• 법제연구
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• 제55호
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• pp.193-237
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• 2018

최근 우리정부를 상대로 제기되고 있는 ISD 소송이 갑자기 증가하면서 소송의 진행상황에 따라 국내적으로 큰 혼란이 초래될 가능성이 크다. 이는 ISD 소송에서 외국인 투자자가 우리나라를 상대로 청구한 손해배상액이 수조원에 이른 경우가 대부분이기 때문이다. 심리가 이미 완료된 '론 스타사건'이나 최근 중재신청을 한 '엘리엇/메이슨 사건'의 소송결과가 나오면 소송의 승패에 따라 국제투자협정에 포함된 ISD 소송제도 자체의 폐기를 주장하는 여론도 분명히 생겨날 것이다. 전 세계적으로 체결되고 있는 대부분의 BIT, FTA에 일반적으로 포함되고 있는 ISD조항은 다수의 투자분쟁사례에서 보여주듯이 우리 정부의 공공정책을 제한하는 요소가 될 수 있다는 점은 분명하다. 하지만 이 제도가 반대로 우리나라의 해외투자자들을 현지국의 위법 부당한 조치로부터 보호할 수 있는 장치라는 점에서 ISD라는 소송제도 자체를 부정적인 시각으로만 볼 필요는 없는 것으로 판단된다. 우리나라는 이미 많은 국가들과 FTA와 BIT를 통해 ISD 소송제도를 허용하고 있고, 또한 새로운 국가들과도 FTA를 체결하기 위한 협상이 진행되는 상황이므로 향후 우리 정부의 공공정책에 대해 외국인 투자자가 ISD 소송절차에 회부할 가능성은 더 크게 증가할 것이다. 우리정부는 ISD 소송에 대비하기 위하여 중앙정부의 소관 부처에 정부 실무가와 민간 학자, 법조인 등 전문가 그룹으로 구성된 대응팀을 발족하여 ISD 소송에서 이슈가 되는 주요 법적 쟁점들을 검토하여 법리를 구축하고, 분쟁이 발생하면 동 대응팀을 가동하여 법리적으로 소송을 지원하고 소송의 증가에 대응할 수 있는 시스템을 갖출 필요가 있다. 특히 국제투자규범과 ISD 제도의 중요성을 인식하지 못하고 있는 지방자치단체 및 각종 공공기관들이 공공정책을 입안하고 시행하는 전 과정이 BIT, FTA 등 국제투자규범에 부합할 수 있도록 관련 정보를 공유하고, 교육함으로써 사전에 ISD 소송을 예방하기 위한 대책을 마련할 필요가 있다.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제68권
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• pp.89-121
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• 2015

Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권4호
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• pp.3-23
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• 2015

The Chevron saga including Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron I") and Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron II") started out of domestic litigations between TexPet and Ecuador in the early 1990s. In Chevron I, the Tribunal decided that Article 2(7) of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT on effective means of provision was breached because of undue delays in the seven legal proceedings TexPet had brought against Ecuador in respect to contractual obligations. In Chevron II, it was contended that through the actions and inactions of the judiciary and the executive, Ecuador breached her several obligations under the BIT. Ecuador objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because TexPet's investment was terminated in 1992, and because Chevron is not a party to the 1995 Settlement Agreement and 1998 Final Release. In its Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Tribunal applied a prima facie standard to the facts alleged by the Claimants but denied by the Respondent, and decided that questions in respect of the Respondent's jurisdictional objections should be joined to the merits under Article 21(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the merits phase of Chevron II, the Tribunal divided the merits of the Parties' dispute into two parts, entitled "Track 1" and "Track 2". In its Partial Award on Track 1, the Tribunal decided that Chevron is a "Releasee" under the 1995 Settlement Agreement. In a decision on "Track 1B", the Tribunal decided that the Lago Agrio complaint cannot be read as pleading "exclusively" or "only" diffuse claims, and that, to this extent, the Claimants' reliance on the 1995 Settlement Agreement as a complete bar to the Lago Agrio complaint must fail, as a matter of Ecuadorian law. The Tribunal maintained the position that the Parties' disputes on both merit and jurisdiction should be reserved for Track 2. It remains to be seen how the Tribunal addresses the Claimants' allegations of multiple denials of justice under international law against the judgments of the Respondent's Courts, together with the Respondent's jurisdictional objections in Track 2 of the arbitration.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제38권
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• pp.181-226
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• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to describe the settling procedures of the investor-state disputes in the FTA Investment Chapter, and to research on the international arbitration system for the settlement of the investor-state disputes under the ICSID Convention and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The UNCTAD reports that the cumulative number of arbitration cases for the investor-state dispute settlement is 290 cases by March 2008. 182 cases of them have been brought before the ICSID, and 80 cases of them have been submitted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID reports that the cumulative 263 cases of investor-state dispute settlement have been brought before the ICSID by March 2008. 136 cases of them have been concluded, but 127 cases of them have been pending up to now. The Chapter 11 Section B of the Korea-U.S. FTA provides for the Investor_State Dispute Settlement. Under the provisions of Section B, the claimant may submit to arbitration a claim that the respondent has breached and obligation under Section A, an investment authorization or an investment agreement and that the claimant has incurred loss or damage by reason of that breach. Provided that six months have elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim referred to under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings; under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The ICSID Convention provides for the jurisdiction of the ICSID(Chapter 2), arbitration(Chapter 3), and replacement and disqualification of arbitrators(Chapter 5) as follows. The jurisdiction of the ICSID shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the ICSID. Any Contracting State or any national of a Contracting State wishing to institute arbitration proceedings shall address a request to that effect in writing to the Secretary General who shall send a copy of the request to the other party. The tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number of arbitrators appointed as the parties shall agree. The tribunal shall be the judge of its own competence. The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. Any arbitration proceeding shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention Section 3 and in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration. The award of the tribunal shall be in writing and shall be signed by members of the tribunal who voted for it. The award shall deal with every question submitted to the tribunal, and shall state the reason upon which it is based. Either party may request annulment of the award by an application in writing addressed to the Secretary General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The award shall be binding on the parties and shall not be subject to any appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in this Convention. Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State. In conclusion, there may be some issues on the international arbitration for the settlement of the investor-state disputes: for example, abuse of litigation, lack of an appeals process, and problem of transparency. Therefore, there have been active discussions to address such issues by the ICSID and UNCITRAL up to now.