• 한국건설관리학회논문집
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• 제19권3호
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• pp.52-60
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• 2018

우리나라의 공공건설공사는 입찰을 통해 공사를 발주하고 있으나 하지만 입찰의 특성상 참여자들간의 담합이 발생할 수 있다. 이에 따른 입찰담합은 발주자에게 손해를 가하는바, 이를 배상할 수 있도록 적절한 가상경쟁가격을 산정해야 한다. 이와 관련하여 계량경제학적 방법이 일반적으로 활용되고 있으나 건설공사, 특히 설계 시공일괄입찰의 특성상 여러 한계와 쟁점이 발생할 수밖에 없다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 설계 시공일괄입찰에서 합리적인 가상경쟁가격을 추정할 수 있는 방안을 제안한다. 이는 입찰 참가자가 제출한 설계도서로부터 한계비용을 도출하고, 입찰 참가자의 기술 수준과 경쟁업체의 기술 수준 및 입찰 형태에 따라 입찰율에 따른 요인을 검토하여 가상경쟁가격을 추정하는 방법이다. 본 연구에서 제안한 방법을 토대로 설계 시공일괄입찰 낙찰자 결정 방식의 특성이 반영된 합리적인 가격이 도출될 수 있으며, 답함에 따른 손해액 산정뿐만 아니라 실제 입찰 과정에서의 참고자료로 활용할 수 있을 것이라 판단된다.

• 수산경영론집
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• 제25권2호
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• Architectural research
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• 제13권3호
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• pp.49-56
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• 2011

Competitive bidding in construction is concerned with contractors making strategic decisions in respect of determination of bid price if contractors opt to bid. This study presents a strategy model for deciding optimum tender price with reflecting appropriate profit in competitive bidding using Bayesian regression analysis (BRA). The purpose of the developed model is to help contractors to secure suitable profitability by predicting the actual profit based on key variables. They may affect construction cost at bidding phase, ultimately which help contractors to secure high quality output. The model was tested empirically by application to a bidding dataset collected from a large South Korea contractor. BRA allows contractors to estimate more accurate actual profit by reflecting not only objective information but also subjective experiences and judgments. Consequently, the model can contribute to improvement of decision-making process for setting an optimum tender price.

• 한국건설관리학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국건설관리학회 2006년도 정기학술발표대회 논문집
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• pp.632-637
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• 2006

우리나라의 입${\cdot}$낙찰제도는 1995년 7월에 적격심사제도를 도입하기 전까지 최저가 낙찰제를 근간으로 삼아왔으며, 평균가 낙찰제나 제한적 최저가낙찰제가 보완적으로 시행되어 왔다. 하지만 최저가 낙찰제도에 의해 공사비의 직접비 수준에도 미치지 못하는 저가투찰(덤핑)이 일반화되고 부실공사에 대한 우려가 높아지면서 평균가 낙찰제나 제한적 최저가 방식이 도입되었다. 그러나 평균가낙찰제나 제한적 최저가낙찰제가 건설업체의 기술개발 노력이나 원가절감 노력을 촉진시키지 못하는 문제점이 부각됨에 따라 또다시 경쟁원리를 내세워 최저가 낙찰제로 회귀하는 악순환이 지난 50년간 반복되고 있다. 따라서 사회 ${\cdot}$ 경제적으로 급변하는 건설 환경에 대처하고 건설 산업의 구조개편에 적극 대응하여 국내 건설엔지니어링의 경쟁력을 재고하고, Global Standard와 우리나라의 실정을 모두 충족시킬 수 있는 개선방향을 해외 사례 분석을 통해 제시하고자 한다.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권6호
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제52권10호
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• pp.610-615
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• 2003

With the growing competitive pressure from market participants, utilities, consumer and government, analyses of existing competitive electricity market become more important. The presence of congestion in the transmission system can significantly increase the potential of exercising market power. Since the congestion in the network depends on the several factors, the market power cannot be simply analyzed through the existing indices. This paper presents a systematic analysis on local market power under uniform pricing scheme and provides determining approach of the level of price cap as mitigation measure of the strategic market power.

• 한국주거학회논문집
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• 제23권2호
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• pp.89-98
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• 2012

As the construction of multi-family housings, especially apartments, has been increased since 1970s, the multi-family housing becomes one of the main housing types in Korea. With the increase of multi-family housings, managing them becomes an important issue. Since 2010, the government has made a lowest price award system by a competitive bid compulsory to promote the development of housing management systems. Although competitive bids were implemented, the maintenance company was finally selected by the price without any other consideration. Consequently, the quality of management service was not enhanced. The purpose of this study is to suggest the improvement scheme of multi-family housing management system. In this study, the bidding data of "K-apt", the bidding method and the successful tendered price are analyzed. The results of analyzing bidding materials, the proportion of applying a lowest price system was 67.7%. Also many diverse ways to select the best management company were used, but most of these ways were violate the law and guidelines of Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs. It meant that the lowest price award system was not implemented by strict standards and didn't correspond with the needs of residents of apartment. This condition made the housing maintenance quality low and deteriorated the management industry development. To enhance this condition, a new standard to select the management company, which are included contents of quality of managing quality, management expenses and companies' soundness, is necessary.

• 국제학술발표논문집
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• The 5th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• pp.479-487
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• 2013

State Highway Agencies (SHAs) have started utilizing cost-plus-time bidding (A+B bidding) since Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) declared it operational on May 4, 1995. Although this technique has successfully accelerated many projects by incorporating construction time in the bidding competition, a framework to illustrate the interactions of incentive/disincentive (I/D) rates on the competitiveness of contractors participating in the bid competition is yet to be developed. In a previous research, authors indicated that for each bid competition there is an efficient cap for I/D rates which are dictated by the capabilities of contractors in project acceleration. However, the results of previous study were based on the assumption that there is a statistically significant relationship between cost and time. In this study, the entire cost-plus-time projects implemented by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) were investigated. Then the significance of relationship between cost and time were analyzed for each contractor utilizing Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique, and the price-time function of each contractor was determined by regression analysis. The results of the analysis indicate that there is a significant relationship between cost and time for the majority of contractors. However, a quadratic relationship is not always significant and for some contractors a linear price-time relationship is significant. The results of this project can be used not only by ODOT to optimize the incentive/disincentive rates but also by contractors to determine the most competitive strategies of other bid participants.

• 토지주택연구
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• 제10권4호
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• pp.13-30
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• 2019

Parking lot within housing site contains public interest of relieving parking space shortage problem and subject to public restriction. If auctioned off at higher price by excessive competition in general competitive bid for land bidders, the development of parking lot will be made against its original purpose supply. The core issue is that a bid price is quite often to be blown out of proportion by 150%~ 250% due to extreme competition and, could face serious problem if a winning bidder runs sale business. If it is rental business, although about 30% of the total floor space of the whole building to be used as neighborhood facilities, too high winning bid price cause to lose transparency. In case of sale at aggregate buildings, most business operators would sell 30% of the neighborhood facilities, spare the parking lot and manages thereof separately. According to Aggregate Buildings Act, neighborhood facilities are allowed for individual registration and ownership of parking lot by business operator or designated person by business operator. In this case, the parking lot becomes 70% of the total floor space of the whole building and 70% of the land share which makes the mortgage very valuable and easier for business operator to get financial loan. There used to be many cases such as owners of neighborhood facilities (aggregate buildings partial owners) who run parking lot to repay their loan running parking lot to repay loan, but found that very tough and reached auction and relatively disadvantaged. For parking lot within housing site, it is recommend to exclude the public factors that land has and take into account of public restriction in area (housing site). Business opportunity for operators and protection of property rights for buyers in aggregate buildings, land supply method is recommended to replace from highest bid method into draw or private contract. In terms of price, supply at estimated price (construction price) and restriction on usage (Co-ownership of parking lot) proposals are submitted.