• Title/Summary/Keyword: 인센티브제도

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국제산업안전보건 동향 - 유럽 산업안전보건 인센티브제도 가이드 개발

  • 대한산업안전협회
    • The Safety technology
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    • no.173
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    • pp.74-74
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    • 2012
  • 유럽 산업안전보건청은 위험성평가에 기초한 예방을 산업안전보건의 기본으로 인식하고, 사업장 안전보건 향상을 위한 인센티브제도 가이드를 개발. 산재예방을 위한 우수사례의 적용을 위해 인센티브제도의 필요성을 인식하고 성공적인 인센티브제도의 정착을 위한 실행 모델을 소개.

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Quantitative Analysis of Port Incentive Effect: Focusing on Busan Port (항만인센티브제도의 효과에 대한 정량적 분석: 부산항을 중심으로)

  • Ha, Myung-Sin;Kim, Chul-Min;Chang, Byoung-Ky
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.27 no.2
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    • pp.355-372
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    • 2011
  • Various incentive policies for transshipment cargo have been enforced without any evaluation of the effectiveness. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of volume incentive on container transshipment cargo. To be different from previous studies, this study tries to quantitatively assess the incentive effects by using econometric techniques. The result derived from the ARIMA type models indicates that the total amount of the increased transshipment cargo during the last 7 years is about one million TEU. In the meanwhile, the multivariate long run equilibrium model implies that the increased transshipment cargo is less than 0.5 million TEU for the 7 years. Furthermore, the structural break tests indicate that the volume incentive does not change the model structures. It means that the effect of volume incentive is not statistically significant. Consequently, the test results conclude the effect of volume incentive on transshipment cargo is not significant although the volume of transshipment cargo is increased to some extent by volume incentive. Considering the magnitude of BPA's expenditure, we doubt the effectiveness of volume incentive. This study, therefore, encourages the port authority to research a more efficient way to induce transshipment cargo rather than focusing on only volume incentives.

창업휴직제도가 개인의 기업벤처링 활동에 미치는 영향

  • 손하늬
    • 한국벤처창업학회:학술대회논문집
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    • 2023.11a
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    • pp.107-110
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    • 2023
  • 인센티브는 조직 내 개인의 동기와 행동에 영향을 미쳐 조직의 목표를 달성하는 데에 중요한 역할을 한다. 기존 문헌에서는 이러한 관점에서 개인의 다양한 동기를 충족시킬 수 있는 경제적, 사회적 보상에 대하여 논의해왔다. 반면, 직업안정성이 개인에게 기업가적 동기를 가진 개인에게 어떠한 인센티브로 작용할 수 있는지에 대한 내용은 간과된 측면이 있다. 본 연구는 창업휴직제도가 직업안정성이라는 비금전적 인센티브로 작용하여, 기업가적 동기를 가진 직원들의 기업벤처링(Corporate Venturing) 활동 참여에 긍정적인 영향을 줄 수 있는지 여부를 조사한다. 본 연구는 전통적인 인적자원관리 문헌에서 비금전적 인센티브를 통해 개인의 일탈과 이직을 방지하려는 관점과는 달리, 개인이 일을 중단하는 것을 허가하는 '창업휴직제도' 자체가 비금전적 인센티브로서 개인이 혁신 성과를 증가시킬 수 있다는 점에 집중한다. 정부출연연구소 내부 기업벤처링 프로그램에 참여한 세 명과의 개인 인터뷰를 통해 이러한 가설을 지지할만한 단서를 발견하였으며, 이를 바탕으로 향후 실험 연구를 통해 실증 분석을 진행하고자 한다.

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Allocating the Budget of Port Incentives for Customers (항만 인센티브 예산의 합리적 배분방법)

  • Park, Byung-In
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.32 no.3
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    • pp.139-154
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    • 2016
  • The port incentive scheme currently implemented in various Korean ports is used as a marketing tool to increase price competitiveness. Typically, ports implement piecemeal imitation strategies to enhance their competitiveness, rather than a precisely designed system. A precise analysis of the effectiveness of a port's system and scheme redesign are lacking because budget allocation is done without input from customers and freight groups. This study models the incentives faced by ports using a linear programming model. We use the Gwangyang port as the base case. Our analysis of the Gwangyang port reveals that there are insufficient incentives implemented when a traditional qualitative analysis is used. We also identify any excess, deficiency, or absence of the incentive effect for each type of customer and freight group. We find the overall budget of the incentive scheme to be more rational when ports allocate funds to minimize port mileage, and allocate 61.77 percent and 38.23 percent of the budget on existing and new (or increased) cargo inventory, respectively. Future studies can build on our work by further considering basic inputs, and by adding a system to estimate the input data of our model to identify constraints and thus provide a more accurate incentive scheme.

A VE Incentive System for Construction Industry (건설VE 인센티브 제안)

  • Song, Yong-Chul;Song, Nak-Hyun;Lee, Chan-Sik
    • Proceedings of the Korean Institute Of Construction Engineering and Management
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    • 2007.11a
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    • pp.1019-1022
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    • 2007
  • Recent construction projects are becoming larger, more complex and higher rising. Accordingly, necessity of the VE is emphasized as more suitable for expense, function and quality. However, the VE is not functional because of difficulty of application process or of the methods in use in the field of construction. One of the alternative is to introduce the incentive system to activate the VE in the field of construction. By using the incentive system, employers can reduce the relevant project's prime cost and builders will maximize profit creation. In domestic case, they presented the systematic support policy 'Technical development compensation system' which is similar to the 1992 American's VE incentive system about builder's technical development effort but the result was not positive. This study investigates both domestic and other country's construction VE incentive system and reported problems in the construction VE incentive system to executives and construction VE experts. From this survey, conclusions were drawn about problems in the domestic construction VE incentive system's similarity system: 'Insufficiency of the construction VE incentive's article and standards', 'Insufficiency of the appraiser of the construction VE and of the full charge department' etc. I had interviews with the experts of the construction VE which were based on the above-mentioned problems and then presented 'Improvement of the construction VE's incentive system relevant law and system', 'Construction VE experts and construction formation' etc. for ways to bring acceptance of the construction VE in the construction industry.

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Effect of Incentives on Enhanced T/S Competitiveness in Busan Port (부산항 인센티브제의 환적경쟁력 강화 효과에 관한 실증연구)

  • Park, Ho-Chul
    • Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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    • v.45 no.3
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    • pp.117-129
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    • 2021
  • This study intends to verify the effectiveness of incentive schemes at Busan Port' aimed at promoting transshipment cargo. The current incentive schemes of Busan port intended to increase the T/S cargo volume have been disputed constantly. It is imperative, therefore, to restructure the system in accordance with the planned strategy. In this study, in order to ensure objectivity of the incentive schemes, all the parties (carriers, terminal operators and Port Authority) with a direct interest are answered and analyzed using the AHP methodology. Effectiveness is the top priority in the analysis of beneficiary validity of incentive schemes, when incentives are provided to Global overseas carriers compared with Global national carriers, IntraAsia carriers and Terminal operators. In the analysis of incentive schemes, direct cash support corresponding to the quantity of the T/S cargo had the highest effectiveness compared with exemption of port dues, cost compensation, port infrastructure support and subsidy for the service opening. The study results, therefore, reference the Port Authority when restructuring the schemes. This study has been conducted only focusing on the Busan port; however, the findings may have significant implications for overseas Port Authorities intending to implement incentive systems to promote cargo volumes similar to those at Busan port.

A Study of Incentive System Problems for Busan.Gwangyang Port (부산항.광양항 인센티브제도의 문제점)

  • Won, Yangyeon;Kim, Dogeun
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.29 no.1
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    • pp.23-45
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    • 2013
  • This paper aims to identify the problems of incentives and find a solution to them by empirically analyzing the port incentives and the development of cargo volume. The current method of paying performance incentives and cargo-increase incentives makes it is possible for shipping companies to get the maximum incentives just by regulating cargo volumes without increasing them. Since the processing volume of transshipment cargo of the Busan port is over the volume eligible for the maximum incentive determined by the tie-up of shipping companies, the transshipment cargo can decrease. The incentive of the Busan port based on the cargo record and increase does not affect the increase of transshipment cargo, only to suffer a loss, and thus a new incentive system is needed that does not allow shipping companies to regulate cargo volumes. Based on the result of this study, We have to apply the even-handed incentive rule which pays the incentive for the cargo volume of the pertinent year with the unit price per 1 TEU to avoid the chicken game among the ports.

A Study on Improvement of Korean Port Incentives (우리나라 항만 인센티브제도 개선방안 연구)

  • Yun, Kyong-Jun;Ahn, Seung-Bum
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.36 no.3
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    • pp.75-98
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    • 2020
  • This study explores the incentive system in Korean ports to become a global logistics hub in Asia or to be competitive among Korean ports as a regional hub. First, we identified the types of port incentives in Korea and in overseas ports. We selected potential incentives applicable to Korean ports and compared whether they were meaningful, efficient, and effective in the short and long term. We selected IPA (Importance-performance Analysis) as an analytical method and surveyed users and experts. The results show that it is necessary and effective to provide incentives for new shipping companies, both export and import shippers, while setting criteria for reasonable incentives. Factors needed for improvement included simplifying and calculating the incentive request process, incentives for terminal operators, and new incentives, in addition to existing incentives. Policy-making organizations will also need to collect feedback on institutional improvements and raise awareness among users. Key factors for improvement include providing incentives for existing shipping companies. In particular, in order to actively manage systematic and efficient policies, incentive criteria for existing shipping companies need to be reconsidered.

CEO Stock Incentive, Board of Directors, and the Performance of Chinese Corporations after the Stock Incentive Management Law in 2006 (주식인센티브 관리법 이후 중국 상장기업 CEO주식인센티브, 이사회, 기업성과의 관계)

  • Zhang, Rui-Zhi;Yoo, Jae-Wook
    • Management & Information Systems Review
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    • v.35 no.3
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    • pp.155-171
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    • 2016
  • Separation of management with ownership induces the agency problems between CEO and shareholders of Chinese firms. To solve this problem Chinese government has enforced the "stock incentive management law for stock listed companies" since 2006. However, it has not been clear that this law is beneficial to reduce the agency cost and thus to increase the performance of Chinese firms. This study aims to answer this question. It is specifically designed to explore the effects of CEO's stock incentive on the performance of Chinese firms. It also examines the moderating effects of the characteristics of the board of directors on this relationship. Using a multi-year sample (2008-2014), we found that CEO's stock incentive is positively related to firm's performance. We also found that the equity stakes of board members strengthens the positive relations between CEO's equity incentives and firms' performance. On the other hand, contrary to expectations, the independency of the board of directors does not significantly moderate the relationship between CEO's equity incentives and firms' performance. Based on the findings, this study provides valuable implication for theory and practice.

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Allocation Methods for Port Incentives at Gwangyang Port (항만 인센티브 배분방법 설계 - 광양항을 중심으로)

  • Sung, Souk-Kyung;Park, Byung-In
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.29 no.2
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    • pp.1-17
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    • 2013
  • This paper aims to review the fairness of carriers' incentive schemes at Gwangyang port in 2010 and to show the desirable incentive allocation rules using the proportional and egalitarian rules under cooperative game theory. The carriers' incentive schemes at Gwangyang port in 2010 did not meet the no-envy and the efficiency, and satisfy the symmetry axiom. According to the research findings, the equal surplus method satisfies the axioms of equity, efficiency, symmetry, and progressivity. However, the uniform losses method meets the axioms of equity, efficiency, symmetry, and regressivity. We use a single allocation criterion of the total throughput to show the regressivity and the symmetry principles into the incentive scheme instead of using multiple criteria such as total throughput, increased volume, and coastal volume. The uniform losses method based on the total throughput can distribute the incentive amount according to the intent of the incentive schemes. Hence, we need to establish a rationing system to allocate reasonably the total amount of different types of incentives, avoiding the temptation to adjust the volume shipped between the ports of carriers considering the efficiency of allocation.