• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.121-156
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• 2010

Back-door-listing can be viewed both as M&A and an alternative to IPO. If IPO is an access to the capital market through regulations, back-door-listing would be the way of entering the market through trading. Back-door-listing can be a better choice considering the common wisdom that regulations hinder the functioning of free market system. One would, however, prefer IPO, for the informational asymmetry isless severe in case of IPO. This paper examines if IPO is superior to back-door-listing as to the informational efficiency. The excess buy-and-hold returns of the Kosdaq back-door-listing firms are estimated over the three-year-period since the event. They are compared against the excess buy-and-hold returns of the Kosdaq IPO firms over the same period of time. The results confirm this paper's prediction that IPO should be more information-efficient. Both IPO and back-door-listing firms start with high short-term excess returns and end up with long-term under-performance. However, back-door-listing firms show more significantly damaging long-term results. Furthermore, back-door-listing firms record poorer accounting results over the research period. These results imply that there exists fad at the time of both events and, in case of back-door-listing, this fad is reinforced by the possibility of window dressing.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.12 no.20
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• pp.123-138
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• 1989

The primary objective of the agency research in the game theory lives in the maintenance of Pareto is optimal condition for the optimal incentive contract. The basic concepts which are related to this objective are reviewed in connection with the general assumptions to model it, the moral hazard and adverse selection which arised from the information asymmetry, and finally the problem of risk distribution. The demand for auditing and the role of auditor have been addressed by ASOBAC. Issues which an auditor is explicitly introduced in a principal-agent framework have been addressed in this paper. These issues must be confronted to appropriately with the auditor, and to achieve an adequate understanding of optimal confronting arrangement with the auditor. The first step in introducing an auditor into this analysis is to examine the game-theoretic foundation of such a expended agency model. The Mathematical program formulated may not yield solution that are resonable. This arises because the program may call for the auditor and manager to play dominated Nash equilibra in some subgame. The nontrivial natures of the subgame implies that randomized strategies by the auditor and manager nay be of crucial importance. The possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested; change the rule of the game and or impose covexity condition. The former seems unjustifiable in on auditing context, and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. The discussion ended with an extension of the revelation principle to the owner manager-auditor game, assuming strategies. An examination of the restriction and improvement direction of the basic concept of agency theory was addressed in the later part of this paper. Many important aspects of auditor incentives are inherently multiple-agent, multiple-period, multiple-objectine, phenomena and require further analyses and researches.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.33 no.4
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• pp.21-38
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• 2014

This study investigates whether and how a firm's cost of equity is influenced by the extent of a firms's name change. Even though corporate name change doesn't give any benefit to investors, it can be a signaling about firm's future valuation. And also, if that signaling has high credibility, it can be decrease information cost and the firm's cost of equity. on the contrary to this, if corporate name change is kind of break with the past and corporate image laundering, it is bad signaling to investors. So it can be increase information risk and the firm's cost of equity. Using yearly cross-sectional regressions of the cost of equity on our proxies for corporate name change, size, beta, market-to-book ratio and other innate risk factor over the 2005-2010, we find that the cost of capital is positively associated with corporate name change after controlling for all other factors. This result implies that corporate name change increase information risk of the business, and thus increase information asymmetries between managers and outside investors with respect to a firm's true future value. This increases information risk, and creates an adverse selection problem, on the part of outside investors. Rational investors therefore demand a premium for bearing this corporate name change-related information risk, which in turn leads us to observe a positive relation between the intensity of corporate name change and the cost of equity.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.13 no.9
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• pp.47-57
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• 2015

Purpose - The aim of this paper is to investigate the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory (the cost of financing increases with asymmetric information) among Korean retail firms from the perspective of debt capacity. According to the Pecking-order theory, a firm's first preference is to use internal funds for its capital needs, its next preference is the issuance of debt, and its last preference is the issuance of equity; this is due to the information asymmetry problem between existing shareholders and investors. However, prior empirical studies, such as Lemmon and Zender (2010), argue that the entire sample test for the Pecking-order theory could be misleading due to the different levels of debt issuance capability of each of the individual firms; in fact, they confirm that the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory improves after taking into account the differences in debt capacity of the U.S. firms they examined. This paper implements a case study approach among Korean retail firms to examine the relationship between debt capacity and the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory in Korea. Research design, data, and methodology - This study uses the sample of public retail firms on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) from the time period of 1990 to 2013. We gather related financial and accounting statements from the financial information firm WISEfn. Credit rating information is provided by the Korea Investor Service. We employ the models of Lemmon and Zender (2010) and Son and Kim (2013) to measure a firm's debt capacity. Their logit models use the rating dummy variable as a dependent variable and incorporate other firm characteristics as independent variables to estimate debt capacity. To test the Pecking-order theory, we adopt variants of the financing deficit model of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). In the test of the Pecking-order theory, we consider all of the changes in total debt obligations, current debt obligations, and long-term debt obligations. Results - Our main contribution to the literature is our confirmation of the predicted relationship between debt capacity and the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory among Korean retail firms. The coefficients on financing deficits become greater as a firm's debt capacity improves. This is consistent with the results of Lemmon and Zender (2010). The coefficients on the square of the financing deficits are also negative for the firms in the largest debt capacity group, which is also consistent with the predictions in prior literature. Conclusions - This study takes a case study approach by examining Korean retail firms. We confirm that the Pecking-order theory explains the capital structure of retail firms more appropriately, after taking into account the debt capacity of each firm. This result suggests the importance of debt capacity consideration in the testing of the Pecking-order theory. Our result also implies that there has been a potential underestimation of the explanatory power of the Pecking-order theory in existing studies.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.6 no.5
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• pp.1-8
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• 2015

The data of fair value hierarchy is expected to contain different degree of measurement error, information asymmetry, and information risk by the level of hierarchy. Thus, this study examines how hierarchy of fair value discriminately influences on companies' cost of capital. Through regression analysis of corporations listed from 2011 to 2014, it turns out that the regression coefficient of level 1 and 2 of fair value variable vary their rank by cost of capital types, while level 3 contains the highest regression coefficient for every cost of capital variable. In addition, further study of how the relevance between cost of capital and the fair value hierarchy gets affected by market risk management level and audit quality finds no consistent results. However, by analyzing the effect of coincident interaction through the convergence of market risk management and audit quality, when audit quality and market risk management level are high, the effect of relieving cost of capital of Level 3 gets the highest. In conclusion, fair value hierarchy data seems to affect discriminately on cost of capital by involved information risk, and the information risk could decrease by the level of market risk management and audit quality.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.151-165
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• 2017

This study investigates the effect of revenue recognition by percentage of completion method on financial analysts' earnings forecasting information in order industry. Specifically, we examines how the analysts' earnings forecast errors and biases differ according to whether or not to report the unbilled revenue account balance and the level of unbilled revenue account balance. The sample consists of 453 firm-years listed in Korea Stock Exchange during the period from 2010 to 2014 since the information on unbilled revenue accounts can be obtained after the adoption of K-IFRS. The results are as follows. First, we find that the firms with unbilled revenue account balances have lower analysts' earnings forecast accuracy than the firms who do not report unbilled revue account balances. In addition, we find that the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts decreases as the amount of unbilled revenue increases. Unbilled revenue account balances occur when the revenue recognition of the contractor is faster than the client. There is a possibility that managerial discretionary judgment and estimation may intervene when the contractor calculates the progress rate. The difference between the actual progress of the construction and the progress recognized by the company lowers the predictive value of financial statements. Our results suggest that the analysts' earnings forecasts may be more difficult for the firms that report unbilled revenue balances as applying the revenue recognition method based on the progress criteria. Second, we find that the firms reporting unbilled revenue account balances tend to have higher the optimistic biases in analysts' earnings forecast than the firms who do not report unbilled revenue account balances. And we find that the analysts' earnings forecast biases are increases as the amount of unbilled revenue increases. This study suggests an effort to reduce the arbitrary adjustment and estimation in the measurement of the progress as well as the introduction of the progress measurement method which can reflect the actual progress. Investors are encouraged to invest and analyze the characteristics of the order-based industry accounting standards. In addition, the results of this study empower the accounting transparency enhancement plan for order industry proposed by the policy authorities.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.1-22
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• 2016

We analyzed the international comovements and structural changes in the quarterly real GDP by the Markov-switching vector autoregressive model (MS-VAR) from 1971(1) to 2016(1). The main results of this study were as follows. First, the business cycle phenomenon that occurs in the models or individual time series in real GDP has been grasped through the MS-VAR models. Unlike previous studies, this study showed the significant comovements, asymmetry and structural changes in the MS-VAR model using a real GDP across countries. Second, even if there was a partial difference, there were remarkable structural changes in the economy contraction regime(recession), such as 1988(2) ending the global oil shock crisis and 2007(3) starting the global financial crisis by the MS-VAR model. Third, large-scale structural changes were generated in the economic expansion and/or contraction regime simultaneously among countries. We found that the second world oil shocks that occurred after the first global oil shocks of 1973 and 1974 were the main reasons that caused the large-scale comovements of the international real GDP among countries. In addition, the spillover between Korea and 5 countries has been weak during the Asian currency crisis from 1997 to 1999, but there was strong transmission between Korea and 5 countries at the end of 2007 including the period of the global financial crisis. Fourth, it showed characteristics that simultaneous correlation appeared to be high due to the country-specific shocks generated for each country with the regime switching using real GDP since 1973. Thus, we confirmed that conclusions were consistent with a number of theoretical and empirical evidence available, and the macro-economic changes were mainly caused by the global shocks for the past 30 years. This study found that the global business cycles were due to large-scale asymmetric shocks in addition to the general changes, and then showed the main international comovements and/or structural changes through country-specific shocks.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.139-148
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• 2016

The importance of technology commercialization is being emphasized more and more, but high technology excellence does not always lead to a successful business. In addition, companies that invest heavily in basic research and technology development are also not always able to guarantee high profits. This is due to the technical problems when present in step research and development levels are difficult to commercialize. And the market will not work rationally is also the cause of the problem. Therefore, to effectively utilize the resources necessary to ensure such partners to build alliances and cooperation with external funding or manpower is crucial to commercialize the research results of basic science successfully. In previous studies, it has been made many studies in accordance with the approach to the technology (e.g. Research and Development, Management of Technology, Technology Innovation, etc.). But the study of technology commercialization point of view is not being done much. This study should explores the available business required, or realized in the process of researching the basic science and trying to understand the imperfections of the market through the property of technology (tacit knowledge, objectified value of technology and the information asymmetry between innovation subjects, etc.). In addition, this paper, we try to focus on a strategic approach to the role of International Science Business Belt (ISBB) with success in science and technology business as appropriate countermeasures about breaking the 'Valley of Death.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.95-125
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• 2009

This paper examines the disciplinary effect of deposits using the semiannual accounting data of mutual savings banks(henceforth 'MSBs') in Korea for the period of 2003 through 2007. I find overall strong evidence in favor of the existence of market discipline in the industry. MSBs with higher BIS ratio and lower NPL ratio turn out to have higher increase rate of deposits than MSBs with lower such ratios. The coefficient of NPL ratio becomes greater with time, suggesting that the effect is cumulative. It turns out that depositors respond more sensitively to NPL ratio than BIS ratio in a period of MSB failure. On the other hand, MSBs turn out to act very positively responding to the depositors' discipline. They increase BIS ratio or decrease NPL ratio following the previous decrease in deposits. Government authorities need to make more efforts to develop a suitable incentive system (e.g. penalties on a false disclosure) to improve the efficiency of disclosure by MSBs. Moreover, they need to acknowledge the importance of NPL ratio as a market disciplinary tool which has been becoming more important, especially in times of MSB failure.