• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.3-40
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• 2020

The term "accident" in the Warsaw Convention of 1929 and the Montreal Convention of 1999, which govern carrier liability in international air transport, is an important criterion for determining carrier liability. However, because there is no explicit definition of the term in the treaty provisions, the term is largely subjected to the judgment and interpretation of the courts. Although there have been numerous changes in purpose and circumstance in the transition from the Warsaw regime to the conclusion of the Montreal Convention, there was no discussion on the concept of "accident" therefore, even after the adoption of the Montreal Convention, there is no doubt that the term is to be interpreted in the same manner as before. On this point, the United States Supreme Court's Air France v. Saks clarified the concept of "accident" and is still cited as an important precedent. Recently, the CJEU, in GN v. ZU, presented a new concept of "accident" introduced in the Montreal Convention: that "reference must be made to the ordinary meaning" in interpreting "accident" and that the term "covers all situations occurring on aboard an aircraft." Furthermore, the CJEU ruled that the term does not include the applicability of "hazards typically associated with aviation," which was controversial in previous cases. Such an interpretation can be reasonably seen as the court's expansion of the concept of "accident," with a focus on "protecting consumer interests," a core tenet of both the Montreal convention and the European Union Regulations(EC: No 889/2002). The CJEU's independent interpretation of "accident" is a departure from the Warsaw Convention and the Saks case, with their focus on "carrier protection," and instead focuses on the "passenger protection" standard of the Montreal Convention. Consequently, this expands both the court's discretion and the carrier's risk management liability. Such an interpretation by the CJEU can be said to be in line with the purpose of the Montreal Convention in terms of "passenger protection." However, there are problems to be considered in tandem with an expanded interpretation of "accident." First, there may be controversy concerning "balance" in that it focused on "passenger protection" in relation to the "equitable balance of interests" between air carriers and passengers, which is the basic purpose of the agreement. Second, huge losses are expected as many airlines fly to countries within the European Union. Third, there is now a gap in the interpretation of "accident" in Europe and the United States, which raises a question on the "unity of rules," another basic tenet of the Convention. Fourth, this interpretation of "accident" by the CJEU raises questions regarding its scope of application, as it only refers to the "hazards typically associated with aviation" and "situations occurring aboard an aircraft." In this case, the CJEU newly proposed a novel criterion for the interpretation of "accident" under the Montreal Convention. As this presents food for thought on the interpretation of "accident," it is necessary to pay close attention to any changes in court rulings in the future. In addition, it suggests that active measures be taken for passenger safety by recognizing air carriers' unlimited liability and conducting systematic reforms.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.197-224
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• 2020

This paper reviews and criticizes some issues as to the case of A and Others v. Finnair Oyj [2020] Case C-832/18 by examining EU Regulations and practical point of views. Under this case, the travellers brought an action against Finnair in light of the Air Passenger Regulation12, seeking compensation for both the first cancelled flight, and the delayed re-routed flight. Finnair had paid the first compensation, but refused to grant the second claim, arguing that the regulation did not set out that passengers were eligible for a second claim in those situations, and that the delay of the second flight was a consequence of 'extraordinary circumstances' under the regulation. The Court of Appeal in Helsinki has asked the CJEU whether an air passenger is entitled to a further compensation where a re-routed flight they have agreed to take is delayed, where both the original and rerouted flight are operated by the same air carrier. The CJEU held that the regulation does not in any way limit the rights of passengers where they find their flights being re-routed. As such, under earlier CJEU case law, the relevant travellers here were entitled to compensation for cancellation of the first flight and delay of the second flight. It also disagreed with Finnair's assessment that the technical failure in the re-routing flight was a matter of extraordinary circumstances.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.3-31
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• 2017

On 12 October 2017, the English Royal Courts of Justice delivered its decision about air carrier's compensation liability for the flight delay. In the cases the passengers suffered delays at a connecting point and, consequently, on arrival at their final destination. They claimed compensation under Regulation 261/2004 (the "Regulation"), as applied by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the "CJEU") in Sturgeon v. Condor [2009]. The principal issues were whether delays suffered by the passengers during the second leg of their respective journeys were compensable under the Regulation, whether there was jurisdiction under the Regulation and whether the right to compensation under the Regulation is, insofar as non-Community air carriers are concerned, excluded by virtue of the exclusive liability regime established under the Montreal Convention 1999. The passengers, the plaintiff, argued that the relevant delay was not that on flight 1 but that suffered at the "final destination". They maintained that there was no exercise by the EU of extraterritorial jurisdiction as the delay on flight 2 was merely relevant to the calculation of the amount of compensation due under the Regulation. The air carrier, the defendant, however argued that the only relevant flights for the purpose of calculating any delay were the first flights (flights 1) out of EU airspace, as only these flights fell within the scope of the Regulation; the connecting flights (flights 2) were not relevant since they were performed entirely outside of the EU by a non-Community carrier. Regarding the issue of what counts as a delay under the Regulation, the CJEU held previously on another precedents that the operating carrier's liability to pay compensation depends on the passenger's delay in arriving at the "final destination". It held that where the air carrier provides a passenger with more than one directly connecting flight to enable him to arrive at their destination, the flights should be taken together for the purpose of assessing whether there has been three hours' or more delay on arrival; and that in case of directly connecting flights, the final destination is the place at which the passenger is scheduled to arrive at the end of the last component flight. In addition, the Court confirmed that the Regulation applied to flights operated by non-Community carriers out of EU airspace even if flight 1 or flight 2 lands outside the EU, since the Regulation does not require that a flight must land in the EU. Accordingly, the passengers' appeal from the lower Court was allowed, while that of air carrier was dismissed. The Court has come down firmly on the side of the passengers in this legal debate. However, this result is not a great surprise considering the recent trends of EU member states' court decisions in the fields of air transport and consumer protection. The main goal of this article is to review the Court's decision and to search historical trend of air consumer protection especially in EU area.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.201-216
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• 2018

After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union's Common Commercial Policy now belongs to the exclusive competence area of the EU, including the foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. Regarding the bilateral investment protection treaties (BITs) between the EU Member States, the European Commission is of the view that such BITs should be discarded. On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in the Achmea BV v. Slovakia case that a BIT between the EU Member States, as well as arbitral awards based on that BIT, is not subject to request for preliminary rulings under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and thus they are not compatible with the EU law. However, the judgment did not silence the controversy. Instead, many people questioned the legal reasoning and the legitimacy of judgment, and therefore the problem is still ongoing.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.3-29
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• 2015

In case of C-410/11, Pedro Espada $S\acute{a}nchez$ and Others v Iberia $L\acute{i}neas$ $A\acute{e}reas$ de $Espa\tilde{n}a$ SA., ECLI:EU:C:2012:747, the passengers of a flight between Barcelona and Paris, whose baggage had been lost, lodged a claim before a Spanish court, asking for compensation. More specifically, the claimants were a family of four (two adults and two children), and had stored all their personal items in two suitcases, which had been checked in and tagged but never returned to the passengers in question. The four claimants relied on the Montreal Convention, ratified by the EU, which provides that each passenger can claim up to 1,000 SDRs in compensation (i.e. ${\euro}1,100$) in case his or her baggage is lost; thus, they sought to recover ${\euro}4,400$ (4,000 SDRs, i.e. 1,000 SDRs x4). The preliminary reference issue raised by the Spanish court to the CJEU regarded the $Montr\acute{e}al$ Convention's correct interpretation; in particular, it asked whether compensation should be available only to passengers whose lost baggage had been checked in "in their own name" or whether it is also available to passengers whose personal items had been stored in the (lost) baggage of a different passenger. The CJEU held that compensation had to be granted to all passengers whose items had been lost, regardless of whether these had been stored in baggage checked in "in their own name." In fact, it maintained that the real aim of the $Montr\acute{e}al$ convention is to provide passenger-consumers with protection for the loss of their personal belongings, so the circumstance of where these were being carried is not relevant. Nevertheless, the CJEU clarified that it is for national courts to assess the evidence regarding the actual loss of an item stored in another passenger's baggage, and maintained that the fact that a group of people were travelling together as a family is a factor that may be taken into account.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.39-77
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• 2019

Crew members engaged in international air transportation provide work in many countries due to the nature of their work. According to the Private International Act, the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work plays an important role in the determination of the governing law of the international labor contract (Article 28, Paragraph 2) and in the decision of international jurisdiction (Article 28, Paragraphs 3 and 4). The concept of the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work was proposed by the EU to determine international jurisdiction and governing law. In international aviation law, the legislative purpose of the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work is different from that of home base, which is a concept introduced for fatigue management of the crew in order to secure the aviation safety; thus the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work and home base are not the same concept. In order to determine the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work, following matters should be considered comprehensively; (i) where the crew starts and ends work, (ii) where the aircraft the crew is performing work on is primarily parked, (iii) where the crew is informed of the instructions and organizes his/her work activities, (iv) where the crew is obliged to reside according to the labor contract, (v) where there is an office provided by the employer and available to the crew, (vi) where the crew is obliged to be when he/she is ineligible for the work or subject to discipline. However, since all of the above items are the same as the location of the home base, it is reasonable to consider the home base as the most important factor when deciding on the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work. In contrast, the state where the aircraft is registered (Article 17 of the Chicago Convention), should not be regarded as a place of where the employee habitually carries out his/her work. In this case, CJEU provided the first judging standard for the concept of the place where the employee engaged in international air transportation habitually carries out his/her work. It is the interpretation of the Brussels regulations which became a model -for the Korean Private International Act,- so it would be helpful to understand the concept of the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.54
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• pp.261-282
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• 2012

The European Union (EU) has introduced the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as one of the key policies to reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions and in July 2008, they decided to include aviation in the scheme. As soon as the decision was announced the EU ETS was met by sharp opposition from world governments and international aviation. A group of US airlines, in particular, dropped a lawsuit against the British government over aviation's inclusion in the EU ETS. On 21 December, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that aviation's inclusion in the EU ETS which covers all flights arriving into and departing from the EU is legal and does not contravene international law. The scheme eventually came into effect on 1 January 2012. However, most countries are in opposition to the EU ETS and have agreed on counter-measures to undermine the EU's plan which may bring chaos to the aviation industry if such measures were to put into practice. This study therefore will analyze the likely effects that may be brought to the Korean aviation industry as a result of the inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS. Further, it hopes to contribute to the Korean aviation industry by studying other countries' counter-measures in advance.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.249-277
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• 2015

Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 ("Regulation") is a common rule on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights. In some recent cases of European nations, passengers sued the air carrier in order to obtain monetary compensation under Article 7(1) of the Regulation. Some courts dismissed the actions on the grounds that, unlike denied boarding or cancellation of the flight, the Regulation provides no compensation in relation to delayed flights. However, Court of Justice of the European Union(CJEU) ruled that Regulation 261/2004 must be interpreted to mean that passengers whose flights are delayed have a right to compensation in cases when the loss of time is equivalent to, or is in excess of three hours - where the passengers eventually reached their final destination three hours or more later than the originally scheduled arrival time. It is true that a strict interpretation of the regulation would suggest that passengers whose flight has merely been delayed are not entitled to compensation. They should only be offered assistance in accordance with the Articles 6 and 9. Nevertheless, the Court recognized the same right to the same compensation for passengers of flights delayed by more than three hours as that explicitly provided for passengers of cancelled flights. On the one hand, the Court bases this ruling on the recitals of the Regulation, in which the legislature links the question of compensation to that of a long delay, while indicating that the Regulations seek to ensure a high level of protection for passengers regardless of whether they are denied boarding or their flight is cancelled or delayed. On the other hand, the Court interprets the relevant provisions of the Regulation in light of the general principle of equal treatment. Furthermore, the Court delivered a ruling that the loss of time inherent in a flight delay, which constitutes an inconvenience within the intention of Regulation No 261/2004 and which cannot be categorized as 'damage occasioned by delay' within the meaning of Article 19 of the Montreal Convention, cannot come within the scope of Article 29 of that convention. Consequently, under this view, the obligation under Regulation No 261/2004 intended to compensate passengers whose flights are subject to a long delay is in line with Article 29 of the Montreal Convention. Although the above interpretation of the Court can be a analogical interpretation, the progressive attitude of the Regulation and the view of Court forward to protect passengers' interest is a leading role in the area of international air passenger transportation. Hopefully, after the model of the positive support in Europe, Korea can establish a concrete rule for protecting passengers' right and interest.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.137-168
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• 2020

Air passengers may be compensated for damages based on the above agreement when the passenger suffers an accident to the extent that they are recognized as an accident under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention in 1999. If a flight or cabin crew and passengers both undergo an accident, passengers are subjected to compensation under the Montreal Convention however flight cabin crews will be compensated by the Labor Law, which is the governing law in the labor contract with the airline. The flight or cabin crew boarding the aircraft work is on a work contract, not a passenger transport contract. Therefore, if the flight or cabin crew on the aircraft is injured due to an accident, and the air carrier is liable for default due to a labor contract, the Labor Law, workers or survivors claim damages due to illegal acts against the employer. In which case, civil law will apply. In this regard, if a Chinese cabin crew working for a Chinese airline dies due to an accident in the Republic of Korea, whether the family of the deceased claims damages against the Chinese airline or not has international court jurisdiction in the Republic of Korea, which is the place of tort. We examined whether it is the law of the Republic of Korea or whether it's the Chinese law, the law applicable to the work contract, is applied. Also, Seoul District Court 1995.5.18. The sentence 94A 14144 was found that if the injured crew during the flight work was not satisfied with the insurance compensation under the Labor Standards Act and the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, he could claime to damage under the civil law against an air carrier or third parties responsible for the accident. This law case shows that you can claim a civil damage as a cause. In case of death due to an existing illness while on the way to work, the Korea Workers'Compensation and Welfare Service did not recognize the death of the deceased as an occupational accident, and the trial was canceled by the parents of the deceased for the survivor's benefit and funeral expenses. (Seoul Administrative Court 2017.8. 31. Although the sentence was judged as an occupational disaster in 2016, the 2016 8816 Decision), it was defeated in the appeals court (Seoul High Court 2018.7.19.Sentence 2017 No. 74186) and I criticized the judgment of the appeal by analyzing the deceased's disease and related the cause of it to workload. Sometimes, a flight or cabin crew is on board not for the flight duty such as transferring to another flight or returning to the home base or lay-over place after their scheduled flight, this is called "Deadheading". If the crew who is not considered the same as a passenger, but is not on duty, is injured in an accident, does the crew claim compensation for damages under the labor contract or whether the Montreal Convention is applied to the passenger. In conjunction with the discussion, there was a similar case, In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1983), Demanes v. United Airlines, 348 F.Supp. 13 (C.D.Cal. 1972), Sulewski v. Federal Express Corp., 749 F.Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) and reviewed by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) at Wucher Helicopter GmbH and Euro-Aviation Versicherungs AG v. After examining several acts in several countries it's undeniably crucial to clearly understand the definition of "passenger" as stated in the Fridolin Santer case.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.54
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• pp.303-343
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• 2018

In 2013 a new era for EU patent law system was launched. The creation of the EU patent with unitary effect and the establishment of the Unified Patent Court established a new legal framework on substantive patent protection and patent litigation in Europe. This year the EU Patent Package would become a reality. It includes a regulation on a unitary patent, a regulation on the translation regime and an international Agreement on the Unitary Patent Court. In contrast to the classical European patent, the post-grant life of unitary patent will be governed by the newly created unified patent court and it will have unitary effect. In this article, I highlight the effect of the unitary patent and the jurisdiction of the unified patent court over unitary patents (and 'traditional' patents granted under the EPC that are not opted-out) for actions in relation to patent infringement or to revocation of a European patent and to licences of right. This article explores on the one hand the relation between national patent, the classical European patent and EU patent with unitary effect and on the other hand the relation of unified patent court to the Brussels $I^{bis}$ Regulation. Particular attention is paid to the institutional changes created by the unitary patent package abd the new supplementary forum that enables the UPC to hear disputes involving defendants from third States that relate to an infringement of a European patent and give rise to damage inside as well as outside the Union. Furthermore on the perspective North-east Asia this essay examines the lessons from the experiences of EU patent package.