• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.145
• /
• pp.91-117
• /
• 2018

This paper aims to clarify the similarities and differences between the Zhouyi and artificial intelligence. The divination of the Zhouyi is rooted in the oldest system of human knowledge, while artificial intelligence stands at the cutting edge of modern scientific revolution. At first sight, there does not appear to be any association that links the one to the another. However, they share the same ground as seen from a semiotic standpoint because both of them depend on the semiotic system as a means of obtaining knowledge. At least four aspects can be pointed out in terms of similarities. First, artificial intelligence and the Zhouyi use artificial language that consists of semiotic signs. Secondly, the principle that enables divination and artificial intelligence lies in imitation and representation. Thirdly, artificial intelligence and the Zhouyi carry out inferences based on mathematical algorithms that adopt the binary system. Fourth, artificial intelligence and the Zhouyi use analogy as a means of obtaining knowledge. However, those similarities do not guarantee that the Zhouyi could arrive at the scientific certainty. Nevertheless, it can give us important insight into the essence of our civilization. The Zhouyi uses intellect in order to get new information about the unknown world. However, it is hard to know what kind of intellect is involved in the process of divination. Likewise, we do not know the fundamental character of artificial intelligence. The intellect hidden in the unknown subject is a mystic and fearful existence to us. Just as the divination of the Zhouyi inspires the sense of reverence toward the supernatural subject, we could not but have fear in front of the invisible subject hidden in artificial intelligence. In the past, traditional philosophy acknowledged the existence of intellect only in conscious beings. Nonetheless, it becomes evident that human civilization ushers into a new epoch. As Ray Kurzweil mentioned, the moment of singularity comes when artificial intelligence surpasses human intelligence. In my viewpoint, the term of singularity can be used for denoting the critical point in which the human species enters into the new phase of civilization. To borrow the term of Shao Yong(邵雍) in the Northern Song Dynasty, the past civilization belongs to the Earlier Heaven(先天), the future civilization belongs to the Later Heaven(後天). Once our civilization passes over the critical point, it is impossible to go back into the past. The opening of the Later Heaven foretold by the religious thinkers in the late period of Joseon Dynasty was a prophecy in its own age, but it is becoming a reality in the present.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.145
• /
• pp.167-194
• /
• 2018

According to the result of 2017 youth statistics, the first rank of the death cause of Korean youth is suicide for nine years. The recent study on factors affecting juvenile suicide presents: family factors; character and psychological factors; mental disease factors; suicide-triggering factors; school factors; and protection factors; and so on. What is required to the youth who are vulnerable to the confusion of identity and the adjustment of emotion or impulse is not only drug treatment or mental therapy but also the support of family or society where adolescents are encouraged to be introspective and form their identity in a healthy approach in the diverse humanistic philosophical dimension. This study is going to pay attention to the aesthetic existence of Kierkegaard who provided the foundation of human existential identity centered on three stages of existence. For this purpose, we attempt to search for the philosophical basis for the understanding of juvenile identity centered on the analysis of Kierkegaard's Either / Or Volume I (Entweder - Oder Teil I). Especially, we are going to attempt the understanding of aesthetics of youth through the analysis of three stages of desire (Begierde) suggested in Chapter 2 of this book. Herewith he suggests aesthetic existence through 'desire', and aesthetic existence as the desire again through three stages of 'dreaming ($tr{\ddot{a}}umend$)' desire, 'searching (suchend)' desire, and 'desiring (begehrend)' desire. Based on this analysis of three stages, we plan to graft the roots of sociological factors presented as the cause of youth's suicide onto the analysis of existential philosophy. Through this, we attempt to grope for the diagnostic and healing discourse which Kierkegaard's existential analysis can present in the formation and recognition of youth identity and disclose a factor of the emotion or the disorder of impulse adjustment as well as depression suggested as the main contributing factor of youth's suicide and search for philosophical discourse for the prevention of juvenile suicide.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.131
• /
• pp.77-103
• /
• 2014

It is well known that Nietzsche insists on the affirmation of life, and the subject of 'affirmation of life' is a familiar one in Nietzsche literature. We want to throw an unfamiliar light on this familiar subject, connecting the theme of affirmation with that of redemption, and insisting on the centrality of the theme of redemption in Zarathustra's teaching of ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$. For Nietzsche, the redemption of human life means that its life is endowed with some meaning and its existence is positively justified. With this redemption, an active affirmation of life is possible, which means that we not only endure this life once but also request it for indefinite times. According to Nietzsche, for this kind of redemption and active affirmation we need an ultimate ground of meaning and only the excellence of life, that is, of 'will to power' can serve as this ultimate ground. Accepting the Greek way of identifying virtue with excellence, Nietzsche thought that life can justify itself at the ultimate form of life in ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$. Then, through ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$ the way is opened for man to endow meanings on and justify its life. That is, ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$ is not only the one who affirms its life, but also the very condition in which humanity can justify its life in general. With the goal and ideal of ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$ accepted, the affirmation and redemption of an individual life depends on how it manages to create its own life in relation to this goal and ideal. According to Nietzsche, though we cannot go back to the past, we still can recreate it and change its meanings through working on the future. Only those who try to create a meaningful future and thus recreate the past could redeem and affirm their own lives. That is, for Nietzsche, to affirm and redeem one's life means not just to change one's attitude to life but to create and recreate it with the eye for ${\ddot{U}}bermensch$.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.146
• /
• pp.307-328
• /
• 2018

The use of thought experiments has a long history in many disciplines including science. In the field of philosophy, thought experiments have frequently appeared in the pre-existing literature on the contemporary Analytic Philosophy. A thought experiment refers to a synthetic environment where the designer of the experiment-with his or her intuition and imagination-tests common-sense knowledge. It can be understood as a conceptual tool for testing the validity of the common understanding of an issue or a phenomenon. However, we are not certain about the usefulness or efficacy of a thought experiment in knowledge production. The design of a thought experiment is meant to lure readers into believing as intended by the experiment itself. Thus, regardless of the purpose of a thought experiment, many readers who encounter the experiment could feel deceived. In this paper, to analyze the logic of thought experiments and to seek the source of uneasiness the readers and critics may feel about thought experiments, I draw lessons from three renowned thought-experiments: Thomson's 'ailing violinist', Putnam's 'brain in a vat', and Searle's 'Chinese room'. Imaginative thought experiments are usually constructed around a gap between the reality and the knowledge/information at hand. From the three experiments, several lessons can be learned. First, the evidence of the existence of a gap provided via thought experiments can serve as arguments for counterfactual situations. At the same time, the credibility and efficacy of the thought experiments can be damaged as soon as the thought-experiments are carried out with inappropriate and/or murky directions regarding the procedures of the experiment or the background of the study. According to D. R. Hofstadter and D. C. Dennett(1981), the 'knob setting' in a thought experiment can be altered in the middle of a simulation of the experimental condition, and then the implications of the thought experiment change altogether, indicating that an entirely different conclusion can be deduced from thought experiment. Lastly, some pre-suppositions and bias of the experiment designers play a considerable role in the validity and the chances of success of a thought experiment; thus, it is recommended that the experiment-designers refrain from exercising too much of their imagination in order to avoid contaminating the design of the experiment and/or wrongly accepting preconceived/misguided conclusions.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.105
• /
• pp.321-350
• /
• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to identify the difference between Sangsan-Simhak(象山心學) and Yangming-Simhak(陽明心學). This means that the whole history of Sung Confucianism needs to be understood based on changing philosophical paradigm according to the times, not general perception which regards the whole history of Sung Confucianism as Li-Hak (理學) and Sim-Hak(心學). This kind of perception is caused by the general perception which divides Sung Confucianism into Sim-Hak and Li-Hak. We regard the former as Chung-Chu study and the latter as Liu-Yang study. Because of this, Sangsan study is recognized as the former stage study of Yangming study and can not be placed in independent position in whole history of Sung Confucianism. And Sang is regarded that it takes diametrical opposition with Chuhsi study. So it is said that there is no point of sameness among them. But Sangsan study was generated from 'Song-Hak(宋學)' based on paradigm of Li-Hak and Yangming study was generated from 'Ming-Hak(明學)' based on paradigm of Sim-Hak. The difference between 'Song-Hak' and 'Ming-Hak' is generated from proposition called 'Sim is Li (心卽理)' that most research has overlooked. To identify these things, this paper examine the philosophical difference between 'Song-Hak' and 'Ming-Hak' and analyze the proposition 'Sim is Li(心卽理)' that regards Sangsan study and Yangming study as same philosophical system. And this paper identify the philosophical difference between Sangsan study and Yangming study by examining the method that the concept of 'Sim is Li(心卽理)' is applied in moral cultivation. This paper shows that the difference of interpretation about the concept of Li(理), between 'Song-Hak' based on Li paradigm and 'Ming-Hak' based on Ki-Hak(氣學) paradigm, causes different meaning in 'Sim is Li(心卽理)'. Through these, this paper demonstrate the difference between the paradigm of 'Song-Hak' that Chuhsi study and Sangsan study have and the paradigm of 'Ming-Hak' that Yangming study has and the fact which Sangsan study is systematic philosophy of Sung Confucianism in itself not former stage of Yangming study.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.146
• /
• pp.49-77
• /
• 2018

This essay examines the ego (I-Subject) problem in Husserl's phenomenology and consists of four parts, as follows. Section I describes the meaning of this research on ego and some important points to note in relation to this study. Section II discusses two aspects of the problem of pure ego, which appears as an ego-problem for the first time. The first aspect is the two opposing positions that Husserl himself took regarding pure ego. Husserl initially rejected pure ego as an object of research in Logische Untersuchungen I (1901) however, he withdrew this position in Logische Untersuchungen II (1913). The second aspect is the content of pure ego that Husserl explored in Ideen I (1913) after he accepted pure ego as a phenomenological problem. The theme of section III is the "theory of three egos" which appeared in Ideen II (1912, 1952). Here, two issues have been noted, one of which is the methodological basis for enabling this theory: the phenomenological "attitude change" (Einstellungsaenderung) and the "Underlying" (Fundierung). The other is the explanation of the content of the three egos: the "physical ego", "personal ego" and the "pure ego". Section IV concerns two themes of the "monadic ego" that appeared in the Cartesianische Meditationen (1931). The first theme is the theoretical premise for the establishment of the monadic ego. In conjunction with this theme, phenomenological-psychological reduction was used as a new method to open up new problem horizons. The second theme brings up the content of the monadic ego, the essence of which can be summarized as follows. 1) This ego is based on a pluralistic and independent ego-concept in which each ego is equal to its own self. 2) It must be asked whether each of the monadic egos is different from one another. 3) The "other" of a certain transcendental ego is not the ego-other relationship but ego-another ego (alter-ego). 4) This phenomenological monadic ego can mutually communicate with alter-egos through empathy, unlike Leibniz's metaphysical monads.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.144
• /
• pp.167-203
• /
• 2017

In this paper I will investigate the problems of the Ego of Kant, Husserl and $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ from the standpoint of $trisvabh{\bar{a}}va$ and the transformation of the basis of $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$. Kant's Copernican revolution and Husserl's Phenomenological reduction are the keys to understanding their philosophies. We especially want to look into the comparison between the Ego of Kant, Husserl and $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$. According to Kant, we need the transcendental Ego as absolute in order to unite consciousness. Kant criticizes traditional metaphysics which had argued that the metaphysicians regard the transcendental Ego as substance. If they regard the transcendental Ego as an empirical object, this attempt will be in vain, because they seek to know unknown things. Husserl's phenomenological reduction is properly understood as a method designed to transform a philosopher into a phenomenologist by virtue of the attainment of a certain perspective on the world phenomenon. We will find the field of the transcendental, absolute ego through phenomenological reduction. Transcendental, absolute ego constitutes our whole world and gives meaning to the world. $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ argues that what our ordinary consciousness (the sixth consciousness) regards subjectivity and objectivity as separate, or that self and the world is an imagination that $alaya-vij{\tilde{n}}ana$, the mind more profound than the ordinary consciousness, created. $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra^{\prime}s$ $alaya-vij{\tilde{n}}ana$ creates the whole objects and the consciousness (the sixth), so we must regard them as illusionary. $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ insists that there are three natures of mind and we attain the transformation of the basis in mind. Based on this point of view, Kant, Husserl and $Yog{\bar{a}}c{\bar{a}}ra$ want to transcend and overcome the limits of the ordinary consciousness, and then they want to find the absolute truth (everything) and want to be a men of freedom.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.131
• /
• pp.165-197
• /
• 2014

In this paper, I investigate on the human nature in philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism from a Kantian point of view. The core argument of the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, Buddhism and Kant is that all human beings have the pure abilities a priori to overcome themselves, to realize their own potentialities. This is called immanent transcendence. At this time human beings can be free. Kant, Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism claim that all human beings themselves will overcome their desires from their mind and body through the immanent transcendence, reflection and contemplation on their own. When we give up the external knowledges, throw away obsessions with the selfish desires and go back to our inside, we can see our original nature. To have an insight into this inner nature, to respect the moral law a priori, this is to overcome the ourselves, and to be a Grate Man(聖人) and a Buddha. This way is the only way to be a Grate Man and a Buddha. The main proposition of Wang Yang-Ming's philosophy is expressed 'There are no things without mind.'(心外無物) The core of Kant's transcendental philosophy is called the Copernican Revolution by himself. Copernican Revolution means the transition from the object-centered epistemology to the subject-centered epistemology. 'Innate Knowing'(良知) and 'Perform Innate Knowing'(致良知), 'All human beings have the mind of Buddha'(一切衆生悉有佛性) contain the apriority, immanence of Moral Law. In this respect, the theory of Innate Knowing in Wang Yang-Ming and mind of Buddha in Buddhism, pure Moral Law in Kant has the same structure grounded in subjectivity. Even if we have the mind of Buddha, innate Knowing, moral law a priori, the reason why we don't know our original nature is that we fall into the obsessions with selfish desires, and that we have inclination to external interests. So the moment you see our original nature, ordinary people themselves turn into a Buddha. These changes and transitions are immanent transcendence. All human beings have the ability to do this changes and transitions. Buddha does not exist outside of us, but it exists with our reflections on our human nature. Buddha can not existed without our insight into the our innate Ego. Where there is our original nature, there is a Buddha. So Buddha is called the another name of the original figure of human beings.

• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
• /
• no.36
• /
• pp.505-530
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning of learning methods for education to transmit the items designated as intangible cultural heritages focusing on Seoul-gut. Recently, as the Act on the Preservation and Promotion of Intangible Cultural Heritages was promulgated, 'the archetype' instead of 'the prototype' has become highlighted as a crucial axis for transmission. Although there are some controversies over the definition of the archetype among scholars, it is now possible for transmitters to make use of transformations rather freely being freed from strict orientation to the prototype to follow some fixed frame. Examining learning methods used in education to transmit mudang-gut, one of the items designated as intangible cultural heritages, however, this author has found that the prototype is still emphasized or in the center of learning instead. Presenting learning methods employed for Hwanghaedopyeongsansonoreum-gut of a national intangible cultural heritage, Namijanggunsadang-gut of Seoul Special City's intangible cultural heritage, and Bonghwasandodang-gut as examples, this researcher intends to reveal the reality. In the recent situation that education centering around academies is being widely spread to transmit mudang-gut, setting forth the designation of some of the items as intangible cultural heritages, they are publishing articles on newspaper as an advertisement to encourage learning about mudang-gut. Responding to the advertisement, there are more and more shamans intending to learn mudang-gut coming to the society for preserving items designated as intangible cultural heritages. They can, of course, perform mudang-gut on their own but come to learn it as there is no fixed or definite system for it. Even though the concept of the archetype was introduced, as now it is possible to learn the fixed frame through learning about the prototype regarding the item of mudang-gut as an intangible cultural heritage, those involved in shamanism are coming to it more and more. As transmitting the prototype rather deteriorated the liveliness of gut, those involved in shamanism are coming to it to learn about gut thinking that it is where they can learn the basic frame and also acquire more detailed knowledge about shamanism. Therefore, it is needed for the item of mudang-gut designated as an intangible cultural heritage to accept the aspects of change and develop new methods of education to transmit intangible cultural heritages.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.116
• /
• pp.155-180
• /
• 2010

The three means of listening, reflection and meditation (${\acute{s}}raava{\d{n}}a$, manana and $nididhy{\bar{a}}sana$) which are central devices of practice in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ philosophy should be understood not as a continuative step but as a methodological extension on condition of having one and the same purpose. In other words, the three means should be interpreted in a listening-oriented manner, in which the process has to be methodologically extended to reflection and meditation only when the direct knowledge on the reality is not gained in listening. This kind of interpretation can be more justified by displaying significant characteristics of Indian philosophy implied in the three means. It can be easily said that $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ belonging to the liberation-centric tradition is a project of 'regaining essential self' through which the self becomes essential self by knowing that self. In this case the listening-oriented interpretation coincides with the basic teachings of $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$, since listening alone can be a sufficient means for obtaining knowledge of the original self. Further, as the project of 'regaining essential self' is carried out by the three means, these can be called a sort of 'event' that is carried out according to the scenario of $Ved{\bar{a}}ntic$ metaphysics. In this case listening is a course of comprehending the scenario of event participated by oneself, and that participant can accomplish the project by way of listening the scenario alone judged as somewhat more effective for liberation. However, in the later $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ there arises a meditation-oriented interpretation of which three means are regarded not as a methodological extension but as a continuative step, because of the emphasis on meditation under the lasting influence of other philosophical systems. This is a result of epistemic desire that tries to convert what is heard to what is specially perceived or what is given to what is accepted. It may be said that this interpretation emphasizing the phased transition from the indirect to the direct of knowledge is an attempt to rationalize the repetitive delay of event as the actual failure of project. Furthermore, an assertion of the later $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ which refers the fourth means called $sam{\bar{a}}dhi$ is based on the logic that the self-realization is possible apart from and outside the text, and accordingly it is incompatible with an assertion of the early $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ that the self-realization is a reproduction as it is of the scenario guided by the absolute text. After all, the standard interpretation on the three means in $Ved{\bar{a}}nta$ have to be the listening-oriented, but not be the meditation-oriented or the $sam{\bar{a}}dhi$-oriented.