that more than 70% of the total catch was from danish seine fishery until 1977 but from 1978 onwards, the catch proportion did not differ from one another, accounting for the nearly same proportion. Catch per unit of effort (CPUE) for both danish seine fishery and trawl fishery maintained a decline tendency after 1977 when the values of CPUE were at level of 800 kg/haul for the former fishery and 1, 300 kg/haul for the latter fishery, respectively. CPUEs of gillnet fishery during 1980~1983 increased to about 3.5 times as high value as in the years, 1970~1979 and during 1987~1988 it decreased again to the level of the years, 1970~1978. The bottom longline fishery's CPUE wa at a very low level (20 kg/basket) through the whole study years, with exception of the value (60 kg/basket) in 1980. Fishing grounds of walleye pollock in the east coast of Korea showed a very limited distribution range. Danish seine fishery concentrated fishing around the coastal areas of Sokcho and Jumunjin during January~February and October~December. Distributions of fishing grounds of trawl fishery were the areas along the coastal regions in the central part of the east coast. Gillnet and bottom longline fisheries fished walleye pollock mainly in the areas of around Sokcho and Jumunjin during January~February and December. Relationship between CPUEs' values from danish seine fishery and trawl fishery was used to standardize fishing effort to apply to surplus production model for estimating maximum sustainable yield (MSY) and optimum fish effort (F-opt) at MSY. The results suggested a MSY of 114, 000 M/T with an estimated F-opt of 173, 000 hauls per year. Based on the estimates of MSY and F-opt, MEY was estimated to be about 94, 000 M/T with a range of 81, 000 to 103, 000 M/T and E-opt 100, 000 hauls per year with a range of 80, 000 to 120, 000 hauls. The estimated values of MEY and E-opt corresponded to 82% of MSY and 58% of F-opt, respectively. An optimal situation in the fishing effort level, which can envisage either simultaneously maximum yield or maximum benefit for both danish seine fishery and trawl fishery, was determined from relationship between revenue and cost of running the fleet : the optimal fishing effort of danish seine fishery was about 52, 000 hauls per year, corresponding to 50 danish seiners and 27, 000 hauls per year which is equal nearly to 36 trawlers, respectively. It was anticipated that the net income from sustainable yield estimated from the respective optimal fishing effort of the two fisheries will be about 3, 800 million won for danish seine fishery and 1, 000 million won for trawl fishery.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.123-159
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• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.53-74
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• 1995

The purpose of this paper is to compare China's and Korea's marine fisheries industries in order to present the main features of China's marine fisheries and show the comparative advantages they have in production. The results indicate that China's marine fisheries have the following features. (1) The marine proportion of the fisheries industry economic activity is less than 60%. Fishing is 71.3% of that marine activity. (2) The production trends of marine fisheries history in China can be classified as follows: 1) an early growth period, 2) a deliberation/consolidation period, 3) a second growth period, 4) a third growth period, and 5) a fourth growth period. The growth rate has rapidly increased recently. (3) Fish production is over 70% of marine fishing fisheries, the next major product is crustacea. The production of shellfish occupies over 70% of marine aquaculture, seaweed production however, is only 22% of total marine aquaculture. (4) The licensed area for marine aquaculture in China is 586.3 ha and that area is 5.4 times larger than that of Korea. The allotted area for shellfish aquaculture is 60% of marine aquaculture, production areas of crustaceans occupy 27.3%, fish has 7 1%, and seaweed production only 5.7% of allocated marine aquaculture areas. (5) The proportion of power vessels for marine fisheries of China's total power vessel fleet is around 65%, and the marine fisheries portion of non - powered vessels constitutes only 12%. The highest proportion of power vessels engaged in marine fisheries activities is between 10 tonnes to 100 tonnes. (6) The portion of marine fishery workers of all fishery industry employees is 22%, and 70% of them are full - time workers. Of marine fishery workers, 64% are in the fishing sector, 22%, aquaculture workers, and the number of employees in marine fisheries is increasing every year. The analysis of China's fishery industry in the production competitiveness indicates as follows : (1) The licensed areas in marine aquaculture, number of fishing vessels, number of marine fishing workers in China's fishery industry are much more than those of Korea's. Therefore China is much more competitive than Korea in the quantity of production side. However, licensed areas for seaweed aquaculture are more extensive in Korea than China. In China, the number of power vessels of between 10 tonnes and 100 tonnes, the licensed shellfish aquaculture areas, and the number of fishing workers within the fisheries industry are much more than those of Korea. (2) It is estimated that the licensed areas in marine aquaculture, number of medium sized power vessels, number of marine fishery workers will be increased as the quantity of production factors grow in China. (3) At present, yield per Ha. in marine cultures is very low in China. Therefore it is estimated that aquaculture techniques have only been diffused recently in China. Yield of fish per Ha especially is much lower than that of Korea. So the level of aquaculture techniques seems much lower than that of Korea. (4) China is behind Korea in production technique, however the number of HP per boat in China is lower than that of Korea. Therefore, China is much more competitive than Korea in Costs. (5) Average fish catches per marine fishery worker in China is only 1/3 that of Korea's, and average marine aquaculture production in China is only 1/2 that of Korea. Therefore we can say Korea is more competitive than China in efficiency. The average income of marine fishery workers in China is higher that that of other Chinese industries. However, the competitiveness of the fisheries industry in China will be increased as more capital is invested and advanced techniques are developed.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.17-30
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• 2020

In the shipping industry, it is essential to engage in the preemptive prediction of freight rate volatility through market monitoring. Considering that freight rates have already started to fall, the loss of shipping companies will soon be uncontrollable. Therefore, in this study, factors affecting the freight rates of bulk carriers, which have relatively large freight rate volatility as compared to container freight rates, were quantified and analyzed. In doing so, we intended to contribute to future shipping market monitoring. We performed an analysis using a vector error correction model and estimated the influence of six independent variables on the charter rates of bulk carriers by Handy Size, Supramax, Panamax, and Cape Size. The six independent variables included the bulk carrier fleet volume, iron ore traffic volume, ribo interest rate, bunker oil price, and Euro-Dollar exchange rate. The dependent variables were handy size (32,000 DWT) spot charter rates, Supramax 6 T/C average charter rates, Pana Max (75,000 DWT) spot charter, and Cape Size (170,000 DWT) spot charter. The study examined charter rates by size of bulk carriers, which was different from studies on existing specific types of ships or fares in oil tankers and chemical carriers other than bulk carriers. Findings revealed that influencing factors differed for each ship size. The Libo interest rate had a significant effect on all four ship types, and the iron ore traffic volume had a significant effect on three ship types. The Ribo rate showed a negative (-) relationship with Handy Size, Supramax, Panamax, and Cape Size. Iron ore traffic influenced three types of linearity, except for Panamax. The size of shipping companies differed depending on their characteristics. These findings are expected to contribute to the establishment of a management strategy for shipping companies by analyzing the factors influencing changes in the freight rates of charterers, which have a profound effect on the management performance of shipping companies.