• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.117
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• pp.161-189
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• 2011

This thesis aims to examine the discussions on communitarianism and liberalism, which was actively debated post-1990's in the West. The paper will focus on the concepts of morality and ethics of Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" in order to connect the discussions on communitarianism and liberalism to our society's political reality. Specifically, through the introduction of Hegel's point of view, this paper will shed new light co the concept of communitarianism, which was viewed from the perspective of political philosophy within the West post-1990's. Through "Philosophy of Law," Hegel imbues a critical and fundamental meaning to modern ethical-political order. For Hegel, Kant's acceptance of morality has a foundational and compositional meaning for the concepts of law and nation. This paper will discuss this topic within the boundaries of Hegel's morality and ethics and regard this as a chance to look back on our political situation with a regretful introspection. International and national reviewers tend to regard the various perspectives of Hegel's philosophy of law as inspirational. However, it seems that the fundamental introspection of why our reality must adhere to his philosophy is lacking. Based on this concern, the paper aims to examine Hegel's "Philosophy of Law" to apply his perspectives to our political reality for a fundamental self-evaluation.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.38
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• pp.97-128
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• 2013

Originally confucianism is closer to communitarianism than to individualism. The ideal of confucianism is to realize ethical community. Chu Hsi's theory of the Song dynasty reestablishes the ideal of ethical community and dignitaries(士大夫) take the job to realize it as their own vocation. There are many developed 'family clans and kinsfolk societies', 'local covenants and sacred storehouses' and 'private academies' in the Chosun dynasty as in the Song dynasty. These communities are three kinds of axial confucian community, which are both natural ascriptive groups and voluntary contract groups in nature. Communities of Chosun dynasty are to strengthen the solidarity through friendship and mutual help as well as to cultivate good customs in society. Also these traditional communities are managed by democratic procedures, as these are originally voluntary contract groups. On the other hand, traditional neo-confucian self-training theories like that individual personality should be harmony with general order, or one should pursuit his private interest according to fair principles are the process of sublimation private individual into public citizen.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.29
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• pp.231-253
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• 2010

Xiang-xiu(向秀) tried to find compromise between naturalness(自然) and Confucian ethical code(名敎), the individual consciousness and the group consciousness in the Wei-Jin(魏晋) dynasty. He made his views on the human nature through the revealing of desire and morality of human. Xinag-xiu considered that the human nature comes from the ultimate principle of the nature(自然之理), so it's possible to provide reasonable basis to the meaning of the 'desire' and 'morality'. Furthermore, the 'desire' is regarded as the driving force of human life through the reasonable cognition, at the same time he insisted that we should control our passions by sociality and the social norm. So in the view of Xiang-xiu, the human nature has two characteristics, such as the principal of the driving force of human life and the control of the base desires and the negative desires. It could be confirmed by his opinions about the following human's nature and sticking to our last in the his Zhuangzizhu( 莊子注). Through the perspective of the human nature, Xiang-xiu emphasized the unification of the unaffected human nature and morality(sociality), the desire and the social norm.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.33
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• pp.97-129
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• 2008

Sin-jeokdo (Hogye, 1574-1663) was a general of patriotic army who protected the region of Euseong at the time of Qing dynasty's invasion in 1627(Jungmyo) and 1636(Byongja). He was an prominent figure outside government as well as a faithful confucian who spent his life with reading and teaching junior scholars after disgraceful treaty in the year of Byongja. Hogye understood the neo-Confucianism in terms of the whole duty of men(綱常) and righteousness(義理) which was in the status of sole official academic subject and thought its practice only hinged upon the practice of filial piety and brotherly love together with loyalty and sincerity based on morals between sovereign and subject, father and son. He, therefore, emphasized that the righteousness only can be accomplished by dying of children and subjects for filial piety and fidelity respectively, at the time of commotion. This was his spirit of righteousness which repelled Japanese army in the Imjin War and he insisted on defeating Japanese army in accordance with this spirit. Hogye's practice of righteousness is grounded on the spirit of Chosun Confucianism which stressed actual practices of moral principles and duties. His practice of righteousness shows internalized cultural sinocentrism and moral-centric, ethic-centric characteristic of Chosun Confucianism. Moreover, the moral consciousness which was shown in Hogye's thought helped to keep Korean's pride and observe morality and it served itself as a basis of commencement of nationalistic military, religious movements afterwards.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.29-58
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• 2018

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy of right is a dialectic critique of liberalism. The dialectical criticism in this article does not mean the formal logical denial, but a return to self by self-negation. Thus, if Hegel's philosophy of right is a dialectical critique of liberalism, Hegel's philosophy of right will be critical of liberalism and at the same time, it will not reject liberalism, but rather have aspects of liberalism. The criticism of liberalism implies that individual freedoms and rights can not be realized subjectively through individual free acts, but are realized intersubjectively through social mediums. And this is also found in controversies among modern liberalists because modern liberalism requires the government's role and institutional arrangements for the realization of individual freedoms and rights. We can find the aspects of liberalism in Hegel's philosophy of right since Hegel's ethical life entails ultimately the concrete realization and extension of individual freedom and rights.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.146
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• pp.245-270
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• 2018

In this paper I study the theoretical characteristic of 'Tao' based on Confucianism. Tao, the most widely used keyword in the history of East Asian philosophy, has amassed ever-greater variety of meaning as time has passed and schools divided into more subdivided schools. Among the many attributes of Tao, the most important thing I think is that Tao has a dual structure between 'Tao' and 'Way'. Somewhere to be reached is called 'Tao', and the pathway that leads to the destination is called 'Way'. In other words, 'Tao' is existence itself, and 'Way' is type of existence. 'Tao' can be goal, and 'Way' can be process. 'Tao' has originality, continuance, and honesty as its own traits, while 'Way' has humanity, practice, and dailiness as its traits. After all, in a broad sense, Tao has a dual structure between the existence and the type of existence; 'Tao' and 'Way'. Many philosophers in Western society have also paid attention to this Tao trait. Among them, Heidegger gave his opinion that is closest to the East Asians. I want to explain why the human beings are the existence on the pathway through this paper. The existence(Tao) and the type of existence(Way) cannot be separated. So, there cannot be existence without type, and type of non-existence is useless. From this point of view, 'Tao' can be both existence and type of existence.

• Journal of Ethics
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• no.76
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• pp.305-329
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• 2010

The problem of freedom is inseparably related to human life. It makes this not to be regarded as a problem restricted to the professional domain of ethics. It suggests rather that the problem of freedom is intimately connected with the philosophical groundwork for discussing the future direction of society, culture and science, and its regulative idea, a philosophical discussion which comes up inevitably with various social, economic and political problems, and problems related to the spirit of law. In this view, when we want to explain the problem of freedom as a fundamental one in reference to future direction of humanities and to find out a solution to this, our research only in accordance with the approach of history of philosophy runs into difficulties. The reason is that the problem of freedom has nowness together with historicity. Finding this problem to be a present one in our concrete human life, we can discuss it more meaningful under the methodological frame changed and developed by philosophical reflections since the modern age. And here I think a culturalistic approach reinterpreting hermeneutic insight and pragmatistic context methodologically can provide a pertinent clue for a theoretical work to investigate the problem of freedom and to find a solution to that because this approach considers historicity and nowness. For this purpose analysing truth intersubjectively and understanding freedom critically, this article tries to reconstruct symbolic interpretation and the concept of self constructed in community of language and action as a cultural horizon of freedom.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.50
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• pp.99-137
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• 2024

This study explores the meaning of mutual life-giving within the concept of Non-self-deception (無自欺) in Daesoon Thought by comparing it with Kant's deontological ethics, Mill's utilitarianism, and Bergson's ethics. Kantian ethics defines moral actions through the categorical imperative, emphasizing the principle of acting according to universal laws. In contrast, Mill's utilitarianism views actions that produce good results as morally good, aiming for happiness and pleasure. Non-self-deception in Daesoon Thought is defined as "abandoning selfish desires and regaining one's conscience," fundamentally based on not engaging in falsehoods. Regarding self-deception, Kant and Mill's systems of ethical thought offer different solutions. Kant argues that self-deception cannot be made a universal law according to the categorical imperative, while Mill allows for self-deception, such as lying, if it promotes overall utility. While Non-self-deception is closer to Kantian ethics in principle, it emphasizes not only ethical forms like the categorical imperative but also ethical content such as human relations and mutual beneficence. Furthermore, non-self-deception complements the potential weaknesses of Kantian ethics, which may lean towards intellectualism or formalism, by considering that in certain situations, expedient measures or silence can be regarded as moral emotional actions embodying mutual beneficence. Moreover, this open characteristic of mutual life-giving ethics aligns with Bergson's concept of "open morality," which sublimates instinct and intellect into emotions of love like philanthropy. In this context, the practical ethics of non-self-deception can be understood as the foundation of a new moral principle embodying inclusive ideals such as the 'harmonious virtue of yin and yang' and the 'resolution of grievances for mutual life-giving.'

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.50
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• pp.139-178
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• 2013

본 논문은 조선시대의 장여헌(張旅軒)과 일본 에도(江戶) 시대의 이토 진사이(伊藤仁齋)의 사상, 특히 도(道)에 관한 견해를 중심으로 인간론과 도덕론을 고찰하여 그 둘의 사상적 특징을 밝히고자 하는 시도이다. 논의의 진행은 먼저 도(道)에 관한 여헌과 진사이의 이해를 주자학적 논의와의 원근 거리와 천도(天道) 인도(人道)와의 관계에서 살펴보았고, 다음으로 인간관에 있어서는 자기와 타인과의 관계를 중심으로 인간에 관한 이해를 논하였으며, 다음으로 마음과 경(敬), 서(恕)에 관한 두 사상가의 상반된 이해를 소개하면서 도덕론을 논하였다. 이하 요점을 추려보면 다음과 같다. 진사이는 도를 천지의 도와 단절된 인륜일용의 인간의 도로 한정하였고 인간에 대해서도 개적 존재를 사상시킨 관계적 존재에 초점을 두고 파악하였다. 그런 관점 위에서 개인 수양의 출발점이 되는 마음이나 경에 대해서도 큰 비중을 두지 않았고, 그것은 개인의 자율성보다는 외적인 규범에 보다 많은 신뢰를 두고 그것에 자신을 맞추어 가는 일종의 타율적인 관계(집단) 속의 도덕론의 전개로 나타나고 있음을 논하였다. 여헌은 도(道)를 천지만물과 사람 모두가 의거하는 총체적인 개념으로 파악하였고, 더 나아가 사람의 도가 능동적으로 천도와 지도를 구현하는 중심이라고 하였다. 이런 관점 위에서 여헌은 인간은 몸(형기(形氣))을 가진 개적 존재이지만 동시에 그 몸의 일부인 천지만물과 통하는 마음을 갖고 있다는 점에서 보편적인 존재라고 정의하며, 그 마음을 다스리는 경(敬)공부를 개인 수양의 기본임과 동시에 천지만물의 보편적 이치를 체득하는 근본적인 실천공부로 중시하였다. 이러한 여헌의 도와 인간에 대한 이해는 도덕의 실현에 있어서 자신이 중심이 되어 그것의 확장으로 모두가 하나가 되는 동심원적 파동의 도덕론으로 전개되고 있음을 고찰하였다.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.31
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• pp.7-32
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• 2011

Cheng Yi(程?, 1033~1107) understood that nature is full of "changes(易)". And he noted that human being as part of nature also exists only in a series of changes, i.e. birth, growth, extinction and death. All things including human being arise from the same principle, or "Heavenly Principle." Hence human being can fundamentally be one with all other beings, or nature. It is called "Unity of all things(萬物一體)" and "Unity of heaven and human(天人合一)." This philosophical perspective cannot be regarded as being unique to Cheng only; neo-Confucian predecessors called "the five masters of the Northern Song(北宋五子)" anticipated Cheng's vision already. Nevertheless, Cheng elaborated on the shared vision, revealing his philosophical uniqueness. Cheng maintains that only human being receives the principle in the unstained form, and thereby is capable of being one with nature. The one who realizes her/his potential to be one with nature is a sage(聖人); for Cheng, the order and pattern found in nature is nothing other than moral principle that human beings have to live up to and vice versa. Cheng's idea on the principle which human being receives from Heaven no doubt relates to Mencian notion of the innate goodness of human nature(性善); the innate goodness of human nature is no other than Heavenly Principle, and to become a sage depends on whether one can realize her/his potential - human nature, i.e. Heavenly Principle in her/himself. For Cheng, human nature tantamount to Heavenly Principle has no evil quality; all the evil in the world comes from imperfect "physical endowment(氣質)," or "capacity(才)" which is various from person to person, making various personalities. Accordingly, the task of moral cultivation in Cheng's theory can translate into the matter of rectification of one's physical endowment.