• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.305-330
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• 2018

The purpose of this article is to examine whether Myanmar's experience in which dealing with the most exemplary change among rogue states or pariah state in the 21st century is feasible for North Korea's case. Recently, North Korea's willingness to dialogue, reform and open is similar to the precedent in which the Myanmar military junta dismantled its ruling system and turned over transition period through general elections in 2010 and 2015 each. The so-called 'Myanmar Model' refers to a country branded as a rogue state which has been under the international sanctions and pressure, and opening its political system and the market by choosing transformation. However, rapid changes in speed across the entire society after opening up are impossible because the political elite is only the leading role and implementation in the transition. In case of Myanmar, military culture has penetrated into society due to such a long-lasting military dictatorship, and even democratic bloc has become accustomed to authoritarian decision-making process. Furthermore, the "reserved area" of the old regime still exists in a deformed political structure that can not retrieve the interests of the military. Therefore there could not be achieved political development in term of qualification. North Korea also appears unlikely to achieve political and economic assessment in a short period of time, as civil society has not appeared due to its long dictatorship and very low economic development levels. Like Myanmar, North Korea is also likely to control the pace and direction of upcoming reforms and open, as the dictator or most powerful person chose to reform and open up. Therefore, if North Korea moves toward the 'Myanmar Model', there will be high expectations of new changes in the short term, but it could be delayed or stalled in the mid and long term.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.5-58
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• 2019

The purpose of this article is to bring about 10.26 accident by providing a fuse for the overthrow of the Park Chung-hee administration in the 10.18 Buma uprising. So, first of all, this article has a main purpose in analyzing the comparison between Masan's 3.15 uprising and 10.18 Buma uprising. The purpose of the study is to compare the 3.15 democratic movement in Masan with the 10.18 Buma uprising, given that the incident laid the foundation for the dictator to be overthrown in the event of an anti-dictatorial movement in Masan. The research method of this article is intended to be used as a research method in the 3.15 and 10.18 protests, given that if a person in power conducts election fraud or suppresses anti-government movements in order to maintain the system, it could lead to the destruction of those in power. In the end, the Masan 3.15 uprising and 10.18 uprising failed to reach a direct attempt to overthrow the regime due to unfinished democratic movements, but with the revolution of 4.19 and the massive political transformation of 10.26 Accident, he achieved the leading role theory that allowed the Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee administrations. In eradicating authoritarian regimes, however, the historic significance of the democratization movement was that the authoritarian regime eventually brought about the collapse of the regime by making a hard-line stance on election schemes or popular protests over the trap of power boomerang, which causes the regime to collapse.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.39
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• pp.185-215
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• 2014

Since North Korea has used terror crime as a means of unification under communism against South Korea, South Korea has been much damaged until now. And the occurrence possibility of terror crime by North Korean authority is now higher than any other time. The North Korean terror crimes of Kim Il Sung era had been committed by the dictator's instruction with the object of securing governing fund. However, looking at the terror crimes committed for decades during Kim Jung Il authority, it is revealed that these terror crimes are expressed as a criminal behavior because of the conflict to accomplish the power and economic advantage non powerful groups target. This study focused on the power conflict in various causes of terror crimes by applying George B. Vold(1958)'s theory which explained power conflict between groups became a factor of crime, and found the aspect by ages of terror crime behavior by North Korean authority and responding plan to future North Korean terror crime. North Korean authority high-ranking officials were the Labor Party focusing on Juche Idea for decades in Kim Il Sung time. Afterwards, high-ranking officials were formed focusing on military authorities following Military First Policy at the beginning of Kim Jung Il authority, rapid power change has been done for recent 10 years. To arrange the aspect by times of terror crime following this power change, alienated party executives following the support of positive military first authority by Kim Jung Il after 1995 could not object to forcible terror crime behavior of military authority, and 1st, 2nd Yeongpyeong maritime war which happened this time was propelled by military first authority to show the power of military authority. After 2006, conservative party union enforced censorship and inspection on the trade business and foreign currency-earning of military authority while executing drastic purge. The shooting on Keumkangsan tourists that happened this time was a forcible terror crime by military authority following the pressure of conservative party. After October, 2008, first military reign union executed the launch of Gwanmyungsung No.2 long-range missile, second nuclear test, Daechung marine war, and Cheonanham attacking terror in order to highlight the importance and role of military authority. After September 2010, new reign union went through severe competition between new military authority and new mainstream and new military authority at this time executed highly professionalized terror crime such as cyber/electronic terror unlike past military authority. After July 2012, ICBM test launch, third nuclear test, cyber terror on Cheongwadae homepage of new mainstream association was the intention of Km Jung Eun to display his ability and check and adjust the power of party/military/cabinet/ public security organ, and he can attempt the unexpected terror crime in the future. North Korean terror crime has continued since 1980s when Kim Jung Il's power succession was carried out, and the power aspect by times has rapidly changed since 1994 when Kim Il Sung died and the terror crime became intense following the power combat between high-ranking officials and power conflict for right robbery. Now South Korea should install the specialized department which synthesizes and analyzes the information on North Korean high-ranking officials and reinforce the comprehensive information-collecting system through the protection and management of North Korean defectors and secret agents in order to determine the cause of North Korean terror crime and respond to it. And South Korea should participate positively in the international collaboration related to North Korean terror and make direct efforts to attract the international agreement to build the international cooperation for the response to North Korean terror crime. Also, we should try more to arrange the realistic countermeasure against North Korean cyber/electronic terror which was more diversified with the expertise terror escaping from existing forcible terror through enactment/revision of law related to cyber terror crime, organizing relevant institute and budget, training professional manpower, and technical development.