• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.343-357
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• 1997

This paper proposes a new AGV dispatching algorithm which is suitable for heterarchical manufacturing control structure. It is developed on the basis of bidding concept utilizing the information of work-in-process in incoming and outgoing buffers of workstation, and travel time of AGV. Since the bidding functions are functions of two parameters, sensitivity test is performed to find their appropriate values. The performance of the algorithm is compared with those of well-known existing rules in terms of system throughput through simulation on a hypothetical job shop type manufacturing system.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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• autumn
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• pp.410-413
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• 2003

In order to build up competitive power in construction market and to cope with international policy, Design-Build bidding is one of the viable bidding system, encouraging collaboration between design office and building construction firm. Design-Build is a promising delivery system to help expediting schedules, saving costs, and improving Quality. However, the problems of Design-Build project in the domestic construction industry are not to be able to take advantages of fast-tracking and value engineering process, because of the problems of inappropriate system and participants' inexperience. The purpose of this study is to suggest alternatives for Design-Build bidding of public sector in the domestic construction industry in the costs, quality and time aspect.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.12
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• pp.597-602
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• 2002

The restructuring of power industry is still going on all over the world for last several decades. Many kinds of restructuring model have been studied, proposed, and applied. Among those models, power pool is more popular than other. This paper assumes the power pool market structure having competitive generation sector, and a new method is presented to build a bidding strategy in that market. The utilities participating in the market have the perfect information of their cost and price functions, but they don't know which strategy to be chosen by others. To define one's strategy as a vector, we make utility's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's cost/price functions into discrete step functions. An utility knows only his own strategy, so he estimates the other's strategy using Nash equilibrium or stochastic methods. And he also has to forecast the system demand. According to this forecasting result, his payoffs can be changed. Considering these all conditions, we formulate a bidding game problem and apply noncooperative game theory to that problem for the optimal strategy or solution. Some restrictive assumption are added for simplification of solving process. A numerical example is given in Case Study to show essential features and concrete results of this approach.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.319-339
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• 1997

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the winner's curse in the context of corporate takeovers. The study analyzes conditions which make overpayment likely. For a sample of corporate takeovers completed between 1982 and 1993, the analysis shows that the volatility of targets relative to that of acquirers (not the uncertainty of the target or acquirer alone) has a definitive impact on the magnitude of the winner's curse. Also, the incidence is more pronounced in multiple-bidder than in single-bidder contests. Specifically, white knights are more likely to overpay than other acquirers in multiple bidding situations. Furthermore, the study finds that the process of competitive bidding is a zero sum game since the greater returns to the shareholders of target firms in multiple-bid contests come at the expense of the acquiring companies, Overall, the evidence suggests that the bidders need to become more conservative, particularly as the relative uncertainty of the target's 'true' value and the number of bidders increase.

• Proceedings of the SAREK Conference
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• 2009.06a
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• pp.1104-1111
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• 2009

Mechanical facilities in modern buildings and industrial plants become more important in the view points of energy and environment issues. However, mechanical construction fields are still considered as to be subjected to buildings, even though design and construction of mechanical fields in the construction production process is independent of other fields. Recently, 'Framework Act on the Construction Industry' has been revised since 2007. According to the revision, the barrier of general construction and specialized construction is collapsed and the construction company can register any type of construction classification if they are able to carry out the construction mission. The mechanical construction fields are exempt until 2011 because of the protection of mechanical construction industry. In the present study, the bidding system has been prospected due to the revision of 'Basic Law on Construction Industry' after 2011. The trends for development of mechanical construction fields has been also discussed.

• International Journal of Precision Engineering and Manufacturing
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.124-131
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• 2000

A shop floor can be considered as and importand level to develop a Computer Integrated Manufacturing system (CIMs). The shop foor is a dynamic environment where unexpected events contrinuously occur, and impose changes to planned activities. The shop floor should adopt an appropriate control system that is responsible for scheduling coordination and moving the manufacturing material and information flow. In this paper, the architecture of the hybrid control model identifies three levels; i.e., the shop floor controller (SFC), the cell controller(CC) and the equipment controller (EC). The methodology for developing these controller is employ an object-oriented approach for static models and IDEF0 for function models for dispatching a job. SFC and CC are coordinated by employing a multi-factors bidding and an adapted Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP) prove applicability of the suggested method. Test experiment has been conducted by with the shopfloor, consisting of six manufacturing cells.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 1999.04a
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• pp.209-210
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• 1999

In the case of paper plant engineering company, one of the most important critical problems is to accurately estimate the cost and the delivery time of the project. This is necessary for the company to win a bidding and to have some room for negotiation. Moreover, the company needs to have time to process all the relevant informations to make timely response to, and deal with the changing conditions of the bidding environments as quickly as possible. One of the popular methodology dealing with this kind of situation is an effective "decision support system," and may researches are currently been done on this subject. In this article, and effective decision support system is developed which can provide automatic delivery time and cost estimates from which plant engineering company may be benefited.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.63-66
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• 2001

In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating to the bidding game accumulates the information of others' strategies and payoffs through the repeated process. Thereby, he is able to map out how he gets his maximum profit, and proceed to the optimal strategy region. This paper shows the algorithm for a player to determine his strategy in t period based the information of the game results of t-1, t-2 period. And this algorithm can be formulated by using Dynamic game theory.

• 한국경영정보학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2007.06a
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• pp.126-131
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• 2007

Most Internet auction studies have focused on examining the determinants of auction success or closing price. However, there has been little previous research which investigates dark-side factors such as overbidding behavior in the Internet C2C transactions. For this reason, this study attempts to find situations with the escalation of commitment to bids using Internet auction systems and also examines whether the bidder's bidding is irrational. Therefore, this study applies escalation of commitment to explain the auction process such as the "going, going, gone period" with competition in Internet C2C auctions. In order to describe the auction process in terms of escalation of commitment, this study proposes psychological sunk costs, completion effect, and self-justification as the key factors of escalation of commitment and also willingness to continue bidding reflecting the decision maker's escalation behavior in terms of persistence perspective as final dependent variable. The results of PLS analysis indicate that a bidder's overbidding behavior is explained by the escalation of commitment.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.10 no.6
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• pp.109-116
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• 2010

A construction project consists of many types of contracts. In the process of selecting the successful contractor after bidding, there will inevitably be fierce competition, which may lead to corruption or bribery. Even after signing the contract, during the period of settling the amount of the contract, bribery could occur. Such corruption could harm the development of the construction industry. It is, therefore, necessary to establish a strategy to prevent corruption by strengthening the transparency of the bidding process. In this study, to prevent corruption in the construction industry, a new service is proposed in which the successful bidder is selected by a professional third party, and the introduction of diverse delivery systems for construction projects and the invigoration of alternative methods of settling disputes are also proposed in this study.