• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• Cross-Cultural Studies
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• v.52
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• pp.79-110
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• 2018

This purpose of this study was to address the issue of forgiving unforgivable crimes, inevitably raised in Paul Ricoeur's thoughts. He explores the possibility of righteous historical representation of tragic events in Western history. Being aware of injustices of amnesty indiscriminately extended by the government, he studied the process through in which a genuine pardon should unfold before granting amnesty. He believes that this process called the "odyssey of forgiveness" presupposes the process of "imputability," in which the perpetrator should acknowledge his/her wrongdoing as his/her act and take reasonable responsibilities for it in a modest position. However, such acknowledgement of wrongdoing cannot be any reason for the victim to necessarily grant forgiveness to the perpetrator. According to him, forgiveness is a gift and the power of love enabled by a complete forgiver only. The initiative of forgiveness is attributable to the forgiver only. To never relinquish tension between love and justice in the forgiving process, he devises a way of planning an equation of forgiveness in a vertical scheme. Finally, he explains the process of requesting and granting forgiveness in a form of a righteous historical representation against the oblivion of past tragic events. He contends that this event of forgiveness promises a new life and a new era to all seeking and granting forgiveness, and that write a righteous history in eschatological hope.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.51-82
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• 2017

In Meditation II, Descartes questions "sed quid igitur sum" ("But what then am I?"). To this question to rule our essence, A. Clark insists that "We are soft selves". The idea by Clark is a spontaneous conclusion of the extended mind theory stating that cognitive process, cognitive state, and self may be extended over biological organisms. However, it seems that it is difficult for the extended self to have the qualifications as a moral agent. There have been disputes about expandability of cognitive process and cognitive state, but there have not been many disputes about the possibility of accountability of behavior by the extended self. First of all, in this thesis, it will be revealed that the extended self through the analysis of metaphorical theories and the ontological essence of agent and behavior by G. Lakoff and M. Johnson is just metaphorical rhetoric, which is not suitable for rational comprehension of ontological essence of agent and behavior. Moreover, the analysis of problem about artificial moral agent (AMA) proposes the "Strong First-person Viewpoint" as a requirement of the agent. Finally, the concept of extended self will be shown to be unsuitable for theoretical explanation of us, and the concept of human person will be proposed as an alternative solution.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.118
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• pp.25-51
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• 2017

The purpose of this article is to elucidate Plotinus' concept of freedom. Particular attention is paid to two terms, 'what is self-determined' (to autexousion) and 'what is up to us' (to $eph^{\prime}h{\hat{e}}min$), which Plotinus employs in order to articulate the meaning of freedom. It is shown that freedom in Plotinus consists in the power of doing whatever one wills while willing the good. We first situate Plotinus' concept of freedom in the Socratic tradition. Next we investigate how Plotinus and Alexander of Aphrodisias conceptualize freedom in terms of self-determination in the context of criticizing determinism. It is shown that Alexander tries to secure the psychological grounds for human moral responsibility by introducing a causally undetermined power of choice between alternatives. In contrast, Plotinus is interested in psychological conditions that allow humans to do the right thing. For this purpose, he establishes the concept of will ($boul{\hat{e}}sis$) as the power of wanting and choosing the best. We then try to clarify his claim that free will cannot choose otherwise by appealing to his concept of divine freedom, which idealizes the power of doing one's best and being oneself at one's best. Finally, we discuss Plotinus' view of the limitations and possibilities of human freedom and indicate its practical implications. In conclusion we claim that Plotinus pleads for an active way of living which spreads inner freedom out into the world, rather than living in seclusion so as to protect an inner freedom which is pure.