• Land and Housing Review
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• v.3 no.4
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• pp.333-341
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• 2012

The financial resources for public land banking enacted by Public Land Banking Act (2009) are LH (Korea Land and Housing Corporation) contributions, LH Bond, Land Bank revenues, etc. But, in real, the efficient funding resource is mainly LH bond. In these days, LH has experienced deep financial distress, and difficulties in issuing it's bond. Therefore, Land Banking project also has been inactivated because of poor financial resources. As Land Banking project depending its financial resources mainly on LH Bond does not have financial sustainability, it is necessary to reform the fundamental funding structure. This is the starting point for the topic of this paper. This paper suggests to reform the funding structure, and to introduce Land Bank Bond guaranteed by Government, and also to modify the accounting method of Land Bank to separate the Land Bank accounts with LH accounts. The funding structure reform can be summarized as follows; In early stage of the Land Banking project, sufficient government support by guaranteeing the Land Bank Bond is necessary. Gradually, the portion of LH's contribution can be increased in company with LH's financial distress being solved and administration being normalized. When the project reached on the stage of maturity, cash inflows by selling the reserved land can exceed the cash outflows for reserve new land. To introduce the Land Bank Bond guaranteed by government, the Public Land Banking Act (2009) should be revised. Along with this, to modify the accounting method of Land Bank, the rule for public enterprise accounting system must be partially revised.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.1-13
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• 2009

In this paper, we develop theoretical game models to determine the level of government subsidies for banks to provide policy loans to Innovative SMEs(small and medium sized enterprises) through banks, which otherwise would not finance them for the sake of their own profitability. For this, we compare net cash flows of each bank using different strategies against high risk innovative SMEs. A bank can decide whether to provide them loans or not In each period. Following Kim(2003)'s Infinite horizon model on the soft budget constraint, we introduce a situation in which banks compete against each other for higher net long-term payoffs from their loans to innovative SMEs and non-innovative SMEs. From the models, we show that competition among banks in general leads to a tighter decision against innovative SMEs, as a Nash equilibrium. It is not because the government bank is simply loose in providing loans, but because competition among commercial banks for fewer riskier borrowers results in tighter loan decisions against innovative SMEs. Thus, the competitive market for policy loans to innovative SMEs fails to reach the socially optimal level of loans for innovative SMMs. Commercial banks in the competitive market may require additional supports from the government to make up for the differences in their payoffs to support innovative SMEs, possibly much riskier due to moral hazards and poor discounted cash flows. The monopolistic government bank might also request such supports from the government to fund otherwise unqualified SMEs. We calculate an optimal level of governmental support for banks to guarantee funding such high-risk innovative SMEs over periods without deviating from their optimal Nash equilibrium policies.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.196-209
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• 2018

This study is founded on banks' profitability factors. Unlike the previous study in terms of diversification of the banks' funding structure, this research performs multiple regression analysis during the entire period and examines the comparative analysis of before and after the financial crisis. the study establishes hypotheses by using the wholesale funding ratio as a key focus variable with 8 explanatory variables and the operating profit on assets as a profitability index. The Loan-deposit rate gap, the Number of stores and the Non-performing loan ratio prove to be a significant profitability factor for all periods of time. Korean banks are also more profitable when their the Loan-deposit rate gap get bigger and the Number of stores grows. The wholesale funding ratio is analyzed to have no statistically significant effect on the profitability of banks. Rather than being influenced by macroeconomic indicators, it is indicated that the situation of individual banks and other financial environments have been affected. And banks increase profitability as banks increase their loan after the financial crisis. The empirical analysis shows that profitability factors have periodical distinctions, and in this aspect, this research has implications. The study needs to be expanded to cover the entire domestic banking sector, in consideration of the profitability of the banking industry in the future.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.