• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.93-143
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• 2010

This paper estimates the impact of Japan's economic sanction on DPRK trade in the 2000s. It conceptualizes the effects of sanction on DPRK trade, econometrically tests whether such effects exist in case of Japan's sanction using currently available DPRK trade statistics, and measures the size of the effects by correcting and reconfiguring the deficiencies of the currently available DPRK trade statistics. The main findings of the paper are as follows. First, Japan's sanction can have two different effects on DPRK trade: 'Sanction Country Effect' and "Third Country Effect.' The former means that the sanction diminishes DPRK trade with Japan while the latter refers to the effects on DPRK trade with other countries as well. The third country effect can arise not simply because the DPRK changes its trade routes to circumvent the sanction, but because the sanction forces the DPRK to readjust its major trade items and patterns. Second, currently no official DPRK trade statistics are available. Thus, the so-called mirror data referring to DPRK trading partners' statistics should be employed for the analysis of the sanction effects. However, all currently available mirror data suffer from three fundamental problems: 1) they may omit the real trade partners of the DPRK; 2) they may confuse ROK trade with DPRK trade; 3) they cannot distinguish non-commercial trade from commercial trade, whereas only the latter concerns Japan's sanction. Considering those problems, we have to adopt the following method in order to reach a reasonable conclusion about the sanction effect. That is, we should repeat the same analysis using all different mirror data currently available, which include KOTRA, IMF and UN Commodity Trade Statistics, and then discuss only the common results from them. Third, currently available mirror data make the following points. 1) DPRK trade is well explained by the gravity model. 2) Japan's sanction has not only the sanction country effect but also the third country effect on DPRK trade. 3) The third country effect occurs differently on DPRK export and import. In case of export, the mirror statistics reveal positive (+) third country effects on all of the major trade partners of the DPRK, including South Korea, China and Thailand. However, on DPRK import, such third country effects are not statistically significant even for South Korea and China. 4) This suggests that Japan's sanction has greater effects on DPRK import rather than its export. Fourth, as far as DPRK export is concerned, it is possible to resolve the abovementioned fundamental problems of mirror data and thus reconstruct more accurate statistics on DPRK trade. Those reconstructed statistics lead us to following conclusions. 1) Japan's economic sanction diminished DPRK's export to Japan from 2004 to 2006 by 103 million dollars on annual average (Sanction Country Effect). It comprises around 60 percent of DPRK's export to Japan in 2003. 2) However, for the same period, the DPRK diverted its exports to other countries to cope up with Japan's sanction, and as a result its export to other countries increased by 85 million dollars on annual average (Third Country Effect). 3) This means that more than 80 per cent of the sanction country effect was made up for by the third country effect. And the actual size of impact that Japan's sanction made on DPRK export in total was merely 30 million dollars on annual average. 4) The third country effect occurred mostly in inter-Korean trade. In fact, Japan's sanction increased DPRK export to the ROK by 72 million dollars on annual average. In contrast, there was no statistically significant increase in DPRK export to China caused by Japan's sanction. 5) It means that the DPRK confronted Japan's sanction and mitigated its impact primarily by using inter-Korean trade and thus the ROK. Fifth, two things should be noted concerning the fourth results above. 1) The results capture the third country effect caused only by trade transfer. Facing Japan's sanction, the DPRK could transfer its existing trade with Japan to other countries. Also it could change its main export items and increase the export of those new items to other countries as mentioned in the first result. However, the fourth results above reflect only the former, not the latter. 2) Although Japan's sanction did not make a huge impact on DPRK export, it might not be necessarily true for DPRK import. Indeed the currently available mirror statistics suggest that Japan's sanction has greater effects on DPRK import. Hence it would not be wise to argue that Japan's sanction did not have much impact on DPRK trade in general, simply using the fourth result above.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Earth Science Education
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.276-286
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• 2012

This research is aimed to examine the differences through comparative analysis of the Earth Science contents in the science textbooks between Korea and DPRK. The contents of level and scope in science textbooks between Korea and DPRK are analysed by TIMSS frameworks. The results of this research are as follows : 1. The science textbooks of DPRK is lower in quality of paper, printing to that of Korea, and the illustrations, editing design in the textbooks of DPRK are fewer, monochromic and monotonous while those in Korea. 2. The contents of Earth Science in DPRK's science textbooks rank 37.0%, but those of Korea's science textbooks rank 25.5% of the whole textbooks. The learning units related to Earth Science are generally similar to the level and scope in science textbooks between Korea and DPRK. The type of inquire activities in the textbooks of DPRK largely takes on the model experiment, and it was shown that the number of experiments directly made by children is very small compared to Korea' textbooks. 3. There are lots of differences in Earth Science learning terms and predicates used in the textbooks between Korea and DPRK.

• Korean Medical Education Review
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.21-25
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• 2016

The government of South Korea and its medical personnel must make a way by which health professionals who have escaped from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) can play a positive and practical role in unification and south-north medical unification while south-north authority talks on DPRK public health and medicine manpower development are not going smoothly. Medical personnel escaped from the DPRK have to be recruited for the interviewer of the national examination, to improve the accuracy of national examination interviews. For those medical professionals who have escaped from the DPRK with 6 years' medical college education, but failed the interview on the national examination, we propose here a course of 3.6 months for them to have a right to apply the Korean Medical Licensing Examinations (KMLE). We also propose that medical professionals who have escaped from the DPRK who have graduated from a 6-year medical college in the DPRK and who are medical doctors over the fifth grade or with more than 6 years of experience can be qualified as unification medical doctors and be exempted from the KMLE, getting the right to go directly into an internship and residency. They should be permitted to work in manpower development projects for the health professions. They should also be given opportunities such as to become psychiatrists who treat the mental illness of persons escaped from the DPRK and people from North Korea after unification. Medical students in South Korea should earn college credits on the topic of medical unification and not only students, but all South Korean medical personnel, should prepare for north-south medical unification with an open mind. A way for each medical college to participate in DPRK manpower development for the health professions through a memorandum of understanding between the medical colleges of the south and north.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.29-56
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• 2020

Despite the deep concerns against the DPRK and the harsh sanctions imposed on it, the country renders the sanctions futile by facilitating various illegal trades such as the ship-to-ship transfers of petroleum or coal. Recently, the international community went into paying attention to solve this matter. Among the measures the community can take, "reinforcing the search and inspection of the DPRK related vessels transiting in the high and territorial seas" is the best policy approach to reduce the sanction evasion and provide the international community with considerable bargaining advantages. This measure requires the forceful action by legal enforcement agencies, also known as VBSS. (Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure) It would make the deals prohibited by the UNSCRs (United Nation Security Council Resolutions) less profitable by reducing the expected return on the deals and increasing the cost for them. So, it would make the illegal deals under the table less attractive. The DPRK has been able to render the sanctions futile by exploiting the limitations of the current maritime sanctions. The resolutions are short of being specific about law enforcement, and the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) is legally nonbinding. However, if the UNSCRs and the PSI are combined, they can generate a new source of power and exploit the weakness of the DPRK. Noting that the recent UNSCRs stipulated all the legal discussions in the resolutions are confined and applied only to the DPRK, the PSI can target the commercial trade as well as the WMD-related materials in the case of the DPRK's illegal maritime practices. Therefore, the PSI endorsing partners should go beyond mere commitments. They should discuss action plans to implement the maritime interdictions to the extent that they discourage the DPRK and its business partners continuing the illegal activities.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.63-67
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• 2018

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the DPRK, is one of the poorest country in world facing chronic economic, energy and food security issues. Prolonged improper management of economic and natural resources has led to extreme poverty, malnutrition and critically vulnerability to nature's forces. Presistent deforestation and forest degradation in the DPRK has national and global consequences which has attracted attention from international community, whose offering financial and technical assistance for targeted interventions. Through REDD+ programs, the DPRK has the opportunity to establish its credentials as a responsible nation while improving the quality of life of its population. This study offers an enabling context under which suitable climate change action related to forestry can be identified and implemented in the DPRK.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.40-63
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• 2015

Anthracite exports have special value within the DPRK's economy. In this paper, we focus on what determines the DPRK's anthracite exports to China. We use panel data consisting of cross-section data from 30 provinces in China and quarterly time-series data from 1998 to 2013. Controlling for all other variables that affect anthracite imports, the variable for steel production in China is robust and statistically significant. This is consistent with on-site interviews which indicate that much of North Korean anthracite is consumed by China's steel industry. This implies that the North Korean authorities need to make adjustments to the foreign trade structure, as the import demand for anthracite in China may decline further.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.3-30
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• 2010

The focus of this paper is the determines of asymmetric cooperation between the European Union(and EC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK). By analyzing the varying degree of cooperation and conflict by the EU and the DPRK, it argues that the outcomes of the asymmetric cooperation and conflict can be fully explained by the domestic and international variables.

• Pediatric Gastroenterology, Hepatology & Nutrition
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.135-139
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• 2014

A nationwide nutrition survey began when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) requested assistance from international relief organizations in 1997 due to flooding in 1995-1996, followed by the worsening food shortage peak in 1997. According to reported data for the 15 years since the active intervention and assistance from international societies, the malnutrition and mortality rates of children in the DPRK have improved. However, the prevalence of the stunting reported in the latest 2012 report is 27.9%, which is still a moderate-severe level, and worrisome in terms of international standards. In particular, the prevalence in Ryangangdo, which is regarded as the worst region in the DPRK, is 39.6%, which is a very high level of stunting. To alleviate such regional deviation will be a major task for future assistance. In addition, one cannot emphasize too highly the importance of early nutritional assistance for pregnant women and infants, considering that the recovery from stunted growth is low after two years of age, and the aftereffects would continue for the rest of their lives.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
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• v.29 no.2
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• pp.122-134
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• 2002

DPRK have been encountered serious food problems in recent years, because of lack of availabilility of supplies, unfavorable weather conditions and above all lack of production incentives for farmers. Self-management is one of the method of increasing production incentives for farmers. For the well established self-management program, DPRK have to distribute farmland to farmers, not property rights but utilization rights. However farming situations are different, the distribution methods will be different according to the farming situations.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.31-43
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• 2017

The situation in Korean peninsula, globally and regionally, which followed the global huge uncertainty, changed a lot. Because of the political crisis, ROK falls into a chaos. And DPRK goes into a policy changing period by the internal issues, international sanctions and assassination accident in Malaysia, which is confirmed to be DPRK's Supreme leader, Kim Jong Un's half brother. Under this changing circumstances, the perspectives of regarding China and the Korean peninsula, must be undated accordingly. Only by understanding the Sino-US relations, the DPRK nuclear issue and the regional dilemmas can we formulate reasonable policies to contribute to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.