• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.12 no.10
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• pp.169-177
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• 2012

Due to the influences of global financial crisis, countries are putting their efforts on the enhancement of appropriateness and transparency of director compensation. In several countries including Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, listed companies and financial institutions in certain levels make public announcement for compensations of individual directors, not the averages. Recently, even Asian countries including China, Hong Kong, and Singapore are introducing individual director compensation public announcement policies. On the other hand, in cases of companies, which must submit annual reports, under current Korean capital market laws and enforcement ordinances, they are obligated to mention 'total wage paid to all executives in that business year' on the annual report, but does not have to mention individual wages of each executive. About this, at the 17th national assembly, revised bill for the Securities and Exchange Act for companies to mention wages of each executive. The financial world is opposing to open individual director compensation to the public as they concern about the shrinking of outstanding human resources recruitment, breach of corporate confidence, privacy invasion, deterioration of labor-management relations, and downfall of the executive's management will as director compensation will be standardized downward; however, if public opening of individual director compensation is forced, domestic companies will prepare more objective and rational standards when they calculate director compensations, and moreover, it will prevent arbitrary intervention of dominant shareholders. Therefore, to clearly and efficiently control director compensation, we need regulations for obligating public opening of individual director compensation.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.187-207
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• 2018

This study examines the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation and examines whether their relationship increases as managerial incentive compensation intensity increases. For this purpose, a total of 2,755 company-years were selected for the analysis of the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from December 2012 to 2016 as the final sample. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between accounting conservatism and manager overpayment. This implies that managers' incentives to distort future cash flow estimates by over booking assets or accounting profits in order to maximize their compensation when manager compensation is linked to firm performance. In this sense, accounting conservatism can reduce opportunistic behavior by restricting managerial accounting choices, which can be interpreted as a reduction in overpayment to managers. Second, we found that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation increases with the incentive compensation for accounting performance. The higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity of accounting performance is, the more likely it is that the manager has the incentive to make earnings adjustments. Therefore, the high level of incentive compensation for accounting performance means that the ex post settling up problem due to over-compensation can become serious. In this case, the higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity for accounting performance, the greater the role and utility of conservatism in manager compensation contracts. This study is based on the fact that it presents empirical evidence on the usefulness of accounting conservatism in managerial compensation contracts theoretically presented by Watts (2003) and the additional basis that conservatism can be used as a useful tool for investment decision.

• Proceedings of the Korea Database Society Conference
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• 2001.06a
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• pp.235-248
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• 2001

o Global Support Centers o 50 Worldwide Field Service Offices o Executive Sponsorship o Quarterly Customer Satisfaction Reviews o Compensation Plans Based on Customer Satisfaction (omitted)

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.305-313
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• 2019

The study examines whether higher CEO compensation is related to unobserved future firm performance in an emerging market, Pakistan. Further, it extends its scope to analyzing the impact of group affiliation and ownership concentration on the relationship between CEO compensation and future firm performance. The study uses an unbalanced panel data consisting of 1508 firm-year observations from 225 non-financial listed companies in Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for period 2005 to 2012. The multiple regression models adjusted to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms are used. The study finds that, in general, CEO compensation is positively associated with future operating performance. However, higher CEO compensation leads to lower operating performance in firms that have lower ownership concentration and are affiliated with business groups. When firms are not affiliated with any group and have high ownership concentration, the relationship between excessive CEO compensation and future operating performance becomes insignificant. Given that efficient compensation packages may lead to long term value creation to shareholders and reduce agency problems, this study highlights an important moderating role of ownership concentration and group affiliation of the firms in emerging markets.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.41-79
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• 2011

This study examines the compensation scheme for the executives and risk-taking behavior in the Korean banks. Theoretically, shareholders prefer risky asset choice to the optimal one due to the limited liability feature of reward, and stock-based executive compensation may induce choices favorable to the shareholder. We empirically test this risk-taking hypothesis using Korean banks' data. Since only the stock option data is available under the current disclosure system, we limit our analysis to examine the relationship between the compensation through stock option and the risk of banks. The result provides no evidence that stock option compensations increase the risk of banks, which is contrary to the theoretical prediction and preceding studies in the US. This may be due to any factor that the executive reward data omit, or regulation effects on the bank management.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.35-43
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• 2017

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives' compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm's ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives' compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.

• Safety and Health at Work
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.95-99
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• 2013

Background: Work-related stress is one of the major causes of occupational ill health. In line with the regulatory framework on occupational health and safety (OSH), adequate models for assessing and managing risk need to be identified so as to minimize the impact of this stress not only on workers' health, but also on productivity. Methods: After close analysis of the Italian and European reference regulatory framework and workrelated stress assessment and management models used in some European countries, we adopted the UK Health and Safety Executive's (HSE) Management Standards (MS) approach, adapting it to the Italian context in order to provide a suitable methodological proposal for Italy. Results: We have developed a work-related stress risk assessment strategy, meeting regulatory requirements, now available on a specific web platform that includes software, tutorials, and other tools to assist companies in their assessments. Conclusion: This methodological proposal is new on the Italian work-related stress risk assessment scene. Besides providing an evaluation approach using scientifically validated instruments, it ensures the active participation of occupational health professionals in each company. The assessment tools provided enable companies not only to comply with the law, but also to contribute to a database for monitoring and assessment and give access to a reserved area for data analysis and comparisons.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.29-37
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• 2002

Since the case of ″Ohio u. The United States, Department of the Interior″, claims for marine environment damage caused by oil pollution have been Increased in the United States. Also European countries have suggested in the Executive Committee of 10pc Fund that 10pc Fund should accept claims for marine environment and several claims for marine environment damage were made to 10pc Fund, but all of which were rejected. In this study, compensation system for marine environment damage caused by oil pollution in the United States and the 10pc Fund were comparatively analyzed and several policy recommendations were suggested.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.157-180
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• 2018

This paper empirically analyzes how working conditions of employees and executives affect Korean companies' survival. To this end, a survival analysis based on the accelerated failure time model is conducted from the end of December 2012 to the end of September 2018 on the 2012 year-end financial data for corporations whose common stocks have ever been listed either in the KOSPI market or in the KOSDAQ market with fiscal year ending at the end of December. The analysis shows that the average wage level per employee and the number of executives relative to the number of employees threaten while the average duration of service for female employees prolongs firm survival. Here, the average wage level per employee has turned out to worsen firm survivability regardless of the gender of employees in question while the average duration of service improves firm survivability only in case the employees are female: the average duration of service for male employees or the entire employees has turned out not to have any statistically significant influence on firm survival. The average compensation per executive and the percentage of temporary employees have turned out not to have any statistically significant influence on firm survival while the percentage of female employees has shown statistically significant positive influence on firm survival in some, although not all, models employed in our study. These results are expected to be a good reference in the course of our reaching agreements regarding the improvement of working conditions either between firms and employees or among the members of the entire society.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.235-251
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• 2004

China's Marine Industry are growing up gradually as China's economy has advanced. Also China's Sipping Industry has been advanced. China Sipping Company is going to become a top 5 of world marine industry. China's Marine Industry has supervised and controled a manager under the mechanism of market economy. China's Marine Industry has been changed from the state-owned marine enterprise affected by government and government has effected on the formation of the board of directors and manager. So, the supervision function of the board of directors was reduced. The executive' role is emphasized when possessing the state-owned enterprise through disposal or auction, or when inducing the participation of foreign attraction. It is desirable for the Chinese director and officer to prepare for the claims internationally due to the international economic actions, , westernization of the public's consciousness about the compensation for damage followed by the increasing national income, and to prepare the increasing demand of cases due to increasing lawyers.