• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.43 no.3
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• pp.160-165
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• 2019

The conduct of seafarer is major cause of marine accidents. This study models the behavior of the seafarer based on the Hidden Markov Model (HMM). Additionally, through the path analysis of the behavior estimated by the model, the kind of situations, procedures and errors that may have caused the marine accidents were interpreted. To successfully implement the model, the seafarer behaviors were observed by means of the summarized verdict reports issued by the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal, and the observed results converted into behavior data suitable for HMM learning through the behavior classification framework based on the SRKBB (Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Behavior). As a result of modeling the seafarer behaviors by the type of vessels, it was established that there was a difference between the models, and the possibility of identifying the preferred path of the seafarer behaviors. Through these results, it is expected that the model implementation technique proposed in this study can be applied to the prediction of the behavior of the seafarer as well as contribute to the prioritization of the behavior correction among seafarers, which is necessary for the prevention of marine accidents.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.324-331
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• 2024

The height of large car and truck carriers from the keel to the wheel house is 44 ~ 46 m, and as the car-carriers increases in size, it exhibits the 'top heavy' characteristic, where the upper section is heavier than the lower section. This study aims to estimate the maximum outward heel angle of the Golden Ray car-carrier (G-ship) during turning maneuvers for accident investigation and the prevention of similar accidents. The theoretically calculated maximum outward heel is 7.5° (at 19 kn, rudder angle 35°) with a GM of +3.0 m or higher, and 16.7° with a GM of +1.85 m. Meanwhile the experimentally modified maximum outward heel is 10.5° (at 19 kn, rudder angle 35°) with a GM of +3.0 m or higher, and 23.3° with a GM of +1.85 m. The G-ship is maneuvered during an accident at a speed of 13 kn, at starboard rudder angle of 10° to 20°, it changes course from 038°(T) to 105°(T) based on the instructions of the on-board pilot. At this time, the maximum outward heel is estimated to be between 7.8° and 10.9° at the port side, which is 2.2 times higher than the normal outward heel. In the IS code, cargo ships are required to exhibit a minimum GoM of +0.15 m or more. The maneuvered G-ship exhibits a GoM of +1.72 m. It is not maneuvered because it fails to satisfy the international GoM criteria and because its GoM is insufficient to counteract the heeling moment during the maneuver. This study is performed based on accident-investigation results from the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal and the USCG.

• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.123-128
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• 2013

In spite of advanced navigational devices and reinforced mandatory standards of officers' education, the number of ship's accidents are increasing. The accidents caused by minor license officers are more than the number of accidents caused by superior license officers. There are many cases of collisions in the past 5 years released on Marine Accidents Inquiry Agency. Especially, officer's negligence from the consequences of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen is the main reason behind ship's collisions. For reducing ship's accidents caused by human error, this paper suggests to develop effective training program using analysis date of domestic and foreign education system as a reference.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.83-90
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• 2022

About 90.5 % of barge-towing tugs weigh less than 200 gross tonnage and most are served by the master alone. They are also not subject to the regulations on the working hours and manning levels stipulated in the Seafarers' Act. Therefore, the master of barge-towing tugs cannot take sufficient rest during the navigational watch. Moreover, barge-towing tugs do not satisfy the human seaworthiness due to the inevitable performance of the navigational watch which must be alternately undertaken with an unqualified person, called the "Boatswain". Furthermore, there are many cases in which the master or owner of a tug fails to comply with the additionally required minimum manning levels stipulated in the Ship Of icers' Act when a tug tows a barge. This study reviews the following: (1) the regulations on the working hours and manning levels that are stipulated in the Seafarers' Act, (2) the regulations on the minimum manning levels for ship of icers of the tug's deck part that are stipulated in the Ship officers' Act, (3) marine accidents in the barge-towing tugs. As a result I suggested that one additional deck officer should be on board when a tug tows a barge through the revision of the minimum manning level for ship of icer on the deck part in order to prevent marine accidents of tugs effectively. Especially, the Act on the Punishment, etc. of the Serious Accident came into effect on January 27, 2022. If marine casualties occur continuously at sea due by the same cause, and the cause of such marine casualties would be turned out by the fatigue of the ship of icer caused by insufficient institutional arrangements, the administrator of competent Authorities of Maritime and Port could be punished, so it seems to prepare for it.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.6
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• pp.946-954
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• 2022

More than half of barges have been surveyed and designated as an "unmanned barge". The main advantage of the unmanned barge is that it can carry more cargo equivalent to 25 percent of freeboard compared to that of a manned barge. In contrast, it needs an onboard crew barge because the bargeman is in charge of several tasks during sailing such as mooring or unmooring barges to or from a wharf, dropping and heaving up an anchor and turning on and of navigational lights and shapes. The instant recognition is that a tug assume the responsibility of operating a barge; however, different situations exist in which the shipper, as the operator of the barge, hires a tug. Although a tug might be a carrier of a barge under a specific contract, the master of the tug should fulfill his duty to complete its voyage. Most masters are not provided with the particulars of a barge and the information regarding the bargemen onboard, which is believed not to respect the master's authority and lead to an unintended violation of relevant laws. This paper presents three recommendations for resolving these issues: the policy approach for changing unmanned barges to manned barges, issuing a minimum safe manning certificate, and providing the master of tug information on the barge and the crew onboard. Thus, the proposed approach can be expected to improve the crew's working conditions, diminish the violation of the maximum number of persons onboard the barge, and ensure the authority of the master of tug through such recommendations.

• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.28 no.6
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• pp.1761-1771
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• 2016

In respect of the existing relation between Sea-going Vessels and Vessels at anchor, Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal has applied 'Ordinary Practice of Seamen' that is regulated by the article No. 2 of COLREG. That is, general navigation rule is not applied between the two vessels, and the action to avoid collision of vessels by utilizing experience knowledge of the seamen. However, the content of the Ordinary Practice of Seamen included in the revised plan in the process of 2011 "Maritime affairs Safety Act" revision was deleted in the screening of the Office of Legislation due to the reason that it could not specified when the content of deed is not concertized. Furthermore, prior application regulation of international treaty included in the existing "Sea Traffic Safety Act"(Article 5) was deleted in the screening of the National Assembly. So, doubt about whether the Ordinary Practice of Seamen could be continuously applied according to the regulation of the international treaty, nevertheless not specified in domestic law, has been continuously raised. In this situation, recently Central Maritime Safety Tribunal changed precedent by applying of Article 96(3) of Maritime Safety Act without applying Ordinary Practice of Seamen in the Case No. 2015-001. Accordingly, this study intended to review propriety of precedent change and legal issue with the decision of Central Maritime Safety Tribunal excluding Ordinary Practice of Seamen for a collision between Sea-going Vessels and Vessels at anchor.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.6
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• pp.918-927
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• 2022

The purpose of this study was to investigate the causes of collisions by examining 668 cases of merchant ship collision accidents that occurred during the past 12 years (2010-2021) and analyzed them statistically. Further, the analysis results were applied to propose a human error prevention collision avoidance (HEPCA) model. The statistical annual report of the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal (KMST) and the collision investigation report were investigated to collect data on the causes of collisions of merchant ships, and frequency analysis was performed using the statistical analysis tool, SPSS Statistics. In the first-stage analysis, the causes of collisions were analyzed targeting 668 merchant ship collision accidents, and in the second-stage analysis, the identified maximum frequency cause factors were analyzed in detail. The analysis results identified that 98 % of the cause of the collision was the human error of the navigator, and the highest frequency was in the order of neglect of look-out > violation of navigation regulations > improper maneuvering. The cause of the neglect of look-out was mainly neglecting continuous monitoring after the first recognition of the target ship. The HEPCA model for human error prevention was proposed by applying the analysis results to the collision case of the investigation report. The results of this study are expected to be used as educational materials at marine navigator educational institutions and in practice for avoiding collisions caused by human errors of navigators.

• Bulletin of the Society of Naval Architects of Korea
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• v.61 no.1
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• pp.16-29
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• 2024

2014년 4월 18일 오전 8시 48분경 전라남도 병풍도 인근 해역에서 세월호는 전복된 후 침몰하였다. 사고 당시 이 배에는 승객 443명과 선원 및 승무원 33명 모두 476명이 타고 있었고, 이 중 미수습자 5명을 포함하여304명이 생명을 잃었다. 그 동안 공식적인 사고원인 규명활동이 꾸준히 진행되어 이 사고의 원인을 규명하기 위한 조사가 네 차례 있었다. 하지만 아직까지 사고 원인이 무엇인지 명쾌하게 밝혀지지 않고 있다. 이 글에서는 먼저 그동안 있었던 네 차례의 공식적인 세월호 사고원인 규명활동을 정리하였다. 가장 먼저 사고원인 규명활동을 전개한 해양안전심판원 특별조사부는 2014년 사고 직후부터 그해 12월까지 활동하였다. 특별조사부 최종보고서에는 화물의 과적과 평형수 적재 부족으로 인한 선박복원성 기준 미달, 타각의 대각도 조타와 장시간 유지로 인한 부적절한 조타, 화물의 부실한 고박으로 인한 화물의 이동, 수밀문의 관리 부실로 인한 조기 침수와 비상대피장소(muster station)로의 승객대피 조치 미이행을 사고의 원인으로 들고 있다. 2015년 3월부터 2016년 6월까지 활동한 4·16세월호참사 특별조사위원회(특조위)는 '4·16 세월호 참사 특별 조사위원회 청산 백서'만을 간행하고 최종보고서를 제출하지 못한 채 활동을 종료하였다. 세월호 선체조사위원회(선조위)는 2017년 4월부터 2018년 8월까지 활동하였다. 선조위는 세월호 사고원인 규명을 위한 다른 기구에 비해 위원의 구성도 균형이 있었고, 직권사건 위주의 조사방법도 적절하였다. 또한 조타기와 조타 과실 여부, 급선회 항적 및 횡경사와 핀안정기의 물리적 손상에 관한 용역을 국내 여러 기관에 발주하였다. 뿐만 아니라 다양한 해양사고 원인규명 용역에 참여한 실적이 있는 영국의 기술용역회사인 Brookes Bell에 급선회와 빠른 침몰의 원인 조사를 요청하였다. 아울러 세계에서 가장 활발히 수조실험을 수행하고 있는 상업 연구소인 네덜란드의 MARIN에 수조시험과 시뮬레이션도 의뢰하였다. 하지만 아쉽게도 선조위는 서로 다른 사고 원인을 주장하는 두 권의 종합보고서를 간행하였다. 종합보고서로 '내인설' 종합보고서[6]는 타기 솔레노이드 밸브의 고착으로 시작된 급선회를 사고의 직접 원인으로 지목하고 있다. 하지만 '열린안' 종합보고서[7]에서는 수중체와의 충돌을 직접적인 사고 원인으로 밝히고 있다. 마지막으로 가습기살균제 사건과 4·16세월호 참사 특별조사위원회(사참위)가 2019년 3월부터 2022년 9월까지 활동하였다. 사참위는 위원으로 조선해양공학과 항해학 전문가가 포함되어 있지 않아 세월호의 사고원인 규명활동을 효과적으로 수행하기에는 적절하지 못하였다. 사참위는 주로 조타장치 고장에 따른 세월호 전타 선회현상 검증, 세월호 변형 손상부의 확인 및 원인 조사와 세월호 횡경사 원인과 침수과정 분석을 직권 과제로 추진하였다. 또한 네덜란드 MARIN에 자유항주시험을 추가로 의뢰하였으며, 핀란드의 NAPA group에도 복원성 계산과 침수해석을 의뢰하였다. 사참위는 선조위의 두 가지 사고원인에 대해 '내인설'의 솔레노이드 밸브 고착은 사고원인일 가능성이 매우 낮고, '열린안'의 수중체와의 충돌 시나리오는 근거가 부족함을 확인하였다. 이상에서 정리한 바와 같이 규명활동이 진행됨에 따라 사고원인이 수렴되어야 함에도 불구하고 아직까지 원인을 시원하게 밝히지 못하고 있다. 이 글에서는 사고원인 규명활동을 수행한 네 개 기구의 구성과 활동 내용을 비교하고, 사고조사 위원회의 바람직한 구성과 위원회의 운영 방법을 제시하고 있다. 또한 Brookes Bell 보고서에 수록된 출항 당시의 흘수에 근거한 배수량과 선미 램프의 폐쇄 전후의 횡경사각으로부터 도출한 GoM도 소개하고 있다. 아울러 출항 당시의 GoM값으로 추정한 사고 당시의 GoM값도 소개하고 있고, 수중체와의 충돌 시나리오를 후보 사고 시나리오에서 제외시켜야 할 이유도 열거하고 있다. 끝으로 해양사고 원인규명 활동이 보다 과학적으로 그리고 보다 합리적으로 이루어질 수 있기 위해 그리고 우리 사회의 안전문화 제고를 위한 몇 가지의 방안을 제시하고 있다. 또한 세월호 사고로 치른, 아직도 치르고 있는 희생을 딛고 해양안전문화가 한 걸음 더 나아가기 위해서는 세월호 사고의 원인을 반드시 규명해야 한다는 말씀으로 글을 마무리하고 있다.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.26-32
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• 2017

Enlargement and speed-up of a ship and diversification of ship's type have served to greatly increase the importance of marine transport means. It's reported that accident occurrence frequency of collision is high next to engine damage among the ship accident types, and that the accident ratio according to human factors is also high. In addition, ship accidents come to occur caused by complex cause factors rather than a sole cause factor, it is necessary to investigate the cause factors through the written verdict. This study proposed the cause factors of collision ship accident on the basis of human factors in collision ship accident among the written verdicts provided by the Korean Maritime Safety Tribunal, and inquired into the cause factor and effect through the correlation analysis of accident occurrence factors. Also, this study predicted the collision accident through analyzed the major cause factor of the occurrence at the zero minute when collision on the basis of the time taken from the time point of detecting collision of ships to the time point of collision occurrence. This study used commercial software-Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS Ver21.0) to do correlation analysis. For time analysis, this study analyzed the cause factor and time by analyzing the time taken from the time point of detected ships to the time point of collision occurrence on the basis of the written verdicts. The study analysis showed that there were many cases of collision ship accidents occurrence caused by more than two sorts of cause factors, and that the case (zero minute) where there is no time to spare for collision avoidance accounted for 36.1 %, and negligence in guard or surveillance of the other ship, and sailing while drowsy, or drinking was a contributor to an accident. Poor watch keeping is very strong relationship with pool ready for sail.