• Survey Research
• /
• v.11 no.3
• /
• pp.57-79
• /
• 2010

This study evaluated the policy performance of i) Public Notice of Critical Information, ii) Substantiation of Facts in Labeling and Advertising, iii) Temporary Injunctions, and iv) Advertisement Correcting Misrepresented Facts, which were main policies belonged to Fair Labeling and Advertising Act(hereinafter referred to as "FLA Act"). The data was collected by visiting 76 persons personally, who were consumer policy and law experts, labeling and advertising staffs of corporations, and persons in charge of policies including public officials dealing with consumer policies at Korea Fair Trade Commission, while using a structured questionnaire at the same time. The survey was performed to examine the general policy performance and evaluation the results of FLA Act by evaluation methods. The results of the analysis are comprehensively summarized as follows. There were differences in the ranking of policies evaluated by labeling and advertising staffs of corporations and persons in charge of policies according to evaluation methods, and, in Simple Evaluation, higher scores were gained compared to Weighted Evaluation which reflected weighted values or Fuzzy Evaluation. The result shows that evaluation results can vary in policy performance evaluation according to evaluation methods.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.21 no.2
• /
• pp.78-84
• /
• 2021

Issues have arisen over the monopoly of housing sales guarantees by the Housing and Urban Guarantee Corporation. If the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport appoints an additional guarantee institution, there is concern that the property protection between the two parties is insufficient due to excessive competition and the weakening of urban regeneration resources. It argues that housing supply policies for stabilization of the housing market can be smoothly implemented through monopoly projects. This is judged to be an abuse of market dominant position under the Fair Trade Act, and excessive restrictions on pre-sale guarantee requirements may cause delays in business and infringement of property rights of members. First, the establishment of a designation system for market dominant operators of the Fair Trade Commission enables new entry of private guarantee institutions. Second, it is necessary to improve regulations under Article 63 of the Fair Trade Act (consultation on the establishment of laws restricting competition, etc.). Third, through the establishment of the 「Rules on Housing Supply」 under Article 15 (2), the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport can additionally designate a guarantee institution, thereby guaranteeing the right to select a pre-sale guarantee for the business entity. In addition, it is expected that at least one of a number of guarantee insurance companies can be designated to improve the efficiency of the distribution of social benefits, thereby lowering the volatility of housing prices. Listen and suggest.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.14 no.3
• /
• pp.23-48
• /
• 1992

The Korea's Consumer electronics industry has exhibited a spectacular growth in the last three decades, expanding into one of the most important industries in Korea in many respects. One interesting aspect of the industry is the dominant role played by the Big Three of the industry, Gumsung, Samsung, and Daewoo. Since 1984, the three companies have accounted for about 90% of the sales in key items such as color TV, VTRs, refrigerators, and washers. The Big Three not only dominated the manufacturing stage, but also the distribution stage of the industry through their networks of exclusive dealers that constitute the major part of the distribution market. In this study, we analyzed the effects of the exclusive dealing by the Big Three on the efficiency of the Korean economy. We find that exclusive dealing by the Big Three could seriously constrain competition in both the manufacturing and distribution stages of the industry. Exclusive dealing by the Big Three effectively forcecloses the market for most other manufacturers as well as deterring entry into the manufacturing stage by potential entrants. Further, it impedes the growth of distributors that achieve the economies of scale and scope and restricts competition by the Big Three. In contrast, we could find little evidence that exclusive dealing by the Big Three is pro-competitive or enhances welfare. As a remedy to this problem, we suggest that the Fair Trade Commission of Korea should regulate the exclusive dealing by the Big Three, thus opening the door for the growth of distributors that are not bound by an exclusive dealing relationship with any of the Big Three. Put differently, we urge the Korean Fair Trade Commission to apply the Article 23 (5) to the exclusive dealing by the Big Three. Article 23 (5) that states that unfair restrictive dealing is illegal has never been clarified by the FTC. We believe that our analysis could also serve as a basic for the clarification of the article in general.

• Korean journal of communication and information
• /
• v.46
• /
• pp.627-670
• /
• 2009

This study analyzed Korean Fair Trade Commission's judgemental cases of cartels in telecommunications and media industry and presented the following results. First, cartels were formed frequently in multi-channel broadcasting industry, telecommunications industry, movie industry, and newspaper industry. In addition, price-fixing were observed in almost all subfield of telecommunications and media industry. Second, administrative guidance facilitated more opportunities for collusion in the telecommunications industry than in the media industry. Third, the telecommunications and media industry, similar to overall domestic industries, had a high proportion of hard-core cartels. Fourth, the depth of judgemental case in evaluating agreements among competitors was generally low, even though detail evaluations were found in the cases of large fines. Fifth, the overall level of sanctions was relatively low.

• Korean Journal of Labor Studies
• /
• v.24 no.3
• /
• pp.109-142
• /
• 2018

This paper aims to analyze the Award wage system in Australia for construction workers. Considering low wages and precarious employment situation of construction workers in general, it is of advantage especially for them in Australia. Furthermore, it seems to be instructive for Korean construction workers, who stand in more precarious and unstable situation and furthermore are lack of fair wage and social safety. After strong and longstanding labour struggle in the late 19th century in Australia, it has been established a tripartite institution called as 'tribunal' between trade unions, employers, and the government. Under the highly institutionalized form of industrial relations, it functions as an arbitration and conciliation system between labour and management. The Award wage system stands in the middle point. This Award wage system including various welfare provisions is settled by the tribunal, today renamed as Fair Work Commission. In this wage system should be defined level of minimum wages according to the various skill levels, which are in turn connected with compulsory superannuation and Medicare as well as vocational education and training. Furthermore, it provides especially for the construction workers, who suffer from job instability, so-called 'portable benefits', which relate to long service leave and redundancy pay. Considering general conditions of precarious construction workers in Korea, In that respect, the Australian Award wage system would be very instructive for our social wage and safety system for construction workers.

• East Asian Journal of Business Economics (EAJBE)
• /
• v.3 no.4
• /
• pp.5-8
• /
• 2015

In addition to the increased used for smart phones daily, various characteristics and problems for social commerce have been drawn attention recently, and also, have been analyzed by various impact factors which were given to the purchasing behaviors of consumers through social commerce. The study investigated consumers' use of social commerce based on SNS by using articles of Fair Trade Commission, Korea Consumer Agency and so on. As a result, cost reduction characteristics of social commerce, the impulse buy, and to understand in Review effect, latest mobile shopping growth of increases explosively, market by market conditions to move from offline to online, the social commerce it was found to have a significant impact on the time of the purchase of the consumer. In addition, the study has discussed the results of the significance and limitation. With those things, they can be a suggestion for future research. More than half of the consumers were satisfied with social commerce. The consumers made use of social commerce 1 or 2 times a month and when they were watching banner advertising. In detail, food and beverage tickets such as restaurants, café and bars occupied 35%, and they showed the highest. 'We-make-price', 'Ticket Monster' and 'Coupang' were used to investigate as representative social commerce companies.

• International Commerce and Information Review
• /
• v.9 no.4
• /
• pp.159-175
• /
• 2007

Under U.S. Antidumping law, dumping occurs when 'subject merchandise' is imported into the United States and sold at less than 'fair value'. The administration of U.S. antidumping law is shared between the U.S. Department of Commerce(USDOC) and the U.S. International Trade Commission(USITC). USDOC's task is to determine whether imports are being dumped, and if so, to estimate the margin of dumping. In determining whether an industry in the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of the subject imports, the USITC must first define the 'like product' and the 'domestic industry'. One of the crucial factors on antidumping measures is the interpretation's scope of the 'like product' and the 'domestic industry', leading the most controversial issues in U.S. antidumping law. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the 'domestic industry' and 'like product' considering U.S. antidumping law. Most USITC's determinations regarding like product and industry as flexible conception have been supported by the U.S. Courts.

• Journal of Distribution Science
• /
• v.17 no.4
• /
• pp.5-16
• /
• 2019

Purpose - This study examines whether price cartel firms perform downward earnings management to avoid or minimize penalty surcharges levied by the Korea Fair Trade Commission and analyzes such earnings management in distribution industry. Research design, data, and methodology - We use 247 firms from 64 price cartel cases in the period of 2011-2016, and collect data from 3 years before to 3 years after the start of price cartel. Earnings management is measured by discretionary accruals. Three discretionary accrual estimation models are employed; modified Jones model, ROA adjusted modified Jones model and CFO-adjusted modified Jones model. For pre- and post-cartel periods, one year, two year, and three year windows are used. Additional empirical analyses are performed for distribution industry sub-sample of 25 cartel firms. Result - The regression results show that cartel firms' discretionary accruals are significantly lower in the period after the start of price cartel than before. And discretionary accruals are lower in cartel firms than in non-cartel firms during the cartel period. Cartel firms in distribution industry also show the earnings management similar to those in other industries. Conclusions - These two findings lead to the conjecture that managers of cartel firms manage their earnings downward. This behavior is indistinguishable between firms in distribution industry and other industries.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
• /
• v.17 no.7
• /
• pp.487-497
• /
• 2017

South Korea needs reorganization of dispute resolution system due to the frequent occurrence of a case that trade secret or technique are leaked. First, the distributed various laws are established and enforced by enacting and enforcing individual laws. Therefore, the redundancy problems, the collision of individual laws, the decline in diversity, integrity, and connectivity are issues. An independent legal system is needed by Act on the Prevention and Protection of Technology Leakage. Thereby, The support system of technological protection that is sprayed in government departments such as the Small and Medium Business Administration, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the Patent Office, the Fair Trade Commission, the Trade Committee, the National Police Agency, and the Spy Agency integrates and unifies institutionally, and it is necessary to advance a policy with functional division. Second, the Patent Tribunal, the Invention Promotion Act, the Industrial Property Right Dispute Mediation Committee by the patent law, the Industrial Technical Dispute Mediation Committee on the Industrial Technology Outflow Prevention and Protection Law and the Medium and Small Firm Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Committee on Small Business Technology Protection Support Law are installed. However, since it established the integrated law on the Act on the Prevention and Protection of Technology Leakage, it is desirable to set the merged operation of establishment on the Technical Dispute Mediation Committee under the Small and Medium Business Administration or the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
• /
• v.11 no.6
• /
• pp.135-144
• /
• 2010

Apple recently announced a new policy about software development kit that banned the use of tools that convert apps built on other platforms into iPhone apps. Therefore, Adobe cannot develop their software to AppStore that inquire to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission about antitrust actions. Someone argue that Apple try to exclusive smartphone market such as the Microsoft antitrust lawsuit in 1998, but this case is essentially different. First, it need to define Apple's software development kit for iPhone and iPad is whether antitrust or not. Because of the characteristics of two-sided market in Smartphone Apple's iPhone cannot monopoly in cellphone or smartphone market, but it can be an antitrust in application store market. However, Apple re-announced new software development kit policy that shows positive results. Instead of hastily intervened regulatory agencies, the DOJ or the FTC, it is quite desirable that watching the interaction between companies that whether market failures or not and if it's harmful for consumer's benefit. Adobe attack Apple to advocate consumers and developers freedom of choice, but the most important thing is conclusion based on a comprehensive analysis need to objective point of view that Apple do whether antitrust act or not and damage to developers and consumers who are both side of platform.