• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.11-21
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• 2014

South Korea should not be in subordinate position in international relationships like the past. As the status of middle power. South Korea achieves peaceful unification through overcoming North Korea's nuclear and conventional threats, and builds military power in Northeast Asia as a 'balancer'. This can firstly be achieved by constructing "attack systems triad". 'attack systems triad' can be established through integrating the C41SR as a common strategy for the purposes of preemptive deterrence and retaliatory deterrence against the dangers of the present and the future. Second, denial deterrence can be achieved by establishing "defense system triad" by combining common military power and defensive weapon system. Finally, development of independent advanced technological strategies can be achieved by building defense industry and combination of research and development through constructing "Infra triad". As for constructing and reinforcing the future of the ROK military, a unilateral principle and policy efforts to achieve the aforementioned force construction models are needed. This can only be achieved through the government's national vision to take on the role of mediator and a basis founded upon the consensus of the public.

• Maritime Security
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.103-128
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• 2024

The Nord Stream explosion and the damage to submarine cables in the Baltic Sea and Red Sea have raised interest in seabed warfare all the world. And each country is preparing response plans and strategy. However, although South Korea relies on submarine cables for most of its internet network and is vulnerable to threats from North Korea and neighboring countries, even the term Seabed Warfare is unfamiliar. This paper is the first domestic study to analyze the definition and characteristics of seabed warfare, the current status of each country, and suggest countermeasures. In order to respond to seabed warfare, I propose establishing a cooperative system based on Mini-multilateralism between countries that share an international rules-based order, and establishing governance with related domestic organizations and companies. And I propose a military response plan based on deterrence by denial and deterrence by retaliation

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.