• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.43 no.2
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• pp.117-124
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• 2010

Objectives: The Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) payment system, which has been mplemented in Korea since 1997, is based on voluntary participation. Hence, the positive impact of this system depends on the participation of physicians. This study examined the factors determining participation of Korean obstetrics & gynecology (OBGYN) clinics in the DRG-based payment system. Methods: The demographic information, practice-related variables of OBGYN clinics and participation information in the DRG-based payment system were acquired from the nationwide data from 2002 to 2007 produced by the National Health Insurance Corporation and the Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service. The subjects were 336 OBGYN clinics consisting of 43 DRG clinics that had maintained their participation in 2003-2007 and 293 no-DRG (fee-for-service) clinics that had never been a DRG clinic during the same period. Logistic regression analysis was carried out to determine the factors associated with the participation of OBGYN clinics in the DRG-based payment system. Results: The factors affecting participation of OBGYN clinics in the DRG-based payment system were as follows (p<0.05): (1) a larger number of caesarian section (c/sec) claims, (2) higher cost of a c/sec, (3) less variation in the price of a c/sec, (4) fewer days of admission for a c/sec, and (5) younger pregnant women undergoing a c/sec. Conclusions: These results suggest that OBGYN clinics with an economic practice pattern under a fee-for-service system are more likely to participate in the DRG-based payment system. Therefore, to ensure adequate participation of physicians, a payment system with a stronger financial incentive might be more suitable in Korea.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.48-55
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• 2011

Objectives: The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)-based payment on the length of stay and the number of outpatient visits after discharge in for patients who had undergone caesarean section. Methods: This study used the health insurance data of the patients in health care facilities that were paid by the Fee-For-Service (FFS) in 2001-2004, but they participated in the DRG payment system in 2005-2007. In order to examine the net effects of DRG payment, the Difference-In-Differences (DID) method was adopted to observe the difference in health care utilization before and after the participation in the DRG payment system. The dependent variables of the regression model were the length of stay and number of outpatient visits after discharge, and the explanatory variables included the characteristics of the patients and the health care facilities. Results: The length of stay in DRG-paid health care facilities was greater than that in the FFS-paid ones. Yet, DRG payment has no statistically significant effect on the number of outpatient visits after discharge. Conclusions: The results of this study that DRG payment was not effective in reducing the length of stay can be related to the nature of voluntary participation in the DRG system. Only those health care facilities that are already efficient in terms of the length of stay or that can benefit from the DRG payment may decide to participate in the program.

• Quality Improvement in Health Care
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.30-44
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• 2021

Purpose: The aim of this study was to investigate the changes in perception of the New Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)-based payment system, make overall evaluation after participation, and examine opinions on further policy improvement among employees of a public hospital participating in the pilot project in Korea. Methods: We investigated changes in perception of the New DRG-based payment system before and after participation in the pilot project using a qualitative research method. We conducted individual in-depth interviews with the management and healthcare professionals and Focus Group Interviews (FGIs) with the staff in the nursing and administrative departments. Results: Before implementing the pilot project of the New DRG-based payment system, the management was in favor of participating in the pilot project, whereas the healthcare professionals were strongly opposed to participation in the pilot project, and the staff in the nursing and administrative departments were slightly opposed to participation. After implementing the pilot project, there were remarkable changes in the perception of the New DRG-based payment system among healthcare professionals and the administrative staff. Healthcare professionals' perception was altered in a positive way, while the administrative staff's perception of the system became negative. Conclusion: There were no restrictions on clinical practice or deterioration of quality of care observed in association with the participation in the New DRG-based payment system. However, certain unintended consequences of the New DRG-based payment system may arise as well. Therefore, the government needs to examine the problems identified in this study to reflect on and improve the New DRG-based payment system for stable expansion.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.393-401
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• 2000

Objectives : To evaluate the impacts of the DRG payment system on the behavior of medical insurance claimants. Specifically, we evaluated the case-mix index, the numbers of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, and the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes before, during and after implementation of the DRG payment system. Methods : In order to evaluate the case-mix index, the number of diagnosis and procedure codes utilized, we used medical insurance claim data from all medical facilities that participated in the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program. This medical insurance claim data consisted of both pre-demonstration program data (fee-for-service, from November, 1998 to January, 1999) and post-demonstration program data (DRG-based Prospective Payment, from February, 1999 to April, 1999). And in order to evaluate the corresponding rate of diagnosis codes utilized, we reviewed 820 medical records from 20 medical institutes that were selected by random sampling methods. Results : The case-mix index rate decreased after the DRG-based Prospective Payment Demonstration Program was introduced. The average numbers of different claim diagnosis codes used decreased (new DRGs from 2.22 to 1.24, and previous DRGs from 1.69 to 1.21), as did the average number of claim procedure codes used (new DRGs from 3.02 to 2.16, and previous DRGs from 2.97 to 2.43). With respect to the time of participation in the program, the change in number of claim procedure codes was significant, but the change in number of claim diagnosis codes was not. The corresponding rate of claim diagnosis codes increased (from 57.5% to 82.6%), as did the exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes (from 16.5% to 25.1%). Conclusions : After the implementation of the DRG payment system, the corresponding rate of insurance claim codes and the corresponding exclusion rate of claim diagnosis codes both increased, because the inducement system for entering the codes for claim review was changed.

• Journal of Korean Clinical Nursing Research
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.321-332
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• 2013

Purpose: Korean health insurance extended application of the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) payment system to tertiary and general hospitals from July, 2013. This study was done to develop a DRG fee adjustment mechanism applied to levels of nurse staffing to assure quality nursing service. Methods: Nurse stafffing grades among hospitals in Korea were analyzed. Differences and ratio of inpatient costs by nurse staffing grades in DRG fees and differences of DRG fee between tertiary and general hospitals were compared. Results: In 2013, nurse staffing grades in tertiary and general hospitals had improved, but other hospital nurse staffing grades remained at the 2001 level. Gaps of inpatient costs between first and seventh nurse staffing grades were over 10% in 4 out of 7 DRG diagnosis; However differences of DRG fee between tertiary and general hospitals were only 4.51% and 4.72% respectively. A DRG fee adjustment mechanism was developed that included nurse staffing grades and hospitalization days as factors of the formula. Conclusion: Current DRG fees motivate hospitals to decrease nurse staffing grades because cost reduction is bigger than compensation. This DRG fee adjustment mechanism reflects nurse staffing supply to motivate hospitals to hire more nurses as a reasonable compensation system.

• Journal of Korean Academy of Nursing Administration
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.1-9
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• 2004

Korean health insurance has adopted preliminary DRG payment system through 8 DRGs from 1997. But present DRG payment system gives economic incentives for hospitals to hire less nurse. This study was attempted to develope DRG adjust index to differentiate DRG price by nurse staffing level for nursing care quality. Method: We analyzed inpatient care cost by medical institute and developed DRG adjust index to differentiate DRG price by nurse staffing level. Results: Among same medical institute, inpatient care cost are very different according to hospital's nurse staffing level. In the case of casarean section, inpatient care cost of the 1st grade general hospital are more expensive 85,732won than the 6th grade hospital. The cost difference are 8.24% of total casarean section DRG price and 16.48% of DTG variable price. We developed DRG adjust index-a to apply DRG variable price and index-b to apply DRG total price for compensation cost difference of hospitals. Conclusions: DRG price adjust index will give economic incentive for hospitals to hire more nurse and improve nursing care quality.

• Journal of Preventive Medicine and Public Health
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.347-353
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• 2001

Objectives : To determine the impacts of Diagnosis-Related Groups/Prospective Payment System (DRG/PPS) on the quality of care in cases of Cesarean section and to describe the policy implications for the early stabilization of DRG/PPS in Korea. Methods : Data was collected from the medical records of 380 patients who had undergone Cesarean sections in 40 hospitals participating in the DRG/PPS Demonstration Program since 1999. Cesarean sections were peformed in 122 patients of the FFS(Fee-For-Service) group and 258 patients of the DRG/PPS group. Measurements of quality used included essential tests of pre- and post-operation, and the PPI(Physician Performance Index) score. The PPI was developed by two obstetricians. Results : Univariate analysis demonstrated significant differences in PPI scores according to the payment systems. With respect to the mean of PPI scores, a higher score was found in the DRG/PPS group than in the FFS group. However, the adjusted effect did not show significant differences between the FFS group and the DRG/PPS group. Conclusion : This study suggested that the problem of poor quality may not be related to the implementation of DRG/PPS in Cesarean section. However, this study did not consider the validity and reliability of the process measurement, and it did not exclude the possibility of data emission in medical records.

• The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.401-410
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• 2017

This study aimed to identify appropriateness and efficiency in the DRG payment system by analysing the hospital length of stay and changes in fees before and after the application of DRG payment system. The subjects of the study were a total of 398 patients consisting of 204 for the fee for service system and 194 for the DRG payment system. They received surgery in the Obstetrics and Gynecology (OBGY) department of a general hospital in G metropolitan city between January and December 2013. The mean hospital length of stay was significantly decreased after application of the DRG payment system(p=0.013). Total fees, insurance charges, and deductions increased significantly(p<0.001), and non-payment charges and total deductions decreased significantly(p<0.001). Application of the DRG payment system reduced length of stay, non-payment charges and total patient's cost sharing and increased out-of-pocket, insurance charges, and total fees.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.17-39
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• 2010

This study explored the impact on the DRG(Diagnosis-Related Groups)-based prospective payment system(PPS) operated by voluntarily participation providers. We analyzed whether the provides in the DRG-based PPS and in traditional fee-for-service(FFS) systems showed different the degree of variation in length of stay(LOS), and the providers' behaviors depending on the differences according to the varied participation periods. The study sample included all data 2,061 institutions participated in DRG-PPS in 2007 and all cases 473 FFS institutions which reported fee-for-service claims were reviewed same diagnosized diseases at least 10cases claims during three months We compared the differences of the LOS among health care institutions according to their type, region, and size. For DRGs showing significant differences in LOS, multiple regression analyses were performed to find out factors associated with LOS and interaction effect participation and hospital types or participation periods. The result provide the evidence that the DRG payment system operated by volunteering health care institutions had impact on resources use, which can reduce the institutions' the length of stay. While some DRGs had no correlation between participation periods and LOS, other DRGs, DRG participation period reversely linear relationship with LOS. That is to say, the longer participation year, the less reducing the LOS. These results support the future expansion of the DRG-based PPS plan to all health care services in Korea.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.180-187
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• 2021

Background: This study analyzed the effect of applying the diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based payment system, which was implemented in July 2012 for hospitals and clinics nationwide, on the cesarean section rate. Methods: The subjects of the study were divided into new groups that participated in the payment system after July 2012 and maintenance groups that participated in the payment system before July 2012. As an analysis method, a difference-in-difference analysis, which is a quasi-experimental design, was used. The risk-adjusted cesarean section rate was used as a dependent variable. Results: Seven risk factors (malpresentation of fetus, eclampsia, multiple pregnancies, problems in the placenta, previous Cesarean section, cephalopelvic disproportion, problems in amniotic fluid) were included in the final risk-adjustment model, and found to have a statistically significant relationship with the cesarean section rate. Results showed that the risk-adjusted cesarean section rate increased significantly in new groups after the application of the DRG-based payment system. Conclusion: Study results provided policy implications for the reorganization of the DRG-based system should that reflects the demands of obstetricians, such as organizing a consultative body with obstetricians and establishing a reasonable fee.