• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.173-188
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• 2016

The introduction and operation of compensation committee can affect managers' incentive-compensation system. In this context, The purpose of this paper examines whether managers' pay-performance sensitivity is affected by the quality of the compensation committee(compensation committee size, the proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee, the proportion of directors with 2 or more non additional board seats on the compensation committee) To test this hypothesis, we use a sample of 260 firm-year observations between 2001-2013. The results are as follows. Firstly, we find that no significant relevance between the compensation committee size and pay-performance sensitivity. But the proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee and the proportion of directors with 2 or more non additional board seats on the compensation committee is positively associated with both pay-earnings based performance sensitivity and pay-stock based performance sensitivity. Secondly, we find that the integration quality of the compensation committee is positively associated with both pay-earnings based performance sensitivity and pay-stock based performance sensitivity. Overall, our analysis suggests that compensation committee are important mechanism in the design of efficient incentive-compensation system.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.63 no.8
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• pp.1075-1079
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• 2014

In this paper, we describe the analysis and the compensation method of the g-sensitivity error for MEMS vibratory gyroscopes. Usually, the g-sensitivity error has been ignored in the commercial MEMS gyroscope, but it deserves our attention to apply for the missile application as a tactical grade performance. Thus, it is necessary to compensate for the g-sensitivity error to reach a tactical grade performance. Generally, the g-sensitivity error seems intuitively to be a gyroscope bias error proportional to the linear acceleration. However, we assert that the g-sensitivity error mainly causes not a bias error but a scale-factor error. And we verify that the g-sensitivity scale-factor error occurs due to the non-linearity of parallel plate electrodes. Therefore, we propose the compensation method to remove the g-sensitivity scale-factor error. The experimental result showed that a proposed compensation method improved successfully the performance of the MEMS vibratory gyroscope.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.105-112
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the reporting earnings strategy on the relationship between managerial ability and manager performance-reward sensitivity. Both upward and downward adjustments can occur in the direction of management performance adjustment according to the manager's reporting earnings strategy. was found to decrease performance-based performance-reward sensitivity. The underreporting strategy is hypothesized that, although additional compensation is paid for the performance of the reporting strategy according to the manager's ability, the level of compensation increases, but this type of compensation will decrease the performance-reward sensitivity because this type of compensation is irrelevant to the actual performance of the manager. This is the result of indirectly confirming that discriminatory compensation is provided for upward and downward adjustment of business performance according to the reporting earnings strategy.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.20 no.11
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• pp.184-191
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• 2020

Using 850 disclosures of individual executive compensation from 2014 to 2017, this study examines the impact of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance relation. The major findings as follow: First, Female auditors have positive effects on the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance, implying that when auditors are appointed to be females who are more ethical, of high moral development, risk averse and conservative as well, they play an efficient monitoring role in aligning executive compensation to performance. Second, the monitoring effects of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation to performance are significant when they are full time employed, suggesting that gender-based differences are more likely to be realized on the condition that they are in position to commit to their jobs for their owns. The results overall support that female auditors exercise efficient monitoring roles in aligning executive compensation to performance in Korean listed firms. The research contribute to complement the study of gender effects on corporate decision making, which have been focused on gender diversity of the board, by providing empirical evidence of the impact of female auditors on the sensitivity of executive compensation-performance relation.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.179-196
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• 2013

This paper examines the difference in compensation structure between family firms and non-family firms in Korea. A manager's compensation is an important means of motivating a manager to make decisions for shareholders by mitigating conflicts of interest between them. However, the role of a manager's compensation can be weakened in family firms for the following reasons. First, a family member manager has fewer conflicts of interest, compared to a non-family member manager. Second, a family member manager has an intrinsic incentive to increase a firm's value (i.e., family wealth). Finally, a family member manager can monitor non-family member managers more effectively. For the reasons, the agency problem will be less severe in family firms and subsequently the role of compensation will be reduced. The empirical results show that pay-performance sensitivity is smaller in family firms than in non-family firms. The main result is robust to variations such as changes in family ownership, the definition of a family firm, and control variables. Furthermore, this paper compares the pay-performance sensitivity of Chaebol family firms with that of other firms. The result shows that the sensitivity is higher for Chaebol family firms, compared to that in other family firms and non-family firms.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.339-358
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• 2011

This study analyzes whether there are differences in the level of compensation and pay-performance sensitivity between venture firms and non-venture firms listed on KOSDAQ. To test the above mentioned purpose, this study uses 726 firm-year data listed on KOSDAQ from 2006 to 2009. The results are as follow: First, we find that managers' compensation level of venture firms are higher than non-venture firms. Second, pay-stock performance sensitivity is higher than pay-accounting performance sensitivity in venture firms. Overall, because venture firms give a lot of stock-option to managers, compensation level of venture firms is higher than other firms. Also, venture firms set higher pay-stock performance sensitivity than pay-accounting performance sensitivity to mitigate short-sighted decision.

• Journal of Industrial Convergence
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.9-16
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• 2023

This study analyzed the effect of manager's ability on compensation policy (compensation level and performance-reward sensitivity). To this end, the final 14,150 company-year data were used for KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed companies excluding the financial industry from 2012 to 2019. As a result of the empirical analysis, the higher the manager's ability, the higher the next reward level (the manager's ability hypothesis), but the performance-reward sensitivity decreased. This confirms the manager ability hypothesis through a positive (+) relationship between manager ability and compensation, and means that high compensation for manager ability may be additional compensation for manager ability other than performance, rather than due to performance. This study differs from previous studies and has contributions in that it examines the more complex effects of managerial ability and compensation system.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.151-160
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• 2021

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of CSR on the managers' compensation-performance sensitivity, and to determine whether there are differences in this relationship as the governance structure is more efficient. The sample for analysis was from KOSPI-listed companies in 2011-2017, and regression analysis was performed to confirm the relevance. The results are as follows: First, in CSR company, there was a negative relationship for managers' compensation-accounting performance sensitivity and a positive relationship for managers' compensation-stock performance sensitivity. Second, CSR and the managers' compensation-performance sensitivity vary depending on the type of corporate governance. In CSR companies, when the corporate governance is effective, the managerial compensation system generally complements each other. These results suggest that there is a need to design an effective manager's compensation system within the company in order to induce managers' decision-making in the direction of increasing shareholder profits in a long-term perspective in CSR companies. In addition, if we identify the relationship with the governance structure and reduce or improve the devices that overlap each other, it is believed that it will contribute to enhancing corporate value.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.9
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• pp.221-228
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• 2019

Companies are making great efforts to integrate CSR into various aspects of their management strategies. A lot of research has been conducted on what management intends to do indirectly and indirectly. Was performed. In this study, we conducted additional research considering executive compensation as an indicator of the motivation for management to participate in CSR. The main purpose of this study was to analyze whether accounting performance measures or market performance measures are given more weight when providing rewards for performance to corporate managers conducting CSR activities. The analysis of the relationship between CSR and executive performance-reward sensitivity showed that corporate executives who actively implement CSR pay more weight to market performance measures rather than accounting performance measures. Considering the long-term performance of CSR when paying executives' compensation, the company pays more for market performance than accounting performance. This study is expected to be useful for executives to design compensation contracts to actively induce CSR implementation.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.85-96
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• 2017

The purpose of this study investigates the relation between corporate life cycle and management compensation. The analysis is performed by comparing the compensation level and pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS) at each life cycle based on Korean data from 2003 to 2014. The results show that regarding compensation level, mature stage has the highest mean value of compensation and compensation level drops after mature stage. In introduction stage, growth and decline stages, compensation is not sensitive to accounting performance. In a while, in mature stage, management compensation varies with accounting performance more significantly than stock performance. In additional analysis, the results indicate that the finding is not designated from growth opportunities and the relation differs when the firm is included in a conglomerate. These findings contribute to the literature by providing additional evidence to understand for compensation and the corporate life cycle studies.