• The KIPS Transactions:PartB
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• v.17B no.3
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• pp.189-196
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• 2010

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) has attracted attention as an alternative way to enable streaming videos on the Internet. Although P2P systems depend on bandwidth contribution from peers, peers are likely to refuse to contribute their bandwidth. In this paper, we proposed a P2P streaming system that encourages peers to contribute their upstream bandwidth by maintaining fairness among peers and providing different video quality between cooperative peers and selfish peers with a manageable way. Our proposed system determines if peers are cooperative or selfish by a rating mechanism based on their contributed upstream bandwidth, and offers a high quality video to cooperative peers as an incentive. Also we propose a tree reconstruction algorithm to make the system work effectively. Through simulation, we show that the tree reconstruction algorithm works effectively, and our incentive mechanism allocates more downstream bandwidth to cooperative peers and punished selfish peers with low quality video.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.42 no.2
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• pp.219-227
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• 2022

In Korea, as the aging phenomenon accelerates, the problem of traffic accidents related to the elderly is continuously emerging. Efforts to improve this are being implemented, but unfortunately the results of these effects are not clear. Therefore, in this study, the effect of traffic characteristics and incentive policies on the return of driver's licenses of elderly drivers was reviewed. As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that the intention to return the driver's license was low in the case of men, older people, those with low dependence on public transportation, those who undertook long driving hours, and those who took frequent trips. On the other hand, financial incentives were found to play a positive role with regard to the intention to return the driver's license. However, the effect is expected to be insignificant for those with a low intention to return the driver's license. As a result, under the current policy, it is predicted that there is a limit to improving the social problems caused by elderly drivers, meaning that it is necessary to review approaches that induce the return of their driver's licenses.

• Proceedings of the KHMA Conference
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• 2002.11a
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• pp.134-139
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• 2002

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.342-349
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• 2002

This paper presents the determination of incentive level of Direct Load Control (DLC) program based on California Test. In the most of the Demand-Side Management (DSM) program, the variables art given by constant value during the DSM program's life time. But, in the case of DLC, variables are depen-dent on the executing number and time of the DLC per year. Therefore, we formulate a newly designed Cal-ifornia Test technique to overcome these problems and to apply effectively to the determination of incentive level of the DLC program. We perform case studies for various scenarios using a proposed formulation and review incentive level of the current DLC program. And we propose a plan to activate the DLC program in the competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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• 2006.11a
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• pp.284-288
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• 2006

Ministry of Construction & Transportation prescribes that all of the construction works including Design-Build whose cost more than then billion won must be applied VE at the design phase. It is difficult to apply VE at the design development phase to design-build projects under current design-build contract because design should be proceeded with fixed price by bidding. Therefore the present study suggests an application of incentive which can maximize the effectiveness of design VE in design-build projects after analysing current design-build's characteristics and difficulties of design VE application.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.25-47
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• 2010

CS is one of the major concerns of managers in the world because it is well known to be a key medium construct for firms' superior outcome. One of the major agents for CS management is retailers. Firms try to manage not only employees but also retailers to promote CS behaviors. And so diverse incentives are used to promote their CS behaviors under diverse channel setting such as multi-channel. However in spite of the rising needs there has been scarce studies on the optimal incentive structure for a manufacturer to offer competing retailers at the multi-channel. In this paper, we try to find better way for a manufacturer to promote the competing retailers' CS behaviors. We investigated how to promote the retailers' CS behavior via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the possible incentive, CS bonus type reward introduced in the studies of Hauser, Simester, and Wernerfelt(1994) and Chu and Desai(1995). We build up a multi stage complete information game and derive a subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. Stages of the game are as following. (Stage 1) Manufacturer sets wholesale price(w) and CS bonus($\eta$). (Stage 2) Both retailers in competition set CS effort level($e_i$) and retail price($p_i$) simultaneously. (Stage 3) Consumers make purchasing decisions based on the manufacturer's initial reputation and retailers' CS efforts.

• Agrochemical news magazine
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• v.24 no.10 s.193
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• pp.18-22
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• 2003

• 월간산업보건
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• s.268
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• pp.28-38
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• 2010

사람들은 일반적으로 건강증진에 대해 오랜 기간이 소요되는 무형의 이익 효과보다는 소요되는 금전적, 시간적 비용 투자를 보다 크게 생각하는 경향이 있다. 행동경제학(bahavioral economics)에서는 이러한 경향을 현재우선편견(present-biased preference)이라고 정의하고 있다. 사람들은 의사결정 과정에서 미래의 비용과 이득보다는 현재 상황에서 발생하는 비용과 이득에 보다 큰 비중을 둔다는 것이다. 아러한 편견은 미래에 발생할 수도 있는 심각한 건강문제로 겪게 되는 막대한 비용요인보다 현재의 흡연에 따른 즉각적인 정신적 쾌감이나 당장의 즉각적인 즐거움을 보다 우선시하는 상황을 설명해준다. 대부분의 사람들은 측정가능하고 눈으로 당장 확인활 수 있는 이득에 대해 보다 쉽게 동기부여가 이뤄진다는 것이다. 따라서 이 때 주어지는 경제적 인센티브는 당장의 건강증진 행위를 실천하는데 소요되는 금전적, 시간적 비용부담을 줄여주는 효과를 제공활 수 있다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.07a
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• pp.830-831
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• 2007

부하의 가격에 대한 높은 반응성(price-responsiveness)과 이를 이끌어 낼 수 있는 적절한 수요관리(demand response) 정책은 구조 개편된 전력 시장에서 가격 변동성 및 설비에 대한 투자 부족 문제를 효과적으로 해결하는 데 필수적이라는 데에는 많은 연구자들이 동의하고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 특히 전력 사용을 미리 계획하지 않는 소규모 소비자들의 경우, 전력 소비가 본질적으로 매우 탄력적이지 못하므로(inelastic) 가격에 민감한 부하를 이끌어 내기 위한 수요관리 정책은 신중하게 세워져야 한다. 본 논문은 최종 소비자에게 전력을 제공하면서 critical peak pricing(CPP)를 동적으로 관리하고 이러한 수요관리에 대한 인센티브를 가진 개체를 도입함으로써 가격에 민감한 부하를 이끌어 내는 수요 반응의 접근법을 제시할 것이다. 가격에 민감한 부하 및 수요 반응 정책의 문제는 정책적, 경제적, 기술적 측면에서 검토되어야 하는 바이나, 본 논문에서는 기술적 측면 및 경제적인 인센티브의 수식화에 초점을 맞추었다. 정책에 인센티브를 가진 개체의 이윤 방정식을 세움으로써 문제를 정식화하였으며, 문제의 최적 해를 구하기 위해 예측 가격을 바탕으로 backward dynamic programming을 통한 swing option 평가 기법을 사용하여 최적의 수요관리 시점을 구해야 함을 제안하는 바이다.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.28 no.6
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• pp.131-149
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• 2023

In light of the COVID-19 incident, organizations have recognized the importance of systematically managing knowledge resources to enhance work efficiency and performance within the organization. We have adopted the perspective of knowledge hoarding, which entails the ownership of individual knowledge, and aim to elucidate the underlying mechanisms that contribute to knowledge hoarding by considering the organizational environment, personal characteristics, and task characteristics. To test our hypothesis, we conducted a survey among employees working in companies that have implemented knowledge management policies or systems. We obtained a total of 381 samples, which were analyzed using AMOS 22.0 and Process 3.1 macros. Our findings reveal that distributive injustice leads to conflicts relationships and subsequently increases individual knowledge hoarding. Furthermore, we found that sensitivity to incentive interacts with distributive injustice, further exacerbating knowledge hoarding. Conversely, task interdependence mitigates knowledge hoarding by interacting with distributive injustice and relation conflict. These results contribute to the development of effective organizational knowledge management strategies aimed at curbing knowledge hoarding within the organization.