• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.45 no.4
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• pp.427-438
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• 2013

In this paper we discuss spent fuel management options in the Republic of Korea (ROK) from two interrelated perspectives: Centralized dry cask storage and spent fuel pyroprocessing and burning in sodium fast reactors (SFRs). We argue that the ROK will run out of space for at-reactors spent fuel storage by about the year 2030 and will thus need to transition centralized dry cask storage. Pyroprocessing plant capacity, even if approved and successfully licensed and constructed by that time, will not suffice to handle all the spent fuel discharged annually. Hence centralized dry cask storage will be required even if the pyroprocessing option is successfully developed by 2030. Pyroprocessing is but an enabling technology on the path leading to fissile material recycling and burning in future SFRs. In this regard we discuss two SFR options under development in the U.S.: the Super Prism and the Travelling Wave Reactor (TWR). We note that the U.S. is further along in reactor development than the ROK. The ROK though has acquired more experience, recently in investigating fuel recycling options for SFRs. We thus call for two complementary joint R&D project to be conducted by U.S. and ROK scientists. One leading to the development of a demonstration centralized away-fromreactors spent fuel storage facility. The other involve further R&D on a combined SFR-fuel cycle complex based on the reactor and fuel cycle options discussed in the paper.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.73-81
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• 2017

In April 2009, in the wake of President Obama's Prague speech, the international community held four nuclear sec urity summits from 2010 to 2016 to promote nuclear security and prevent nuclear terrorism. The Nuclear Security S ummit has made significant progress in preventing terrorists from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials, but it still has limitations and problems. To solve this problem, the international community should resume the joint efforts for strengthening bilateral cooperation and multilateral nuclear security regime, and the participating countries should strive to protect their own nuclear materials and fulfill their commitments to secure nuclear facilitie s. Second, the United Nations(UN), the IAEA(International Atomic Energy Agency), International Criminal Police Or ganization(INTERPOL), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT), and the Global Partnership(G P) must continue their missions to promote nuclear security in accordance with the five action plans adopted at the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit. Third, the participating countries should begin discussions on the management and protection of military nuclear materials that could not be covered by the Nuclear Security Summit. Fourth, the intern ational community must strive to strengthen the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuc lear Material(CPPNM) Amendment and International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrori sm(ICSANT), prepare for cyber attacks against nuclear facilities, and prevent theft, illegal trading and sabotage invo lving nuclear materials.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.237-247
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• 1993

Activity ratio of two radioactive primary fission products which had sufficiently different half-lives was expressed as functions of cooling time and irradiation histories in which average burnup, irradiation time, cycle interval time and the dominant fissile material of the spent fuel were included. The gamma-ray spectra of 36 samples from 6 spent PWR fuel assemblies irradiated in Kori unit-1 reactor were obtained by a spectrometric system equipped with a high purity germanium gamma-ray detector. Activity ratio $^{l44}$Ce $^{l37}$Cs, analyzed from each spectrum, was used for the calculation of cooling time. The results show that the radioactive fission products $^{l44}$Ce and $^{l37}$Cs are considered as useful monitors for cooling time determination because the estimated cooling time by detection of activity ratio $^{l44}$Ce $^{l37}$Cs agreed well with the operator declared cooling time within relative difference of $\pm$5 % despite the low counting rate of the gamma-ray of $^{l44}$Ce (about 10$^{-3}$ count per second). For the samples with several different irradiation histories, the determined cooling time by modeled irradiation history showed good agreement with that by known irradiation history within time difference of $\pm$0.5 year. From this result, it would be expected to be possible to estimate reliably the cooling time of spent nuclear fuel without the exact information about irradiation history. The feasibility study on identification of and/or sorting out spent nuclear fuel by applying the technique for cooling time determination was also performed and the result shows that the detection of activity ratio $^{l44}$Ce $^{l37}$Cs by gamma-ray spectrometry would be usefully applicable to certify spent nuclear fuel for the purpose of safeguards and management in a facility in which the samples dismantled or cut from spent fuel assemblies are treated, such as the post irradiation examination facility.mination facility.