• Language and Information
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.21-40
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• 2002

This paper explores Discourse Rep-resentation Structures which can successfully describe the mental representations that discourse participants form when they hear so-called double access sentences. The syntactic, semantic and pragmatic characteristics of double access sentences are discussed. The analysis proposed in this paper, employing a modified version of the 'conditional beliefs' of Chung(1997), successfully explains the semantic and pragmatic characteristics of present or future tense in double access sentences as well as when and why the speaker should take or can be exempted from the responsibility for using present or future tense in double access sentences.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.59-96
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• 2018

${\bot}$It is often said that in a purely formal perspective, intuitionistic logic has no obvious advantage to deal with the liar-type paradoxes. In this paper, we will argue that the standard intuitionistic natural deduction systems are vulnerable to the liar-type paradoxes in the sense that the acceptance of the liar-type sentences results in inference to absurdity (${\perp}$). The result shows that the restriction of the Double Negation Elimination (DNE) fails to block the inference to ${\perp}$. It is, however, not the problem of the intuitionistic approaches to the liar-type paradoxes but the lack of expressive power of the standard intuitionistic natural deduction system. We introduce a meta-level negation, ⊬$_s$, for a given system S and a meta-level absurdity, ⋏, to the intuitionistic system. We shall show that in the system, the inference to ${\perp}$ is not given without the assumption that the system is complete. Moreover, we consider the Double Meta-Level Negation Elimination rules (DMNE) which implicitly assume the completeness of the system. Then, the restriction of DMNE can rule out the inference to ${\perp}$.