• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.177-192
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• 2023

A prerequisite for a lasting ceasefire is the emergence of a prevailing view in Moscow and Kyiv that the fighting has reached a hurting stalemate. In sum, they both lose more through continuing warfare than by a ceasefire. This study applies social identity dynamics of nationalism to this escalatory conflict. It generates findings that imply that China as a third-party great power intervening mediator can potentially play a pivotal role. Shifting the respective prevailing views in Moscow and Kyiv of their interaction from a zero-sum foundation requires proffering powerful economic and political third-party incentives. Effective inducement would facilitate national defense, development and prestige for Moscow as well as Kyiv. China arguably has the underutilized potential power capabilities necessary to alter the respective prevailing views of strategic relationships among the great powers within Moscow, Brussels and Washington. A prerequisite for success in striving effectively towards this strategic goal is cooperation with the Beijing despite skepticism from Washington. This study utilizes a process tracing methodological approach. It highlights that the foundations of the Russo-Ukraine war lie in the institutionalization within Euro-Atlantic integration of the Cold War assumption that the USSR was an imperialist revisionist actor. Russia is the USSR's successor state. Moscow's prevailing view is that Russian national self-determination was unjustly circumscribed in the multinational Soviet totalitarian Communist system. The Euro-Atlantic community is perceived as a neocolonial imperial threat by allying with post-1991 Ukrainian nationalism at Russia's expense. The study finds that acknowledging Eurasian regional multipolarity is necessary, if not sufficient, to coopt Beijing into a global political stabilization strategy. It functionally aims to promote international balancing to lessen potentials for horizontal as well as vertical escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.1-9
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• 2024

Although federated learning is designed to be safer than centralized methods in terms of security and privacy, it still has many vulnerabilities. An attacker performing an adversarial attack intentionally manipulates the deep learning model by injecting carefully crafted input data, that is, adversarial examples, into the client's training data to induce misclassification. A common defense strategy against this is so-called adversarial training, which involves preemptively learning the characteristics of adversarial examples into the model. Existing research assumes a scenario where all clients are under adversarial attack, but considering the number of clients in federated learning is very large, this is far from reality. In this paper, we experimentally examine aspects of adversarial training in a scenario where some of the clients are under attack. Through experiments, we found that there is a trade-off relationship in which the classification accuracy for normal samples decreases as the classification accuracy for adversarial examples increases. In order to effectively utilize this trade-off relationship, we present a method to perform adversarial training by adaptively selecting a loss function depending on whether the client is attacked.

• Clinical and Experimental Vaccine Research
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.337-345
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• 2023

Purpose: The global fight against the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has led to widespread vaccination efforts, yet the optimal dosing schedule for SARS-CoV-2 vaccines remains a subject of ongoing research. This study aims to investigate the effectiveness of administering two booster doses as the third and fourth doses at different intervals to enhance vaccine protection. Materials and Methods: This study was conducted at a military regional hospital operated by the Ministry of National Defense in Taiwan. A cohort of vaccinated individuals was selected, and their vaccine potency was assessed at various time intervals following their initial vaccine administration. The study participants received booster doses as the third and fourth doses, with differing time intervals between them. The study monitored neutralizing antibody titers and other relevant parameters to assess vaccine efficacy. Results: Our findings revealed that the potency of the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine exhibited a significant decline 80 days after the initial vaccine administration. However, a longer interval of 175 days between booster injections resulted in significantly higher neutralizing antibody titers. The individuals who received the extended interval boosters exhibited a more robust immune response, suggesting that a vaccine schedule with a 175-day interval between injections may provide superior protection against SARS-CoV-2. Conclusion: This study underscores the importance of optimizing vaccine booster dosing schedules to maximize protection against SARS-CoV-2. The results indicate that a longer interval of 175 days between the third and fourth doses of the vaccine can significantly enhance the neutralizing antibody response, potentially offering improved protection against the virus. These findings have important implications for vaccine distribution and administration strategies in the ongoing battle against the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Further research and largescale trials are needed to confirm and extend these findings for broader public health implications.

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.61-96
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• 2023

Amidst the ongoing instability and military tensions between North and South Korea, it is essential for us to comprehend and assess North Korea's military capabilities, while preparing for potential contingencies through military reinforcement. However, to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the military balance on the Korean Peninsula, it is imperative to move beyond simplistic quantitative comparisons of combat capabilities and embrace a broader perspective, which includes qualitative comparisons of military strength, operational capabilities, and a nation's ability to wage war. To address this need, this study employs the method of "Net Assessment" to evaluate the relative combat power of South and North Korean conventional naval forces, with a particular focus on surface combatants. This evaluation involves both quantitative and qualitative comparisons of military assets (personnel and equipment) and intangible factors (naval strategies, geography, etc.). By conducting a holistic assessment, the research aims to identify and analyze strategic asymmetries that may exist between the two navies.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.18
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• pp.135-183
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• 2003

Aerospace force is a determining factor in a modem war. The combat field is expanding to space. Thus, the legitimacy of establishing aerospace force is no longer an debating issue, but "how should we establish aerospace force" has become an issue to the military. The standard limiting on the military use of space should be non-aggressive use as asserted by the U.S., rather than non-military use as asserted by the former Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union's argument is not even strongly supported by the current Russia government, and realistically is hard to be applied. Thus, the multi-purpose satellite used for military surveillance or a commercial satellite employed for military communication are allowed under the U.S. principle of peaceful use of space. In this regard, Air Force may be free to develop a military surveillance satellite and a communication satellite with civilian research institute. Although MTCR, entered into with the U.S., restricts the development of space-launching vehicle for the export purpose, the development of space-launching vehicle by the Korea Air Force or Korea Aerospace Research Institute is beyond the scope of application of MTCR, and Air Force may just operate a satellite in the orbit for the military purpose. The primary task for multi-purpose satellite is a remote sensing; SAR sensor with high resolution is mainly employed for military use. Therefore, a system that enables Air Force, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, and Agency for Defense Development to conduct joint-research and development should be instituted. U.S. Air Force has dismantled its own space-launching vehicle step by step, and, instead, has increased using private space launching vehicle. In addition, Military communication has been operated separately from civil communication services or broadcasting services due to the special circumstances unique to the military setting. However, joint-operation of communication facility by the military and civil users is preferred because this reduces financial burden resulting from separate operation of military satellite. During the Gulf War, U.S. armed forces employed commercial satellites for its military communication. Korea's participation in space technology research is a little bit behind in time, considering its economic scale. In terms of budget, Korea is to spend 5 trillion won for 15 years for the space activities. However, Japan has 2 trillion won annul budget for the same activities. Because the development of space industry during initial fostering period does not apply to profit-making business, government supports are inevitable. All space development programs of other foreign countries are entirely supported by each government, and, only recently, private industry started participating in limited area such as a communication satellite and broadcasting satellite, Particularly, Korea's space industry is in an infant stage, which largely demands government supports. Government support should be in the form of investment or financial contribution, rather than in the form of loan or borrowing. Compared to other advanced countries in space industry, Korea needs more budget and professional research staff. Naturally, for the efficient and systemic space development and for the prevention of overlapping and distraction of power, it is necessary to enact space-related statutes, which would provide dear vision for the Korea space development. Furthermore, the fact that a variety of departments are running their own space development program requires a centralized and single space-industry development system. Prior to discussing how to coordinate or integrate space programs between Agency for Defense Development and the Korea Aerospace Research Institute, it is a prerequisite to establish, namely, "Space Operations Center"in the Air Force, which would determine policy and strategy in operating space forces. For the establishment of "Space Operations Center," policy determinations by the Ministry of National Defense and the Joint Chief of Staff are required. Especially, space surveillance system through using a military surveillance satellite and communication satellite, which would lay foundation for independent defense, shall be established with reference to Japan's space force plan. In order to resolve issues related to MTCR, Air Force would use space-launching vehicle of the Korea Aerospace Research Institute. Moreover, defense budge should be appropriated for using multi-purpose satellite and communication satellite. The Ministry of National Defense needs to appropriate 2.5 trillion won budget for space operations, which amounts to Japan's surveillance satellite operating budges.

• Strategy21
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• s.38
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• pp.112-162
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• 2015

This study began to confirm or review the balance of power theory by applying scientific methods through experiential cases. Though there are several kinds of national power, this study supposes military power as a crucial power when it comes to war and peace. This research covered balance and imbalance through comparing relative military power between nations or nations' group. Comparison of relative military power can be achieved by statistically processing the values of which has been converted into the standard variables in same domain, then calculating the values of nation's power which has been synthesized different experiential factors. In addition, the criteria of experiential experiment is highly dedicated to European countries, USA, Japan prior to 1st and 2nd World War, as well as USA, Soviet Union and North East Asia during Cold War era. In addition, the balance of power theory has been redefined to review the action of the state upon the changes of power as mentioned in the theory. To begin with, the redefined theory states that relative level of military power between nations defines the consistency of peace and balance of power. If military power is enough to be on the range of level required to keep the power in equilibrium, peace and balance can be achieved. The opposite would unbalance the military power, causing conflicts. While the relative military level between nations change, nations seek to establish 'nations group' via military cooperation such as alliance, which also shift relative military power between nations group as well. Thus, in order to achieve balance of power, a nation seeks to strengthen its military power(self-help), while pursuing military cooperation(or alliance). This changes relative military power between nations group also. In other words, if there exists balance of power between nations, there is balance of power between nations group as well. In this theory, WWI and II broke out due to the imbalance of military force between nations and nations group, and reviewed that due to the balance of military force during the Cold War, peace was maintained. WWI was resulted from imbalance of military cooperation between two powerful states group and WWII was occurred because of the imbalance among the states. Peace was maintained from cooperation of military power and balance among the states during the Cold War. Imbalance among continental states is more threatening than maritime states and balance of power made by army force and naval force also is feasible. Also the outcomes of two variables are found military power balanced ratio of military power for balance is 67% when variable ratio of balance is 100% and standard value for balance is 0.86. Military power exists in a form of range. The range is what unstabilized the international system causing nations to supplement their military powers. These results made possible the calculation and comparison between state's military power. How balance of power inflicted war and peace has been studied through scientific reviews. Military conflict is highly possible upon already unbalanced military powers of North East Asian countries, if the US draws its power back to America. China and Japan are constantly building up their military force. On the other hand, Korean military force is inferior so in accordance to change of international situation state's survival could be threatened and it is difficult to achieve drastic increase in military force like Germany did. Especially constructing naval force demands lots of time; however but has benefit that naval force can overcome imbalance between continental states and maritime states.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.49-168
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• 2010

Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.10
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• pp.6852-6859
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• 2015

The purpose of this study was to determine the growth characteristics and distribution pattern of a brackish water clam Corbicula japonica in Seomjin River. Field samples were taken from 14 stations with salinity gradients during spring. Salinity at the bottom layer ranged from 1.0 psu to 32.9 psu, with low salinities in the upper area of the river. In particular, salinity at St.11 was decreased drastically to be ca. 15.0 psu, indicating an intermediate salinity zone. The distribution pattern of C. japonica was related to the salinity gradient, with the highest densities of $2,102ind.m^{-2}$ at Station 13, followed by $1,507ind.m^{-2}$ at Station 11. Here, we focused on the growth characteristics of collected C. japonica collected at two stations with different salinity values. The relationship between shell length and total weight was highly correlated ($R^2=0.91$, P<0.001) at Station 13 compared to that at Station 11 ($R^2=0.72$, P<0.001). On the other hands, the degree of correlation between shell length and shell height (SH) or shell width (SW) at Station 11 (SH: $R^2=0.91$, P<0.001; SW: $R^2=0.69$, P<0.001) was higher than that at Station 13 (SH: $R^2=0.64$, P<0.001; SW: $R^2=0.48$, P<0.001). In addition, fatness index of C. japonica at Station 13 was significantly (P < 0.001) higher than that at St. 11 (t-test value=-22.8, p<0.001). This implies that C. japonica at Station 13 might have enhanced their somatic growth, whereas C. japonica at Station 11 might have this kind of defense mechanism their internal organization against the salinity stress. Ecologically, this kind of defense mechanism of C. japonica against salinity flucuation may play an important role in their survival strategy.