• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.178-201
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• 2014

China National People's Congress has passed the bill to combine the Marine Law Enforcement into "State Oceanic Administration People's Republic of China". This bill was intended to resolve the overlapping jurisdiction and disputes caused in ocean territory in nearby countries. The purpose of reorganizing the administration was to combine the dispersed organization into one group. This new big administration was basically organized to increase the power of China marine state on the long-term. The reorganization plan is to group General Administration of Customs, China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, and Border Control Department into one State Oceanic Administration. The new state Oceanic Administration carries the authority to protect rights and enforce the marine law supported by Public Security Bureau. Korea Coast Guard has been cooperating with China Marine Surveillance since 1998 when the first pact was made. The next step expanded to General Administration of Customs. Currently working with Regional Maritime Law Enforcement organizations dealing mostly with illegal Chinese fishing boats and IEODO conflict. In order to solve the problems we face today is to observe the process of the New China Coast Guard administration, analysing the effects that could be caused by the change and to keep close cooperation between the new administrations.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.175-199
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• 2018

Recent marine territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea have come to us as a great threat. China, which has recently established the China Coast Guard and has rapidly developed maritime security forces, is trying to overcome the various conflict countries with its power. Japan is also strengthening intensively its maritime security forces. Since Korea, China, and Japan are geographically neighboring and sharing maritime space in Northeast Asia, there is no conflict between maritime jurisdiction and territorial rights among the countries. The struggle for initiative in the ocean is fierce among the three coastal nations in Northeast Asia. therefore, Korea needs more thorough preparation and response to protect the marine sovereignty. As the superpowers of China and Japan are confronted and the United States is involved in the balance of power in strategic purposes, the East Asian sea area is a place where tension and conflict environment exist. China's illegal fishing boats are constantly invading our waters, and they even threaten the lives of our police officers. The issue of delimiting maritime boundaries between Korea and China has yet to be solved, and is underway in both countries, and there is a possibility that the exploration activities of the continental shelf resources may collide as the agreement on the continental shelf will expire between Korea and Japan. On the other hand, conflicts in the maritime jurisdictions of the three countries in Korea, China and Japan are leading to the enhancement of maritime security forces to secure deterrence rather than military confrontation. In the situation where the unresolved sovereignty and jurisdiction conflicts of Korea, China and Japan continue, and the competition for the strengthening of the maritime powers of China and Japan becomes fierce, there is a urgent need for stabilization and enhancement of the maritime forces in our country. It is necessary to establish a new long-term strategy for enhancing the maritime security force and to carry out it. It is expected that the Korean Coast Guard, which once said that it was a model for the establishment of China's Coast Guard as a powerful force for the enforcement of the maritime law, firmly establishes itself as a key force to protect our oceans with the Navy and keeps our maritime sovereignty firmly.

• Maritime Security
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.1-44
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• 2021

China's new Maritime Policy Law (MPL) purports to regulate the duties of China's maritime police agencies, including the China Coast Guard, and safeguard China's sovereignty, security, and rights and interest. The MPL has potentially far-reaching application, as China claims extensive maritime areas off its mainland and in the South China Sea. This expansive application of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction is problematic given that most of China's maritime claims are inconsistent with international law. To the extent that the MPL purports to assert jurisdiction over foreign flagged vessels in disputed areas or on the high seas, it contravenes international law. Numerous provisions of the MPL regarding the use of force are also inconsistent with international rules and standards governing the use of maritime law enforcement jurisdiction, as well as the UN Charter's prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. China could use the MPL as a subterfuge to advance its illegal territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas and interfere with coastal State resource rights in their respective exclusive economic zone.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.37-43
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• 2024

National aircraft are subject to exceptions under the International Civil Aviation Convention. Each country must ensure the safety of civil aircraft through reasonable consideration (due regard). Accordingly, the Aviation Safety Act of Korea also includes an exception for national aircraft. However, Korea Coast Guard aircraft are legislated to be subject to the law on five provisions. As Korea Coast Guard aircraft operate under the application of these provisions of international and domestic laws, they will be required to control flight procedures from China's civil air traffic control when flying over provisional action zone, which is international waters in the West Sea. China's demand is a major limiting factor in protecting the safety of the people of Korea, which is the original mission of Korea Coast Guard aircraft, and through this study, countermeasures to solving these problems at the national level were suggested.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.44
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• pp.85-116
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• 2015

Found in 23 Dec 1953 to cope with illegal fishing of foreign ships and coastal guard duty, Korea Coast Guard was re-organized as an office under Ministry of Public Safety since the outbreak of sinking of passenger ship "Sewolho". In the course of re-organization, intelligence and investigation duty were transferred to Police Department except "Cases happened on the sea". But the definition of intelligence duty is vague and there are lots of disputes over the jurisdiction and range of activities. With this situation in consideration, the object of this study is to analyse legal and institutional characteristic of KCG Intelligence, to compare them to that of Police Department, foreign agencies like Japan Coast Guard and US Coast Guard, to expose the limit and to suggest solution. To summarize the conclusion, firstly, in the legal side, there is no legal basis on intelligence in [The Government Organization Act], no regulation for mission, weak basis in application act. Secondly, in the institutional side, stated in the minor chapter of [The Government Organization Act], 'the cases happened on sea' is a quite vague definition, while guard, safety, maritime pollution duty falls under 'on the sea' category, intelligence fell to 'Cases happened on the sea' causing coast guard duty and intelligence have different range. In addition, reduced organization and it's manpower led to ineffective intelligence activities. In the case of Police Department, there is definite lines on 'administration concerning public security' in [The Government Organization Act], specified the range of intelligence activities as 'collect, make and distribute information concerning public security' which made the range of main duty and intelligence identical. Japanese and US coast guards also have intelligence branch and performing activities appropriate for the main missions of the organizations. To have superiority in the regional sea, neighboring countries Japan and China are strengthening on maritime power, China has launched new coast guard bureau, Japan has given the coast guard officers to have police authority in the regional islands, and to support the objectives, specialized intelligence is organized and under development. To secure maritime sovereignty and enhance mission capability in maritime safety duty, it is strongly recommended that the KCG intelligence should have concrete legal basis, strengthen the organization and mission, reinforce manpower, and ensure specialized training administrative system.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.149-173
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• 2020

While the United States and other Western states are in trouble with COVID-19 crisis, China is continuing its aggressive ocean expansion with its Gray-zone strategy. The Gray-zone strategy, which China uses around the South China Sea, refers to a strategy that promotes a change in international politics by creating an unclear state, neither war or peace. China, which is trying to expand its influence across East Asia, will also try to project a Gray zone strategy on the Korean Peninsula. The possible scenarios are as follows: 1) South Korea is accidentally involved in a dispute in the South China Sea, 2) Military conflicts between South Korea and China is caused by illegal fishing of Chinese boats in Yellow Sea, 3) China tries to interfere with Socotra Rock, 4) Unlikely, but possible in the future that China induce the military conflicts between Korea and Japan on the Dokdo issue. In order to cope with these scenarios, Korea should prepare the following measures from a long-term perspective: the creation of an Asian maritime safety fleet, the integ rated operation of the navy and the coast guard in the framework of the national fleet, and strengthening the conflict control system for China's provocations.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.57-88
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• 2018

Security situations are fundamentally and rapidly changing on the Korean Peninsula. Above all, as North Korea(NK) is heightening its nuclear and missile capabilities, Republic of Korea(ROK) is facing an existential threat. At the same time, as China's economic, diplomatic and military power is quickly rising, the balance of power is shifting and strategic competition between the Unite States(US) and China is accelerating in the Asia-Pacific region. Under the pressure of development of these situations, ROK seems to face allegedly the most serious crisis in its national security since the end of the Korean War. In the current grim geopolitical situation, maritime security may become the most difficult security challenge for ROK in the years to come. The purpose of this paper is to compare major changes in maritime security affairs of the ROK during last twenty years from 1998 until now(2018). 1998 was when this journal 『Strategy 21』 was published for the first time by the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy. Then, this paper tries to identify challenges and risks with which this country has to deal for its survival and prosperity, and to propose some recommendations for the government, the Navy, and the Coast Guard as they are responsible for the maritime security of the country. The recommendations of this paper are as follows: strengthen ROK-US alliance and expand security cooperation with regional powers in support of the maintenance of the current security order in the region; building-up of maritime security capacity in preparation for crisis on the maritime domain with the navy targeting to acquire 'a non-nuclear, balance-of-terror capability, to improve interoperability with the Coast Guard based on 'a national fleet,' and to actively pursue innovation in naval science and technology. Finally, this paper proposes that naval capability the country needs in another twenty years depends on how effectively and rigorously the navy put its utmost efforts towards building 'a strongest navy' today.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Fisheries and Ocean Technology
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• v.50 no.1
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• pp.12-20
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• 2014

The objective of this paper is to aid in basic directions for the countermeasure against marine accidents by using the statistical data of Jeju Coast Guard from 1983 to 2012. Marine accidents of about 600~1,000 vessels was reported in all the waters around South Korea from 2000 to 2008. From 2009, these accidents increased rapidly and reached 1,600~2,000 vessels. Although marine accidents of longline fishing vessels did not show a big change prior to 1993, the number have increased steadily until 2007. This is considered a tendency that appears when longline vessels, using the Port of Sungsanpo as a base and operating in fishing grounds in the East China Sea, are converted to long-term fishing from short-term fishing for reasons such as cost reduction due to the sudden rise of oil prices and the performance improvement of the fishing vessels. The number of vessels in marine accidents decreased gradually from 1999 to 2002 and for nearly 7 years from 2002 to 2008, the annual average of marine accidents stayed at 97 vessels. This is seemed to be the result of a change in the policy of either the central or local government and largely associated with changes in the way of statistical processing. This tendency is resulted in lower number of the accidents due to careless navigation which can be viewed as a human error than the number of marine accidents due to poor maintenance as a cause of mechanical failure in the same period. The increase rate in the marine accidents of Jeju Island-based fishing vessels is greater than that of other area-based fishing vessels among the fishing vessels operating in coastal and near sea around Jeju Island each year.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.33-59
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• 2019

There have many research papers to see China's evolution of maritime strategy and naval modernization in terms of its naval mind-set. However, this article focuses on assessing how China uses its all sorts of maritime strength to achieve 'a building maritime great power.' The aim of the article is to introduce a new perspective to this debate by analysing China's diversified ma maritime capabilities and a new way of implementation in maritime security strategy. In recent years, China has been developing not only unpredictable maritime military capabilities but also maritime supporting forces - Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. And recently China adopted up-to-date operational concept aimed at gaining military superiority in Asia-Pacific waters. By taking salami slicing strategy, gray zone strategy and cabbage strategy, China has been trying to exercise surpassing influences in regional maritime area, also in western Pacific region. This article provides a stepping stone to comprehend the aspect of China's recent maritime strategic actions, especially in Yellow Sea. In conclusion, this article suggests some policy recommendations for countering China's coercive maritime strategy. First, Korea should make sure a strategic concept of maritime security, instead of land warfare focused strategic concept. Second, it is needed to set up suitable naval forces for actively responding to neighbor nation's offensive actions.

• Ocean and Polar Research
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.255-276
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• 2014

The dispute between China and Japan regarding $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is believed to be quite similar to the controversy surrounding Dokdo in terms of historical and post-war processes except for the point that the phenomena of occupation is different with regard to Dokdo. China's claim to $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$ is based on historical title and continuous use while the basis of Japan's claim is summarized as preoccupancy of ownerless land. Even though Japan acknowledges that China discovered $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, Japan claims that the act to establish sovereignty over the island from the standpoint of International Law was not taken by China. However, at that time, effective occupation was not an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of a territory. That is to say, from a legal perspective, the legal right for an area could be established based on the discovery of the land, and so it is thought that Japan is applying the current criteria of International Law in a manner that is inappropriate. When we review the post-war process, the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not directly mention $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. But based on the said treaty, we can note that Japan gave up all rights for the southern area that is north of the boundary line that equates to latitude $29^{\circ}$ and that includes the Ryuku Islands and $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. Of course, the provisions for the territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and its disposal are not the final factor for the judgment regarding dominium of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$. However, it seems clear that Japan's attitude and interpretation regarding the issues of $Di\grave{a}oy\acute{u}t\acute{a}i$, the Kuril Islands and Dokdo is problematic.