• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.12
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• pp.555-586
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• 1999

United States has extended the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law in 1990s. First, The U.S. Federal Supreme Court declared in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California that the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law is according to Effect Doctrine. Therefore, U.S. Antirust Division and FTC will continue to base their assertions of juridiction on the test of direct, substantial and foreseeable effects on U.S. interests. Second, U.S. Antitrust Law apply to foreign conduct that such conduct has direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. domestic or import commerce and export commerce. Third, United States has extended the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law on international licensing contract or international merger. Forth, United States impose criminal responsbility of U.S. Antitrust Law on the foreign anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, our government and industries must consider the corresponding stratigies against the extension of the extraterritorial application of U.S. Antitrust Law.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.27
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• pp.21-27
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• 1997

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.79-116
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• 1995

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.18 no.5
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• pp.446-454
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• 2012

This study discusses effective extraterritorial application of criminal Law outside the territorial sea. The paper focuses on the factual differences between vessels and cars which justify the varying standard. Thus, warrantless searches and safety inspection need to be validated because of the exigent circumstances of the sea. Warrantless searches at sea may also be justified based on border search exception. These theories in U. S. law will be helpful for legislation and law enforcement related to the Korean Coast Guard's mission. The paper also discusses Korean Coast Guard's Act's newly enacted provisions concerning search, arrest and hot pursuit.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.53
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• pp.419-454
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• 2017

Faced with the internationalization of capital markets, Korea needs to protect its investors and markets by applying the relevant laws extraterritorially. The Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act ("Capital Markets Act") explicitly introduced a new provision recognizing the extraterritoriality of the Act. While Article 2 of the Capital Markets Act comprehensively provides for prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction, the enactment of extraterritoriality alone does not guarantee that the Act will apply to cross-border transactions effectively. The effective extraterritorial application of an act is inseparable from the adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction of the act. Specifically, active investigations and detections by the public regulators might be the first step for enforcing the Capital Markets Act. Unlike domestic regulations, however, multinational enforcement actions outside a regulator's home country becomes more problematic because of various obstacles. This Article examines difficulties which domestic regulators may confront in enforcing the Capital Markets Act extraterritorially and makes several recommendations for more effective multinational enforcement as follows. First, the Korean regulators should continue to foster cooperation through the IOSCO and provide international markets with the information and tools necessary for successful regulation of cross-border transactions. Second, the principle of dual criminality should be applied in a modified form for the effective mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Third, there should be a legal device for the domestic regulator to freeze foreign wrongdoer's assets located outside Korea to repatriate those assets for distribution to defrauded investors in Korea.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.117-149
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• 2015

On May 16, 2014 the Supreme Court of Korea rendered its decision with respect to litigation filed by All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. ("ANA") for revocation of an order of correction and payment of a penalty imposed by the Korea Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC"). On or around September 2002, ANA and various airlines operating air cargo service from Japan to Korea were allegedly to have agree to introduce of fuel surcharge into their rates on cargo fares in an attempt to recoup falling profits from rising of oil price. As this hard core cartel was per se prohibited under Korean competition law (The Monopoly Regulation And Fair Trade Act), KFTC began an investigation and consequently with fruitful results imposed an amount of penalty and issued an order of prohibition. ANA protested against this imposition by filing suit against KFTC under the reasons that (1) their agreement was simply pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations including Air Transport Agreement between Korea and Japan, (2) there was an administrative guidance from Japanese government to allow this agreement, (3) extraterritorial application of Korean competition law to the agreement in this matter was improper as it was made within Japan and targeted only for the shipment from Japan to Korea: accordingly there is not a direct and serious effect between the agreement and any result of anti-competitive. This article aims to review ANA's allegation and the judgement delivered by Korean court under some issues respectively; (1) whether there is an effectively actual anti-competitive cartel between airlines including plaintiff, (2) whether filed rate doctrine is reasonable and applicable in this case for precluding wrongfulness, (3) what is the reasonable limitation of boundaries in extraterritorial application of Korean competition law. Additionally, this article also suggests to concern particular features of air transport business as an regulated industry in judging the unfair restrain on competition.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.103-125
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• 2020

This paper reviews the EU Case, Claudia Wegener v. Royal Air Maroc SA [2018] ECLI:EU:C:2018:361, Case C-537/17. It analyzes some issues as to Wegener case by examining EU Regulations and practical point of views. Article 3(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, entitled scope, provides: "this Regulation shall apply: (a) to passengers departing from an airport located in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies; (b) to passengers departing from an airport located in a third country to an airport situated in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies, unless they received benefits or compensation and were given assistance in that third country, if the operating air carrier of the flight concerned is a Community carrier." ECJ held that must be interpreted as meaning that Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 applies to a passenger transport effected under a single booking and comprising, between its departure from an airport situated in the territory of a Member State and its arrival at an airport situated in the territory of a third State, a scheduled stopover outside the European Union with a change of aircraft. According to the Court, it is apparent from the regulation and case-law that when, as in the present case, two (or more) flights are booked as a single unit, those flights constitute a whole for the purposes of the right to compensation for passengers. Those flights must therefore be considered as one and the same connecting flight.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.