• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.113-120
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• 1994

A duopoly model is developed in order to examine the effect of imperfect competition on the price-setting behavior of competing providers in a congested market. Multiple Nash price equilibria are found and the implications of such multiple price equilibria are discussed.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.65-75
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• 2016

We study limit pricing in a price-based duopoly market under asymmetric information on the demand state. An incumbent, who is a monopolist in the initial period, has complete information on the size of a market, while a potential entrant only knows it partially. After observing the sales price of the incumbent in the first period, the entrant decides whether to enter a duopoly market and the sales price if she chooses to. We present a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which indicates that limit pricing can deter the entry of a potential entrant under price competition when there is information asymmetry about the demand state.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1995.04a
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• pp.363-374
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• 1995

A duopoly model of R&D competition is presented to investigate whether an equilibrium R&D level with flexible spillovers is insufficient (or excessive) from the viewpoint of social welfare. The model focus on flexible spillovers which include much portion of externality occurring in R&D activity. Flexible spillovers refer to the spillovers that vary with industry equilibrium level of R&D. Innovating firms have incentives to cooperate in R&D in the presence of large spillovers. For any symmetric R&D profile, socially desirable equilibrium output is larger than equilibrium output produced in duopoly. Cooperative equilibrium R&D investment is observed to be socially insufficient in terms of welfare criterion irrespective of the magnitude of spillovers. While noncooperative R&D yields socially excessive expenditure on research project for a certain range of spillovers.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.79-90
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• 2019

As an increasing number of cloud service providers begin to provide cloud computing services, they form a competitive market to compete for users. Due to different resource configurations and service workloads, users may observe different response times for their service requests and experience different levels of service quality. To compete for cloud users, it is crucial for each cloud service provider to determine an optimal price that best corresponds to their service qualities while also guaranteeing maximum profit. To achieve this goal, the underlying rationale and characteristics in this competitive market must be clarified. In this paper, we analyze price competition in the multimedia cloud service market with two service providers. We characterize the nature of non-cooperative games in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market with the goal of capturing how each cloud service provider determines its optimal price to compete with the other and maximize its own profit. To do this, we introduce a queueing model to characterize the service process in a multimedia cloud data center. Based on performance measures of the proposed queueing model, we suggest a price competition problem in a duopoly multimedia cloud service market. By solving this problem, we can obtain the optimal equilibrium prices.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.165-183
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• 1996

In acquiring and transferring a superior knowledge assesing the intermediate result value of a competitive R&D project is very important for a firm engaging in R&D. Most existing literatures on R&D evaluation are concerned with project selection and resource allocation. In this paper the stage of an R&D project is classified into research, exploratory development, and development. And a model is suggested which evaluates the intermediate result value before completion of development stage under duopoly and oligopolistic competition. Assessed value of the intermediate result transferred to the next tier company can be used as a minimum acceptable price to the inventor when more advanced knowledge acquired through R&D is transferred to the next tier one. The model suggested is composed of structural variables including research cost, success rates, potential profits, discount rate degree of competition. By using exponential distribution for invertion process time in each stage, we derive a formula that can assess the value of the intermediate result, and we demonstrate how the model can be applied to a competitive R&D situation through an example.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.545-557
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• 1997

This paper deals with dynamic optimal pricing for new products by a firm which maximizes the discounted profit stream of it's own in a duopoly. The problem is constructed as differential games and dynamic optimization theory. Cost is assumed to decline as time goes on. A modified customer's choice model is formulated as a diffusion model and we solve a dynamic optimization problem by adopting the diffusion model. Since this paper focus on deriving real prices not showing a time trend, we formulate recursive form equations of costate variables(shadow price) and a simultaneous equation of price. Hence we derive a dynamic optimal pricing model for using in real market. In particular, we construct a dynamic optimal pricing model in the case that there are benefits from not only new subscribers but also previous subscribers. We analyze instant camera market in U.S.A(1976-1985) by utilizing the above model.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

This study examines optimal emission taxes and welfares in mixed duopoly markets where public and private firms produce differentiated goods and emit pollutions. Both comparing quantity and price competitions and comparing simultaneous and simultaneous games provides the followings findings: First, irrespective of competition modes between quantity and price competitions or simultaneous and sequential games, the optimal emission tax is always lower than marginal environmental damage. Second, emission tax under private leadership is the highest in quantity competition while that under public leadership is the highest in price competition. Third, environmental damage under Cournot and private leadership is worsened in quantity competition while that under public leadership is worsened in price competition. Finally, welfare under Bertrand and public leadership is improved in price competition while that under private leadership is improved in quantity competition.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2001.10a
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• pp.226-229
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• 2001

Owing to handset subsidies, large growth in the Korean mobile telephony subscribers has occurred. While most of firms create artificial switching costs by rewarding customers for repeated purchases to retain their customers, mobile telephone carriers discriminate against loyal customers through handset subsidies. This article examines the effect of switching cost on the prices and profits in a two-period, differentiated product duopoly model.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.83-100
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• 2015

We analyze a duopoly competition when two firms face input cost increases. The objective of this study is to determine the firms' optimal strategy between a price increase and downsizing under conditions of a spatially differentiated market and consumers' diminishing utility on the product size. We develop a theoretical model of two competing firms offering homogenous products using the standard Hotelling model to determine how firms' optimal strategies change when facing input cost increases. In this paper, there are two types of duopoly competitions: symmetric and asymmetric. In the symmetric case, the two firms have the same marginal cost and are producing and selling identical products. In the asymmetric case, the two firms have different marginal costs. The results show that the optimal strategy decision depends on the size of the input cost increase and the cost differences between the two firms. We find that when two firms are asymmetric (i.e., they have different marginal costs), the two firms might choose asymmetric pairs of strategies in equilibrium under certain conditions. When the cost differences between the two firms are sufficiently large and the cost increase is sufficiently small, the cost leader chooses price increase, and the cost-disadvantaged firm chooses downsizing in equilibrium. This asymmetric strategy reduces price competition between two firms, and consumers are better off. When the cost differences between the two firms are sufficiently large, downsizing is the dominant strategy for the cost-disadvantaged firm. The cost-disadvantaged firm finds it more profitable to reduce the product size than to increase its price to reduce price competition, because consumers prefer downsizing to price increases. This paper might be a good starting point for further analytical research in this area.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.1-28
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• 2018

This study investigates the strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) of polluting duopoly when two firms have different production costs and compete with prices. We then examine an endogenous timing game in choosing ECSR and its effects on environmental damage and social welfare. The followings are the main findings: First, sequential choice of ECSR is strategic complements and it provides late adopter advantage irrespective of cost difference. Second, sequential choice of ECSR is the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. In particular, an efficient firm-leading ECSR is the payoff dominance equilibrium when cost difference is significant. Finally, environmental damage and social welfare depend on the social cost of pollution. In particular, an efficient firm-leading ECSR is socially desirable when social cost is high. However, an inefficient firm-leading ECSR increases environmental damage irrespective of social cost and it reduces social welfare when cost difference is significant.