• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.101-128
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• 2018

While there are various opinions about the relationship of Schiller's thought and Kant's, it is undeniable that Schiller owes much to Kant. What distinguished Schiller from other Weimar thinkers at his time, such as Goethe, Herder and Wieland, was that unlike them Schiller accepted Kant's project of critical philosophy. In fact, Schiller did not just accept it, but tried to interpret and formulate anew the relation of beauty and morality and some other aesthetical-ethical ideals on the basis of the new philosophy. Schiller's famous project of 'aesthetic education of mankind' itself is the product of such an endeavor. In this work we follow the history of Schiller's acceptance of Kant's critical philosophy and ruminate over its implications. And then, we'll show that Schiller's 'beautiful soul' in Grace and Dignity (1793), which is often suggested to be a proof of Schiller's conflict with Kant, was understood on the basis of Kant's moral theory. In this part of the work, we compare Schiller's ideal of the 'beautiful soul' and Shaftesbury's ethical thought, which is often presumed to be its background. From this comparison we'll be able to see that there is a considerable disparity, despite apparent similarities, between Schiller's and Shaftesbury's ethical ideals, which is due to their respective philosophical sources, that is neo-platonic metaphysics and Kant's critical philosophy.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.25-52
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• 2013

In this thesis, the author will examine how modern philosophical expression manifests in the field of ethics based on Kant's Ethics. The author will critically assess whether Kant's Ethics is an appropriate rational theoretical alternative to overcome today's ecological crisis. In the first section, the author lists the characteristics of modernity. The purpose of this section is to show why Kant's Ethics must be understood in the context of modern age and how his ethics expresses the ideology of the modernity(I). In the second section, the author will analyze the challenge Kant's Ethics face in relation to ecological crisis from the context of dualism between person and thing(II). In the last section, the author will inspect the flaw of Kant's Ethics based on his positive position regarding vicarious duties toward animals, and pose the basic direction of the theory of ecological publicness that can overcome the limits of Kant's Ethics in the context of a critical reconstruction of neo-confucian tradition(III).

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.79-110
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• 2010

In this paper I will consider the Rousseauistic origin of Knat's theory of Freedom. Kant's autonomous freedom which is the main theme of the Critique of practical Reason have three characteristic elements, namely spontaneity, self-lawmaking and universal validity. Rousseau mentions three kinds of freedom in his works. Natural freedom which is treated in Discourse on the origin of inequality is freedom which a man in natural state have. I proved that natural freedom is the origin of Kant's theory of spontaneity that is a essential part of autonomous freedom. Social freedom which is treated in Social contract is deeply connected with general will. General will is the power of self-lawmaking. We can easily conclude that Rousseau's social freedom is the origin of Kant's theory of self-legislation which is another essential part of autonomous freedom. The last essential part of Kant's autonomous freedom is universality that is inseparably connected with Rousseau's moral freedom which is largely mentioned in Emlie.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.120
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• pp.217-250
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• 2018

Subjekt oder $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ ist ein grundlegendes Prinzip neuzeitlicher Philosophie. Das $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ ist bei Kant $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$(analytische Einheit der Apperzeption als klare Selbstbeziehung) in Objekts $bewu{\ss}tsein$(synthetischer Einheit der Apperzeptuion). Dabei zeigt er ein Reflexionsmodell des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$. Aber er $erkl{\ddot{a}}rt$ nicht systematisch ein $Verh{\ddot{a}}ltnis$ zwischen synthetischer Einheit und analytischer Einheit der Apperzeption, und auch $l{\ddot{o}}st$ er nicht theorienimmanente und formale Schwierigkeiten von Zirkelargument bzw. unendlicher Iteration in der Reflxionsstruktur des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$. Aufgrund der Voraussetzungen seiner eigenen Fundamentalontologie kritisiert der $fr{\ddot{u}}he$ Heidegger, $da{\ss}$ Kants $traditionsabh{\ddot{a}}ngige$ $Subjektivit{\ddot{a}}tstheorie$ Symptome der Seins vergessenheit zeigt, transformiert Kants $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseinstheorie$, interpretiert Kants transformierte Theorie als $subjektivit{\ddot{a}}tstheoretische$ $Begr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ der traditionellen Ontologie von Vorhandenheit, und versteht sie als ersten Schritt und erstes phlosophisches Modell seiner Fundamentalontologie. Durch kritische Interpretation von Kants Lehre von Selbstaffektion und $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ deutet er ein Modell des $Selbstbewu{\ss}tseins$ als des $ph{\ddot{a}}nomenologischen$ $Horizontsbewu{\ss}tseins$ an. In diesem Modell der vorreflexiven und unmittelbaren Selbstbeziehung entstehen Schwierigkeiten von Zirkelargument bzw. unendlicher Iteration nicht. Apel kritisiert Kants $selbstbewu{\ss}te$ Apperzeptionstheorie in dem Sinne, $da{\ss}$ sie solipsistisch sei, und in seiner Transzendentalpragmatik $vervollst{\ddot{a}}ndigt$ er Kants transzendentalphilosophische $G{\ddot{u}}ltigkeit$ in der Dimension von $Intersubjektivit{\ddot{a}}t$ diskurierender Menschen. Hierbei ersetzt die Kommunikationsgemeinschaft Kants Apperzeption oder $Bewu{\ss}tsein$ ${\ddot{u}}berhaupt$. In der transzendentalpragmatischen Sicht, die auf den sprachlichen Bezug des Denkens und Erkennens und die Kommunikationsgemeinschaft geht, beruht das $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$ oder die Reflexion des Subjekts wesentlich auf seinem sprachlich vermittelten sozialen Bezug. Also geht es nicht um Zirkelargument und unendliche Iteration in denkender Selbstbeziehung des Subjekts. Ebeling hebt Heideggers Daseinsanalytik auf das Niveau von Apels Transzendentalpragmatik an und entwickelt Fundamatalpragmatik ${\ddot{u}}ber$ $Widerstandsbewu{\ss}tsein$ gegen allgemeinen Tod. Dieser $Widerstandsbewu{\ss}tsein$ ist fundamentalpragmatische Transformation von Kants $Selbstbewu{\ss}tsein$. Der $Widerstandsbewu{\ss}tsein$ der Vernunft bleibt in der solipsistischen Dimension nicht und ist ein $Bewu{\ss}tsein$, das in der Widerstandsgemeinschaft durch Argumentation universalisiert werden kann. Hierbei geht es nicht um Zirkelargument und unendliche Iteration.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.34
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• pp.363-385
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• 2009

I criticize Mou's moral metaphysics and propose the alternative depending on Kant's analysis on the sublime. (1) Mou's moral metaphysics conflicts with the scientific world view. (2) Kant's 'aesthetic space' does not conflict with the scientific world view. Futhermore, Kant's 'aesthetic space' satisfies the conditions which Mou's moral metaphysics requires. (3) Mencius's autonomous morality is not sufficient for justifying the moral law or categorical imperative. (4) At this point, the sublime plays the important role in bridging between nature and morality. (5) In Kant's context, the possibility of the autonomous moral action is achieved on the basis of the educated feeling of the sublime.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.27-51
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• 2016

According to Kant, morality is an institution that preserves and promotes humanity. However, some pathologies can be found in morality. Nietzsche is the one who severely criticized pathologies of morality, especially in terms of the phenomenon of "self-deception". Those who support Kantian tradition, can also learn from Nietzsche's criticism. But they regard "respect" as the fundamental moral attitude. This is different from Nietzsche's "pathos of distance", which is based on disrespect and contempt.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.401-421
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• 2008

The purpose of this paper is to examine the achieved role of Kant philosophy in restructuring Deleuze philosophy from either a positive or effective perspectives. On top of this foundation, I will demonstrate the major part largely unknown in a composing structural elements of Deleuze philosophy as follows: 1. I will draw a bird's-eye view of the triad of Bergson, Nietsche, and Spinoza regarding Deleuze philosophy. Especially I will spare time in analyzing Deleuze's late works like and then demonstrate the structure of Deleuze movie philosophy. 2. The line of Kant's position in that circumstance will be clarified as well. 3. Through that, the meaning of Kantian attempt and its effect will be examined. Finally the connecting Kant with various levels of Deleuze's Copernicusian revolutions based on will certainly bring about a meaningful fruitification.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.137
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• pp.151-191
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• 2016

Kant and Lacan strongly criticized the epistemological premise of formal logic. However, Lacan was opposed to Kant in terms of subject, object, knowledge and truth. From the viewpoint of Kant's transcendental logic, formal logic does not have the ability to represent the nature of truth. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of Lacan's psychoanalytic logic, Kant's transcendental logic misunderstands or only partially represents the state of things. But I would like to try to criticize the epistemological premise of the two forms of logic. Transcendental logic takes the evident and new function in that it has studied the necessary condition of content rather than the form of thinking which formal logic considers as his object of study. Transcendental logic evidently studies the categories which dominate our way of thinking. Can we say that the 12 categories which Kant provided are sufficient in explaining the necessity of thinking? Lacan's psychoanalytic logics tells us that Kant's categories are only a kind of metaphor related with hypothesis that tries to explain the possibility of synthetical judge a priori. Is Lacan's psychoanalytic logic sufficient in explaining the possibility of science? It is not sufficient in explaining the objectivity and strictness of science, for it depends on metaphor and metonymy which are useful to literature and unconsciousness. I would like to try to synthesize Kant's transcendental and Lacan's psychoanalytic logic in terms of structure-constructivism which combines both formal and dialectical logic, which is consistent with the ideal of human science, and not blinkered science. My conclusion is that Kant's ethical and esthetical theory should be modified though Lacan's psychoanalytic logic, and Lacan's theory of the unconsciousness revised by Kant's transcendental logic.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.34
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• pp.339-362
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• 2009

If we try to define the concept of beauty in the large sense, as Kant and Chaung-tzu all agree, It can not be fixed in the one sense, but whose connotation and denotation should be extended infinitely. In this sense, I would like to say that the beauty is liberty. Aesthetics of Kant is oriented toward subjective and reflexive dimension, while that of Chuang-tzu is oriented toward natural and practical one. The difference between aesthetics of the two philosophers begins from their philosophical methodology. If the transcendental methode which is proper to Kant's philosophy prefers to discriminate and devide everything especially from dichotomic viewpoint by langage. But Chuang-tzu' methode called Za-Mang criticizes such a dichotomic division and langage itself. Even so, the two in the long run agree as to the foundation of beauty. But Kant's liberty is one of will or transcendental, meanwhile that of Chuang-tzu is based on recognize the fact that we are all production of nature. according to Chuang-tzu, in the great beginning, there was non-being. It had neither being nor name. The One originates from it. When things obtain it and come into existence. As the One, Tao is in the excrement and urine. Everything is under the constant flux. All species have originative or moving power. Although the universe is vast, its transformation is uniform. Because all things are one. Vacuity, tranquillity, mellowness, quietness, and taking no action characterize the things of universe at peace and represent the ultimate of Tao and virtue. The material was transformed to be form, form was transformed to become life, and now life has transformed to become death. A basic principle of Chuang-tzu's art is expressed in the phrase "taking off clothes and squatting down bare-backed". The key of Chuang-tzu's aesthetics is to dedicate to the expression of inner spirit instead of physical verisimilitude, and painting should be a spontaneous and instantaneous flow of the brush. Kant's concepts such as "disinterested" and "purposiveness of nature" seem to imply in the long run the unification of nature and human being which is fundament to Chuang-tzu's aesthetics.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.177-212
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• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.