• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.674-678
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• 2007

Baldwin defined the approximate reasoning using truth function mapping. In paper [4], we defined two truth function mappings and applied these truth function mappings to generalized modus ponens. In this paper, we introduce the results of generalized modus tollens using these two truth function mappings.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.198-202
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• 2006

In this paper, we introduce Baldwin's approximate reasoning with fuzzy logic and some truth function mappings usually used in Baldwin's method. And we introduce some assessment criteria for approximate reasonings and we define some truth function mappings which satisfy more criteria than those which are already known.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.347-380
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• 2013

In this paper I will try to show how Wittgenstein criticized Frege's theory of meaning. Frege's theory of meaning can be compressed as sense-reference theory. Frege distinguishes between sense and reference on all the linguistic expressions. In particular, he regards that a sentence has sense and reference. This distinction was raised from, so to speak, the problem of identity sentences. Wittgenstein's "fundamental thought" of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the key of his direct criticism of Frege's sense-reference theory. That is, it is an attack on Frege's thought that the reference of a sentence is a truth value and truth values are "objects themselves" (in Frege's meaning). According to Wittgenstein, such an object does not exist and according to his picture theory, the function of a name and that of a proposition are fundamentally different. By the way, Frege can reply justly to this criticism that it is insufficient. In short, Frege's 'sense' and 'reference' etc, are the technical terms. Hence Wittgenstein's decisive criticism of Frege's theory consists in accusing his theory of logical flaws. There is an another route to the sense and reference of a sentence which Frege introduces. In discourses of judgement stroke and content stroke in his Begriffsshrift and in those of horizontal stroke since his "Function and Concept", Frege deals with the sense and reference of a sentence. Wittgenstein criticize that the sense of a complex sentence such as ~p would by no means be determined by Frege's determination.