• 에너지공학
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• 제15권4호
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• pp.256-276
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• 2006

경쟁적 전력시장에서, 송전혼잡은 지역적 시장지배력의 핵심 요인들 중 하나이다. 재무적 송전권을 구매한 시장 참여자는 그들이 지불한 혼잡 세를 돌려받음으로써 재무적 보호를 받을 수 있다. 하지만 많은 연구에서, 이러한 송전권이 오히려 시장지배력을 강화시킴을 보였다. 따라서 본 논문은 새로운 개념의 송전권인 Contingent Transmission Rights을 이용해 지역적 시장지배력을 완화시키는 것이 목적이다. 본 논문은 각 모선의 한계가격 (Locational Marginal Pricing LMP)을 기반으로 한 모선별 가격제도(Nodal Pricing)와 최적조류계산(Optimal Power Flow)를 이용해 사례연구를 수행하였다.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제39권1호
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• pp.30-45
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• 2013

Predicting monthly electricity price has been a significant factor of decision-making for plant resource management, fuel purchase plan, plans to plant, operating plan budget, and so on. In this paper, we propose a sophisticated prediction model in terms of the technique of modeling and the variety of the collected variables. The proposed model hybridizes the semi-supervised learning and the artificial neural network algorithms. The former is the most recent and a spotlighted algorithm in data mining and machine learning fields, and the latter is known as one of the well-established algorithms in the fields. Diverse economic/financial indexes such as the crude oil prices, LNG prices, exchange rates, composite indexes of representative global stock markets, etc. are collected and used for the semi-supervised learning which predicts the up-down movement of the price. Whereas various climatic indexes such as temperature, rainfall, sunlight, air pressure, etc, are used for the artificial neural network which predicts the real-values of the price. The resulting values are hybridized in the proposed model. The excellency of the model was empirically verified with the monthly data of electricity price provided by the Korea Energy Economics Institute.

• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제15권2호
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• pp.319-353
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• 2006

본 논문은 날씨파생상품이 전기도매시장에서의 가격 및 수량 위험의 헤지수단으로서 활용될 수 있다는 것을 보여주고 있다. 또한 일별 수준의 가격과 물량이 아니라 여름기간 동안의 전기도매시장에서의 전기구입 비용 혹은 전기판매 수입을 대상으로 하여 날씨관련 계약형태의 위험헤지효과를 살펴보았다. 날씨관련 계약들이 전기도매시장의 시장신호를 더 잘 보전하고 있으며, 도매전기 구입관련 금융위험을 더 잘 헤지함을 발견하였다. 전기도매시장에서 선물계약과 날씨파생상품을 결합하였을 경우, 더운 날의 경우 높은 전기생산비용이 가격에 반영되며, 전기판매 수입 혹은 전기구입 비용의 변동성이 현저히 낮아진다는 것을 발견하였다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권4호
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• pp.172-178
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• 2006

In this paper, an advanced demand clustering algorithm which can explore the planned maintenance outage of generators in changed electricity industry is proposed. The major contribution of this paper can be captured in the development of the long-term estimates for the generation availability considering planned maintenance outage. Two conflicting viewpoints, one of which is reliability-focused and the other is economy-focused, are incorporated in the development of estimates of maintenance outage based on the advanced demand clustering algorithm. Based on the advanced clustering algorithm, in each demand cluster, conventional effective outage of generators which conceptually capture maintenance and forced outage of generators, are newly defined in order to properly address the characteristic of the planned maintenance outage in changed electricity markets. First, initial market demand is classified into multiple demand clusters, which are defined by the effective outage rates of generators and by the inherent characteristic of the initial demand. Then, based on the advanced demand clustering algorithm, the planned maintenance outages and corresponding effective outages of generators are reevaluated. Finally, the conventional demand clusters are newly classified in order to reflect the improved effective outages of generation markets. We have found that the revision of the demand clusters can change the number of the initial demand clusters, which cannot be captured in the conventional demand clustering process. Therefore, it can be seen that electricity market situations, which can also be classified into several groups which show similar patterns, can be more accurately clustered. From this the fundamental characteristics of power systems can be more efficiently analyzed, for this advanced classification can be widely applicable to other technical problems in power systems such as generation scheduling, power flow analysis, price forecasts, and so on.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권1호
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• pp.85-92
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• 2005

In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. We analyze the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions and propose a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction. We assume that spot markets are operated as uniform pricing auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid. Depending on the bids of generation companies, market demands are allocated to each company accordingly. The uniform pricing auction in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium originating from the Nash idea. Based on the so called residual demand curve, we can derive the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies, analytically. Finally, we present an efficient means to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to illustrate the basic idea of the proposed methodology. From this, we can see the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem, even though further future analysis is required.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제4권3호
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• pp.346-352
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• 2009

The eventual goal of this paper is to help the generating companies and load-serving entities to choose appropriate relative levels of interconnected system versus bilateral trades while considering risk, and economic performance. In competitive power markets, electricity prices are determined by balance between demand and supply in electric power exchanges or bilateral contracts. The problem formulation is bilateral contract incorporated into Multi-area unit commitment with import/export and tie-line constraints. This proposed method considers maximizing own profit or minimize the operating cost among the generating companies in multi-area system. The feasibility of the proposed algorithm has been demonstrated using IEEE system with four areas and experimental results shows that proposed method is reliable, fast and computationally efficient

• 에너지공학
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• 제11권2호
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• pp.142-148
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• 2002

경쟁적인 전력시장에서 실시간 전력가격의 변화는 전력소비자들의 전력소비에 영향을 주게된다. 서로 다른 특성을 가지는 가정용, 상업용, 산업용 부하들은 전력소비 성향의 변화에 따라 서로 다른 가지 탄력성을 가진다. 따라서, 본 논문에서는 계산된 각 용도별 부하에 대한 수요 탄력성을 적용하여 경쟁 전력시장에서 수요 탄력성에 따른 전력수요의 변화가 현물가격에 미치는 영향을 분석한다.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• 제7권5호
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• pp.681-688
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• 2012

This paper presents the application of Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm to obtain a solution for Bid Based Dynamic Economic Dispatch (BBDED) problem including the transmission losses and to maximize the social profit in a deregulated power system. The IEEE-30 bus test system with six generators, two customers and two trading periods are considered under various bidding strategies in a day-ahead electricity market. By matching the bids received from supplying and distributing entities, the Independent System Operator (ISO) maximize the social profit, (with the choices available). The simulation results of DE are compared with the results of Particle swarm optimization (PSO). The results demonstrate the potential of DE algorithm and show its effectiveness to solve BBDED.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.855-857
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• 2005

Transmission congestion is one of the Key factor to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financial protection to their holders by paying back the congestion cost. However, the market participants who have market power can exacerbate their market power. This paper analyzes the effect of exercising local market power with the rights on the market price. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow(OPF). Case study is fulfilled by GAMS simulation. The simulation are condusted in case of Nodal Pricing.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.775-777
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• 2005

In this paper, effects of the subsidy in the electricity market on the market equilibrium are analyzed. The generation competition markets are considered as the basic market structure. The market equilibrium with Cournot game model is derived, first. Then, the variation of Nash equilibrium is investigated when the subsidies to generation companies are provided. The market equilibrium with the subsidy in the electricity market, which is equivalent to the subgame perfect equilibrium, is analytically derived using Stackelberg game model and backward induction method. From this, how the provisions of subsidy to generation companies can affect the strategic behaviors of the generation companies and corresponding market equilibrium are explored, in this paper. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the basic idea of this paper.