Management of plant genetic resources at RDA in line with Nagoya Protocol
-
- 한국작물학회:학술대회논문집
- /
- 한국작물학회 2017년도 9th Asian Crop Science Association conference
- /
- pp.51-52
- /
- 2017
"Plant genetic resources for food and agriculture" means any genetic material of plant origin of actual or potential value for food and agriculture. "Genetic material" means any material of plant origin, including reproductive and vegetative propagating material, containing functional units of heredity. (Internal Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, ITPGRFA). The "Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (shortly Nagoya Protocol)" is a supplementary agreement to the Convention on Biological Diversity. It provides a transparent legal framework for the effective implementation of one of the three objectives of the CBD: the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The Nagoya Protocol on ABS was adopted on 29 October 2010 in Nagoya, Japan and entered into force on 12 October 2014, 90 days after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification. Its objective is the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. The Nagoya Protocol will create greater legal certainty and transparency for both providers and users of genetic resources by; (a) Establishing more predictable conditions for access to genetic resources and (b) Helping to ensure benefit-sharing when genetic resources leave the country providing the genetic resources. By helping to ensure benefit-sharing, the Nagoya Protocol creates incentives to conserve and sustainably use genetic resources, and therefore enhances the contribution of biodiversity to development and human well-being. The Nagoya Protocol's success will require effective implementation at the domestic level. A range of tools and mechanisms provided by the Nagoya Protocol will assist contracting Parties including; (a) Establishing national focal points (NFPs) and competent national authorities (CNAs) to serve as contact points for information, grant access or cooperate on issues of compliance, (b) An Access and Benefit-sharing Clearing-House to share information, such as domestic regulatory ABS requirements or information on NFPs and CNAs, (c) Capacity-building to support key aspects of implementation. Based on a country's self-assessment of national needs and priorities, this can include capacity to develop domestic ABS legislation to implement the Nagoya Protocol, to negotiate MAT and to develop in-country research capability and institutions, (d) Awareness-raising, (e) Technology Transfer, (f) Targeted financial support for capacity-building and development initiatives through the Nagoya Protocol's financial mechanism, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Nagoya Protocol). The Rural Development Administration (RDA) leading to conduct management agricultural genetic resources following the 'ACT ON THE PRESERVATION, MANAGEMENT AND USE OF AGRO-FISHERY BIO-RESOURCES' established on 2007. According to
고령사회의 진입과 인간의 평균 수명이 연장되고, 여성의 사회적 진출 및 남성들의 외모에 대한 관심증가, 미디어 매체를 통한 K-문화가 전 세계적으로 관심을 받으면서 자연스럽게 관심은 K-Bueaty에 집중되고 있다. 최근, 의료관광 분야의 점유를 보면 성형 및 피부과와 같은 피부미용 의료관광의 경우 중국, 일본 등 아시아뿐만 아니라 북미, 유럽 등에서 인기를 누리고 있다. 사람의 노화를 가장 먼저 외면적으로 확인할 수 있는 부위는 바로 얼굴의 피부 주름이다. 깨끗하고 주름이 없으면서 탄력성 있는 건강한 피부는 대부분의 사람들이 원하는 바람이다. 대표적으로 집속형초음파자극(HIFU:High Intensity Focused Ultrasound)와 저주파, 고주파(RF:Radio Frequency), 미세전류를 이용한 갈바닉 테라피, 급속 냉각을 이용한 크라이오 테라피 등 피부의 컨디션과 상태에 따라 관리하는 방식이 달라지며, 같은 기전을 이용한 의료기기 및 피부미용 기기의 시술 역시 출력 및 자극 부위 등에 따라 시술의 효과가 차이가 난다. 본 연구는 수많은 피부미용 의료기기 및 미용기기 중 마이크로니들을 이용한 침습형 고주파 피부 의료기기를 개발하고자 국제규격인 IEC 60601-2(의료기기개별기준규격)및 MFDS(Ministry of Food and Drug Safety : 식품의약품안전처)에서 고시한 고주파 자극기 기준 규격을 준수한 고주파 출력 장치를 설계 및 개발하였다. 회로 설계는 Class-A Topology를 이용한 증폭장치(AMP:Amplifier)와 Half-Bridge Topology를 이용한 전원장치로 이루어져 있다. 개발된 고주파 출력 장치를 측정한 결과 평균 63.86%의 효율을 얻었으며, 최대출력은 116.7W, 50.67dBm으로 측정되었다.
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.