• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2000.04b
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• pp.223-225
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• 2000

사화나 경제와 같은 동적 시스템에서 행동에 대한 적절성은 주위의 개체들에 의해 평가되고 일반적으로 동적 시스템에서 개체들의 행동은 주위 상황의 변화에 민감한 자극-반응의 형태로 나뉜다. 본 논문에서는 그와 같은 동적 시스템을 간단한 반복적 죄수의 딜레마게임으로 모델링하고 에이전트들의 연합을 통해 일반화 능력을 향상시킴으로써 환경변화에 보다 적응적으로 반응하도록 한다. 이를 위해 반복적 죄수의 딜레마 게임에서 획득된 전략 연합에서 에이전트들의 신뢰도를 조정함으로써 일반화 능력이 향상되도록 하였다. 실험결과, 전략 연합에서 에이전트들의 신뢰도를 진화적으로 조정함으로써 일반화 능력을 크게 향상시킬 수 있음을 볼 수 있었다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.9 no.6
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• pp.1996-2013
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• 2015

This paper considers a scenario that more D2D users exist in the cell, they compete for cellular resources to increase their own data rates, which may cause transmission interference to cellular users (CU) and the unfairness of resource allocation. We design a resource allocation scheme for selfish D2D users assisted by cooperative relay technique which is used to further enhance the users' transmission rates, meanwhile guarantee the QoS requirement of the CUs. Two transmission modes are considered for D2D users: direct transmission mode and cooperative relay transmission mode, both of which reuses the cellular uplink frequency resources. To ensure the fairness of resource distribution, Nash bargaining theory is used to determine the transmission mode and solve the bandwidth allocation problem for D2D users choosing cooperative relay transmission mode, and coalition formation game theory is used to solve the uplink frequency sharing problem between D2D users and CUs through a new defined "Selfish order". Through theoretical analysis, we obtain the closed Nash bargaining solution under CUs' rate constraints, and prove the stability of the formatted coalition. Simulation results show that the proposed resource allocation approach achieves better performance on resource allocation fairness, with only little sacrifice on the system sum rates.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.211-218
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• 2020

In recent years, the hub and spoke strategy has been strengthened in accordance with the enlargement of ships. As the needs of the port users change, the ports are also becoming larger and modernized. Under these circumstances, changes in existing port operations are expected. One example is the movement to promote economic and operational effectiveness through the joint operation of small and medium-sized operators. This study analyzed the effect of the association of small and medium-sized operators on Busan New Port in terms of economy. Additionally, the issue of cost allocation within the association of operators was presented through the game theory. As a result, in the case of operating jointly rather than divided into five operating companies as of the present, it has been shown to have a cost reduction effect in terms of operating companies. Considering the use of the Proportional method, the Shapley Value, and the Nucleus method in allocating the costs among the operators participating in the coalition, the Shapley Value method was the most suitable method in this study.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.321-327
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• 2019

This study aims to investigate the transition of the game rating system in Korea and to search for problems and improvement measures in the era of IARC game grade review. IARC(International Age Rating Coalition) is an International Classification Alliance, with 37 member organizations from 6 countries. In addition, IARC grants participating store-fronts autonomy to review game ratings. The method of deliberating games in Korea is proceeding with direct review by rating system and deliberation by IARC's own classification system. The problem of the rating system of the game is that the civilian becomes the subject, it relies on the questionnaire, and its side effects are caused by its own classification system. IARC guidelines can be developed to improve the game rating system, education on penalties and ratings for game developers, and management of participating front-stores. In conclusion, it may be dangerous to delegate rating authority to open market, and it is necessary to construct a discussion forum for ratings, including government and industry, game developers, users, and parents of under-age gamers. It is necessary to create a rating system for the game environment in Korea.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 2002.04b
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• pp.310-312
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• 2002

반복적 죄수의 딜레마게임은 복잡한 사회현상들을 모델링 하기 위하여 주로 사용되는 방법이다. 본 논문에서는 집단을 협동으로 진화시키는데 있어서 전략적 연합을 이용하는 방법과 전략적 연합에 속해 있는 전략들이 연합의 의사를 결정할 때 어떠한 방법을 선택할 경우 더 빠르고 안정적으로 진화하는가에 대한 실험 결과를 제시한다. 의사결정방법으로는 신경망으로 결합에 주로 사용되는 투표방법 Borda 함수, Condorect 함수, 평균방법 그리고 최고이득 함수방법 등을 사용하였다. 실험결과 최고이득 함수 방법이 가장 좋은 결과를 보였으며 결합 방법에 따라 다소 상이한 결과를 나타내었다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Information Science Society Conference
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• 1998.10c
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• pp.48-50
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• 1998

반복적 죄수의 딜레마(Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, IPD)게임은 사회적, 경제적, 그리고 생물학적 시스템에서 협동의 진화를 연구하기 위한 대상으로 사용되어져 왔다. 이제까지 이기적이며 합리적인 개체들 사이에서의 협동의 진화에 대한 완전한 이해를 위하여 게임자의 수와 협동의 관계, 기계학습의 일환으로서의 전략학습, 그리고 이득함수가 협동에 미치는 영향 등에 관한 많은 연구가 이루어져 왔다. 이 논문에서는 실험을 통해 이득함수에 따른 협동연합의 크기와 지역화가 NIPD(N-player IPD)게임에서 협동의 진화에 미치는 영향에 대해 밝히고자 한다. 시뮬레이션 결과 이득함수와 협동연합의 크기에 대한 실험에서는 협동개체에 대한 이득함수의 기울기가 배반개체에 대한 이득함수의 기울기보다 급하거나 최소 연합의 크기가 작을수록 협동연합의 정도가 높게 나타남을 알 수 있었다. 그리고 지역화 실험에서는 상호작용하는 이웃의 크기가 작을수록 협동연합의 크기가 크게 진화됨을 알 수 있었다.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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• 2002.11a
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• pp.315-318
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• 2002

반복적 죄수의 딜레마 게임은 사회적 상호작용, 경제활동, 국제관계 등 다양한 현상들을 모델링하기 위한 하나의 방법이다. Axelrod가 이 게임을 제안한 이래, 많은 학자들이 다양한 방법으로 연구를 진행해 왔으나 대부분은 게임자 개인 전략이나 이득함수의 개선에 중점을 두었다. 본 논문에서는 죄수의 딜레마 게임에서 다양한 개체 선택방법과 의사결정 방법을 이용한 전략적 연합을 적용함으로써 일반화 성능을 높이는 결과를 도출하였다. 전략적 연합은 결합 조건이 만족할 경우 자율적으로 형성될 수 있으며, 연합에서의 의사결정은 개인의 의사결정보다 우수하다는 가정 하에 실험을 진행하였다. 실험 결과는 이러한 가정을 뒷받침하여 전략적 연합을 이용한 전략이 테스트 전략에 대해 일반화 성능이 우수함을 보여주고 있다.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.827-858
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• 2006

The paper presents game theoretic models for self-enforcing coalition formation in order to sustain effective international environmental agreements(IEAs). The model analyzes how the intrinsically strategic nature of a government's environmental policies(the emission allowance standard) calls for rules to sustain an IEA. Focusing on the recent theoretical developments in the infinitely repeated game, the paper introduces some mechanisms to show how self-interested sovereign countries are cooperatively able to maintain an IEA rather than defect to initially profit at the expense of a pollution heaven later on. For a more realistic case needed to sustain an IEA, an optimal international environmental policy with both signatories and non-signatories under imperfect monitoring is also explored. In this extension of the model, the derivation process for a critical discount factor, a trigger price level and the length of punishment period is briefly discussed.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.111-126
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• 2015

Currently, many enterprises are trying to allocate the investment costs and risks through collaboration, and strengthen their competitiveness by sharing their resources and gains. Intercorporate sharing economy, a type of intercorporate collaboration, refers to the economic activity to share the idle resources of enterprises and enhance their efficiency. For a successful intercorporate economy with the participation of various stakeholders, there is a need to establish the clear allocation method of gains. Accordingly, this study suggested three methods-the MST method that can apply transaction cost incurred when forming a coalition for sharing economy; the average of transaction cost incurred by each participant, and the Shapley Value application method for the transaction cost incurred between the participants. In addition, this study also suggested gain allocation methods such as the "Equal distribution of gain" method, a gain allocation method based on the Cooperative Game Theory, the the "Proportional distribution of gain" method, and the Shapley Value method that takes in consideration the transaction costs.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.251-281
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• 2015

This paper examines the perceptions of sustainability, which is conceptualised as cross-generational social preferences, on the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in a two-stage game in two periods. There are two scenarios are considered: myopic and sustainable development scenarios. The myopic scenario assumes the decision makers only concern the present welfare. Whilst the scenario of sustainable development has two characters: cross-generational fairness and altruism. When both are taken into account, a coalition will be expanded. The numerical example indicates that the marginal cost of the total emissions is the crucial factor for the formation of IEAs. Only when the marginal cost is low, a sustainable system can be succeeded. While, the technological advancement may lead to a more efficient production per unit of emissions, it also encourages countries to emit more in total and have a lower level of welfare. The results confirm the importance of sustainability to IEAs. The lesson learnt from this study is: when decision makers are myopic, the system is unsustainable even if an IEA is formed. Only when the perception of sustainability is considered, the system could be sustainable. Regardless of the existence of IEAs, international environmental conventions shall not neglect the fundamental goal to pursue sustainable development.