• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• Communications for Statistical Applications and Methods
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.125-134
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• 2014

Kullback-Leibler (KL) information is a measure of discrepancy between two probability density functions. However, several nonparametric density function estimators have been considered in estimating KL information because KL information is not well-defined on the empirical distribution function. In this paper, we consider the KL information of the equilibrium distribution function, which is well defined on the empirical distribution function (EDF), and propose an EDF-based goodness of fit test statistic. We evaluate the performance of the proposed test statistic for an exponential distribution with Monte Carlo simulation. We also extend the discussion to the censored case.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.2
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• pp.97-106
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• 2005

This paper presents a method for evaluating the nash equilibrium of the Cournot model for N-Gencos in wholesale electricity market. In wholesale electricity market, the strategies of N-Gencos can be applied to the game model under the conditions, which the Gencos determine their strategies to maximize their benefit. Generally, the Lemke algorithm has known as the approach to evaluate the mixed nash equilibrium in the only two-player game model. In this paper, we have developed the necessary condition for obtaining the mixed nash equilibrium of N-player by using the Lemke algorithms. However, it is difficult to find the mixed nash equilibrium of two more players by using the analytic method since those have the nonlinear characteristics. To overcome the above problem, we have formulated the object function satisfied with the proposed necessary conditions for N-player nash equilibrium and applied the modified particle swarm optimization (PSO) method to obtain the equilibrium for N-player. To present the effectiveness the proposed necessary condition and the evaluation approach, this paper has shown the results of equilibrium of sample system and the cournot game model for 3-players.

• Publications of The Korean Astronomical Society
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.297-299
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• 2015

In this paper we have examined the linear stability of triangular equilibrium points in the photogravitational restricted three body problem when both primaries are triaxial rigid bodies, the bigger one an oblate spheroid and source of radiation. The orbits about the Lagrangian equilibrium points are important for scientific investigation. A number of space missions have been completed and some are being proposed by various space agencies. We analyze the periodic motion in the neighbourhood of the Lagrangian equilibrium points as a function of the value of the mass parameter. Periodic orbits of an infinitesimal mass in the vicinity of the equilibrium points are studied analytically and numerically. The linear stability of triangular equilibrium points in the photogravitational restricted three body problem with Poynting-Robertson drag when both primaries are oblate spheroids has been examined by A. Kumar (2007). We have found the equations of motion and triangular equilibrium points for our problem. With the help of the characteristic equation we have discussed stability conditions. Finally, triangular equilibrium points are stable in the linear sense. It is further seen that the triangular points have long or short periodic elliptical orbits in the same range of ${\mu}$.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1988.11a
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• pp.206-209
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• 1988

Fixed boundary MHD static equilibrium for the axisymmetric toroidal plasma is analyzed numerically. The Grad-Shafranov equation is solved using FFM. The toroidal current tenn is expressed by plasma pressure p($\psi$) and toroidal field function g($\psi$). The numerical results are compared to the Solovev analytic equilibrium for the verification of the analysis. For SNUT-79 tokamak device in Seoul National University, flux surfaces and toroidal current profiles according to the variation of p and g profiles are observed. Also the safety factor q and average beta are obtained.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.29 no.5_6
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• pp.1117-1127
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• 2011

In this paper, a class of more general delayed viral infection model with lytic immune response is proposed by Song et al.[1] ([Journal of Mathematical Analysis Application 373 (2011), 345-355). We derive the basic reproduction numbers $R_0$ and $R_0^*$ 0 for the viral infection, and establish that the global dynamics are completely determined by the values of $R_0$ and $R_0^*$. If $R_0{\leq}1$, the viral-free equilibrium $E_0$ is globally asymptotically stable; if $R_0^*{\leq}1$ < $R_0$, the immune-free equilibrium $E_1$ is globally asymptotically stable; if $R_0^*$ > 1, the chronic-infection equilibrium $E_2$ is globally asymptotically stable by using the method of Lyapunov function.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.55 no.5
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Precision Engineering
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• v.22 no.8 s.173
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• pp.192-198
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• 2005

In this paper, we propose a new training system for the improvement of equilibrium sense using unstable platform. The equilibrium sense, which provides orientation with respect to gravity, is important to integrate the vision, somatosensory and vestibular function to maintain the equilibrium sense of the human body. In order to improve the equilibrium sense, we developed the software program such as a block game, pingpong game using Visual C++. These training system for the equilibrium sense consists of unstable platform, computer interface and software program. The unstable platform was a simple structure of elliptical-type which included tilt sensor, wireless RF module and the device of power supply. To evaluate the effect of balance training, we measured and evaluated the parameters as the moving time to the target, duration to maintain cursor in the target of screen and the error between sine curve and acquired data. As a results, the moving time to the target and duration to maintain cursor in the target was improved through the repeating training of equilibrium sense. It was concluded that this system was reliable in the evaluation of equilibrium sense. This system might be applied to clinical use as an effective balance training system.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2005.06a
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• pp.2464-2467
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• 2005

The purpose of this study was to explore the effectives of a virtual bicycle system in improving the ability of equilibrium sense of normal healthy adults. Experiments were performed to find the factors related to the training of equilibrium sense. The subjects consisted of young and elderly people and the group of young people was compared against the group of elderly people. We investigated three different running modes of virtual bicycle system with two successive sets in total. W measured the parameters related to the running time, the velocity, the weight movement, the degree of the deviation from the road, and the location of the center of pressure (COP). The results showed that the running capability of the elderly became much better after repeated training. In addition, it was found out that the ability to control postural balance and the capability of equilibrium sensory were improved with the presentation of the visual feedback information of the distribution of weight. We also found that the running time and the running velocity reduced when there was no visual feedback information. From the results, our newly developed bicycle system seems to be effective in the diagnosis of equilibrium sense as well as in the improvement of the sense of sight, and vestibular function of the elderly in the field of rehabilitation training.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.5260-5275
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• 2019

In the process of constructing the traditional offensive and defensive game theory model, these are some shortages for considering the dynamic change of security risk problem. By analysing the critical indicators of the incomplete information game theory model, incomplete information attack and defense game theory model and the mathematical engineering method for solving Bayes-Nash equilibrium, the risk-averse income function for information assets is summarized as the problem of maximising the return of the equilibrium point. To obtain the functional relationship between the optimal strategy combination of the offense and defense and the information asset security probability and risk probability. At the same time, the offensive and defensive examples are used to visually analyse and demonstrate the incomplete information game and the Harsanyi conversion method. First, the incomplete information game and the Harsanyi conversion problem is discussed through the attack and defense examples and using the game tree. Then the strategy expression of incomplete information static game and the engineering mathematics method of Bayes-Nash equilibrium are given. After that, it focuses on the offensive and defensive game problem of unsafe information network based on risk aversion. The problem of attack and defense is obtained by the issue of maximizing utility, and then the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of offense and defense game is carried out around the security risk of assets. Finally, the application model in network security penetration and defense is analyzed by designing a simulation example of attack and defense penetration. The analysis results show that the constructed income function model is feasible and practical.